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Abstract
This thesis deals with the basic design and rigorous analysis of cryptographic schemes
and primitives, especially of authenticated encryption schemes, hash functions, and
password-hashing schemes.
In the last decade, security issues such as the PS3 jailbreak demonstrate that
common security notions are rather restrictive, and it seems that they do not model
the real world adequately. As a result, in the first part of this work, we introduce
a less restrictive security model that is closer to reality. In this model it turned out
that existing (on-line) authenticated encryption schemes cannot longer be considered
secure, i.e., they can guarantee neither data privacy nor data integrity. Therefore, we
present two novel authenticated encryption schemes, namely COFFE and McOE,
which are not only secure in the standard model but also reasonably secure in our
generalized security model, i.e., both preserve full data inegrity. In addition, McOE
preserves a resonable level of data privacy.
The second part of this thesis starts with proposing the hash function Twisterπ,
a revised version of the accepted SHA-3 candidate Twister. We not only fixed all
known security issues of Twister, but also increased the overall soundness of our
hash-function design.
Furthermore, we present some fundamental groundwork in the area of password-
hashing schemes. This research was mainly inspired by the medial omnipresence of
password-leakage incidences. We show that the password-hashing scheme scrypt is
vulnerable against cache-timing attacks due to the existence of a password-dependent
memory-access pattern. Finally, we introduce Catena the first password-hashing
scheme that is both memory-consuming and resistant against cache-timing attacks.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation widmet sich dem Design und der Analyse von kryptographischen
Primitiven und deren korrekte Anwendung. Im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit stehen da-
her das Design von beweisbar sichere Verfahren zur authentisierten Verschlu¨sselung,
kryptographische Hashfunktionen sowie Passwort-Hashing-Algorithmen.
In der Vergangenheit haben Sicherheitslu¨cken wie beispielsweise der PS3-Jailbreak
gezeigt, dass die ga¨ngigen Sicherheitsmodelle zu restriktiv sind und daher die Praxis
eher unangemessen widerspiegeln. Der erste Hauptteil dieser Arbeit bescha¨ftigt sich
daher mit der Einfu¨hrung eines realita¨tsna¨heren Sicherheitsmodelles unter dem prak-
tisch alle bestehenden On-line-Verfahren zur authentisierten Verschlu¨sselung als un-
sicher anzusehen sind. Weder Vertraulichkeit noch Integrita¨t der zu schu¨tzenden
Daten ko¨nnen noch sichergestellt werden. Aus diesem Grund stellen wir in dieser
Arbeit zwei neue On-line-Verfahren zur authentisierten Verschlu¨sselung vor. Bei
dem ersten handelt es sich um COFFE. Dieser Betriebsmodus fu¨r Hashfunktionen
schu¨tzt selbst in unserem realita¨tsna¨heren Sicherheitsmodelles noch die Integrita¨t der
verarbeiteten Daten. Das zweite ist McOE. Es ist ein a¨usserst robustes Verfahren
– basierend auf einer Blockchiffre – welches auch in dem neuen Modell vollsta¨ndige
Integrita¨t und angemessene Vertraulichkeit von den verarbeiteten Daten sicherstellt.
Im zweiten Hauptteil dieser Arbeit wird als Erstes die kryptographische Hashfunk-
tion Twisterπ vorgestellt. Hierbei handelt es sich um eine u¨berarbeitete Version
von Twister (akzeptierter SHA-3-Kandidat). Zum einem behebt Twisterπ alle
bekannten Sicherheitsprobleme der urspru¨nglichen Version, zum anderen bietet es im
Vergleich noch signifikant ho¨here Performance.
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Weiterhin werden neue Anforderungen fu¨r Sicherheit und Funktionalita¨t an Passwort-
Hashing-Verfahren vorgestellt. Im Zuge dessen wurde ein akademischer Cache-Timing-
Angriff auf das derzeit fu¨hrende Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren scrypt entwickelt, mit
dessen Hilfe sich ein sehr effizienten Filter fu¨r Passwortkandidaten konstruieren la¨sst.
Letzlich stellen wir in dieser Arbeit noch Catena vor. Hierbei handelt es sich um
das erste beweisbar sichere Passwort-Hashing-Verfahren welches sowohl speicherin-
tensiv als auch sicher gegen Cache-Timing-Angriffe ist.
vi
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Introduction
No amount of experimentation can
ever prove me right; a single
experiment can prove me wrong.
Albert Einstein
This thesis is dedicated to provable security wich is an essential part of modern cryp-
tography. It deals with the formalization and the rigorous analysis of cryptographic
schemes with the goal to turn an ancient art into a science.
Foundations of Provable Security. Provable security arised in the late 1970s and
was shaped in the 1980s. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman pioneered the public-key
cryptography when they presented a key-exchange protocol based on the foundations
of abstract mathematics [79]. This enabled them to justify their security claims by
mathematical arguments. Furthermore, they introduced the concept of a Trap-Door
One-Way Function (TDOWF), a function which can only be inverted when knowing
auxiliary (trap-door) information, i.e., the secret key. However, without giving an
example. Two years later, in 1978, Rivest et al. introduced the first instance of a
TDOWF: the famous RSA encryption scheme [202].
In 1982, Goldwasser and Micali showed that the concept of a TDOWF is not sound
since it allows to leak certain information about the encrypted plaintext such as its
parity [116]. Therefore, they introduced a superior security notion, probabilistic en-
cryption1. This revolutionary work paved the way for the theory of provable security.
1Ciphertext indistinguishability where a secure encryption scheme must not leak any information
about the plaintext, except its length.
1
1. Introduction
In 2012, the importance of their work was dignified by The Association for Computing
Machinery Advancing Computing as a Science & Profession with the Turing Award.
Polynomial Security. The security notions introduced by Goldwasser and Micali in
[116] have their roots in complexity theory and the intractability of well-known and
hard mathematical problems, e.g., the discrete logarithm problem or the integer fac-
torization problem. This allows cryptographers to apply polynomial-time reductions
to proof the security of an encryption scheme. However, such a reduction does not
make any statements about the choice of the security parameter, e.g., the key length.
Practitioner have to guess reasonable values. Therefore, polynomial security results
are rather unsatisfactory for practical applications, but very crucial for the field of
information-theoretic cryptography.
Concrete Security. In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway introduced the random oracle
model [24] where a cryptographic primitive is modeled as a random oracel, i.e., a
black box that always returns a random value that does not depend on its input. An
adversary, allowing to ask queries to such an oracle, is modeled as a computationally
unbounded algorithm which is only limited by the number of oracle queries. For the
first time, this approach allowed to observe, in some very limited way, the behavior
of an adversary during the attack by recording the queries to the oracle. Moreover,
it allowed to upper bound the concrete success probability of adversaries in breaking
encryption schemes.
Security proofs in the random oracle model are controversial. In 1998, Canetti et
al. presented a separation result [59]: “There exist signature and encryption schemes
which are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which ANY implementation
of the random oracle results in insecure schemes”. Nevertheless, concrete security
bounds derived from security proofs in this model are meaningful since they enable
practitioners to apply reasonable security parameters.
A much less controversial approach is the standard model where a cryptographic
primitive, e.g., a hash function or a block cipher, is replaced by a (keyed) pseudoran-
dom counterpart ,e.g., Pseudorandom Function (PRF) [114] or Pseudorandom Per-
mutation (PRP) [20], instead of an ideal one. An adversary A is modeled as a (time-
and) computationally bounded algorithm since an unbounded algorithm can apply
an exhaustive search on the key space to reveal the secret key. Like in the random
oracle model, A has black-box access to the cryptographic scheme Π. In the standard
model, the concrete security of a scheme against an adversary A is determined by
the success probability of A in breaking Π. A scheme is considered to be secure if the
2
maximum success probability over all adversaries that ask at most q oracle queries
is negligible. In 1994, Bellare et al. introduced concrete security in the standard
model by presenting a security notion for Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
[20]. In the following years, Bellare et al. introduced several standard-model security
notions for all common cryptographic schemes such as digital signatures [26], sym-
metric encryption [18], and authenticated encryption schemes [21]. Starting from the
last decade, it is costume to introduce a novel cryptographic scheme along with a
concrete security claim supported by a security proof given either in the standard or
in the stronger random oracle model.
Misuse Resistance. A provably secure cryptographic scheme provides rigorous secu-
rity properties, e.g., integrity and confidentiality, only under well-defined assumptions
against well-defined adversaries. Hence, the term secure is a placeholder for to protect
something against a well-defined class of adversaries. In contrast to cryptographers,
who exactly know what is meant by referring a cryptographic algorithm to be secure,
regular users implicitly assume that a secure scheme matches any of their security
requirements; without further investigation. This common misconception causes se-
rious security issues and is typical for the human nature. Thomas Gray pointed this
out by the felicitous idiom: “Where ignorance is bliss, ’tis folly to be wise”2. Hence,
re-education of all users is an enormous hard task for the cryptographic community.
This virtuality leads to the conclusion that cryptographers should take responsiblility
and should design their algorithms in a way that the naive usage of their algorithms
should not end up into big security disasters.
But, this is easier said than done. On the one hand, it is not the task of a digital
signature scheme to provide any kind of data privacy. On the other hand, a digital
signature scheme should not reveal the secret key when one of its security assumption
is violated once such as the ECDSA signature scheme [128]. It is a good starting
point to design robust algorithms that still offer some decent level of security, even
when a security assumption is occasionally violated. In this thesis we introduce
the first authenticated encryption scheme that provides full security under standard
assumptions, and still a reasonable level of security under much weaker assumptions.
Therefore, such an algorithm provides a second line of defense in a misuse scenario,
e.g., faulty random number generator.
2Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College
3
1. Introduction
Outline
In the first part of this work we introduce the concepts, security notions, and def-
initions needed to grasp the latter parts. Nevertheless, the experienced reader can
directly start with the second part of this thesis.
The essential elements of this work, namely Part II and Part III, are partitioned
as follows:
Part II: First, in Section 5 we introduce the concept of robust authenticated en-
cryption schemes. Then we show in Section 6 that published authenticated
encryption schemes are not robust, so far. In Section 7 we present COFFE,
a partially robust On-line Authenticated Encryption (OAE) scheme. Finally,
in Section 8 we introduce McOE, the first robust OAE scheme. Note that a
preliminary version of McOE was published before in [98, 100], and has been
thoroughly revised.
Part III: First, in Section 9 we present Twisterπ, a family of cryptographic hash
functions. It is a rigorously improved revision of the accepted SHA-3 can-
didate Twister [93]. Furthermore, in Section 10 we introduce Catena, a
novel memory-consuming password scrambling framework that is based on a
cryptographic hash function. Note that a preliminary version of Catena was
published before in [103] and the extended abstract will be appear at ASI-
ACRYPT’14 [104].
Further notable results of my studies that are not mentioned in this work can be
found in [1–4, 92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 101, 102]. A complete list of my publications, so far,
is given in Section 12.
4
Part I
Foundations
5

2
Hash Functions
Nothing in life is to be feared, it is
only to be understood. Now is the
time to understand more, so that we
may fear less.
Marie Curie
The concept of hash functions was introduced in the early 1950s [142], and became
vital in the field of modern cryptography. Informally, a hash function compresses an
input of arbitrary length to a fixed-length output which is usually referred to as a
hash value or message digest. Today, hash functions have many applications and are
virtually used everywhere in, e.g., encryption schemes [25], digital signature schemes
[26, 108], key derivation schemes [131, 191], key exchange protocols [109], and MACs
[17, 240]. Due to the wide range of use-cases, a good hash function should be both
memory- and time-efficient to be applicable on restricted devices, e.g., wireless sensor
nodes [244], trusted computing modules [228], and smart meters [172]. In this thesis
we borrow the notion of unkeyed hash function that was presented by Rogaway in
[207].
Definition 2.1 (Hash Function). An n-bit hash function H is a function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, n ∈ N+.
In practice, the notion arbitrary-length input is usually interpreted as messages up
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to 2r bits for a reasonable large r with r ≪ n/2. Cryptographic hash functions have
this limitation since their expected security properties cannot longer be guaranteed
if the length of an input exceeds 2n/2 bits [238]. Considering the fact that contem-
porary hash functions have an output length of 256 or 512 bits, this observation is
only of academical interest. Anyway, common hash functions follow an iterative ap-
proach to process a long message M ; they divide M into m blocks of n bits, i.e.,
M = M1, . . . ,Mm, where |Mi| = n for i = 1, . . . ,m. Individual message blocks are
processed iteratively by a compression function.
Definition 2.2 (Compression Function). A compression function F is a func-
tion
F : {0, 1}h × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}h, h, n ∈ N+,
where h denotes the size of the chaining value and n the size of the message block.
In the area of cryptography, the majority of iterative hash functions are based
on the Merkle-Damg˚ard design [72, 171] where the message blocks are sequentially
processed by a fixed-length compression function.
This approach obtained its popularity for being property-preserving, i.e., certain
properties of the hash function are inherit from the compression function. In the
light of the SHA-3 competition, the recent research has put a focus on designing
constructions that preserve as many properties of the compression function as possible
[36, 41].
2.1. Security Notions
2.1.1. Random Oracle Model
Ideally, a hash function should be indistinguishable from a random oracle [24] with
fixed output size. A random oracle is an abstract and ideal primitive that returns
a random bit string for each fresh input. Thus, the output of a random oracle is
independent of the input, except that repeated queries are always treated consistently,
i.e., the function property is always fulfilled. Furthermore, random oracles are atomic
building blocks, i.e., they cannot be decomposed. In the context of provable security,
random oracles are used for hiding implementation details, e.g., the insides of a
specific hash function like MD5 [200] or SHA-256 [184]. Random oracles become
handy when no known implementable function provides the mathematical properties
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required for the proof – or when it gets too tedious to formalize these. A security
proof of a cryptographic scheme using a random oracle as a component function is
said to be in the random oracle model. From a theoretical point of view, it is clear
that such a security proof is only a heuristic indication of the security of the scheme
when instantiated with a specific hash function.
In fact, many recent separation results [16, 60, 81, 115, 163, 179] illustrate that
various cryptographic schemes are secure in the random oracle model, but completely
insecure for any efficient instantiation. According to [144], all such counterexamples
are artificial and do not seem to attack any practically relevant scheme directly.
Nevertheless, a security proof in the random oracle model is at least an indication
for the soundness of the analyzed scheme.
2.1.2. Standard Model
Beside the random oracle model, the security of a hash function can also be de-
termined under the three much weaker standard model assumptions: (1) collision
resistance, (2) preimage resistance, and (3) 2nd-preimage resistance. The insecurity
of a cryptographic function is quantified by the success probability of an optimal
and resource-bounded adversary A. Depending on the setting, different notions of
success and different limitations of the resources apply for the adversary. Actually,
the standard model does only work for families of hash functions H where H is con-
sidered to be secure if there exists no efficient adversary A that violates at least
one out of the three standard assumptions for H
$
← H. The standard model is not
suitable to prove the security of a single n-bit hash function H such as SHA-256
[184] since here A is not restricted in the access to SHA-256. Suppose AX,Y with
some fixed X,Y ∈ {0, 1}2n is an adversary that just outputs the two 2n-bit values X
and Y . By the pigionhole principle, there must be two values X ′ and Y ′ such that
H(X ′) = H(Y ′) and thus, there exists an efficient adversary, namely AX′,Y ′ . In 2006,
Rogaway introduced a way to analyze the security of a single hash function in the
standard model by bringing human ignorance into equation [207] which means that
H is secure if there is no efficient algorithm which is known to man that violates at
least one out of the three standard assumptions. Thus, a hash function is considered
to be secure if mankind is unable to find an efficient adversary.
Next, we introduce a common hybrid model where an adversary has only restricted
access to a hash function.
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2.1.3. Hybrid Standard Model
In this thesis, any analyzed cryptographic system is an algorithm that uses (at least
one) other component function – the primitive – inside. As the adversary is assumed
to have no knowledge about the inner workings of these primitives – in the past
always formalized by assuming a secret key – these are accessed by the adversary
via an oracle interface. Such an oracle interface essentially formalizes the black-box
mode of operation of an adversary towards the scheme or primitive being attacked. It
provides a clearly defined set of exposed functions an adversary is able to send queries
to and can expect to get an answer from. We always assume that such an adversary
is an efficient algorithm, i.e., it has resource-bounded access to the compression or
hash function. Next, we give formal definitions of the mentioned standard model
assumptions.
Collision Resistance. A hash function H is collision resistant if it is hard to find two
distinct inputs that are mapped to the same output. More formally, the advantage
of an adversary A with oracle access to H is defined as follows:
Definition 2.3 (Collision Resistance). Let H be a hash function and A be an
adversary. Then, the collision advantage of A against H is given by
AdvcollH (A) = Pr
[
(M,M ′)← AH : H(M) = H(M ′) ∧M 6=M ′
]
.
Note that the adversary A is only limited by the number of queries to its oracles.
Thus, we write
AdvcollH (q, t) = max
A
{
AdvcollH (A)
}
,
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries that ask at most q oracle queries
and run in time at most t.
For an n-bit hash function, the number of message pairs with q messages is
(
q
2
)
=
q(q − 1)/2 ≈ q2/2. An ideal n-bit hash function returns random n-bit strings. Since
two of these are equal with probability 2−n, one needs 2n pairs before a collision can
be expected. More precisely with q = 2(n+1)/2 queries, the probability of a collision is
greater than 0.5, i.e., 1− 1e ≈ 0.63. This generic attack works for any hash function
and is commonly known as the birthday attack.
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Preimage Resistance. A hash function H is preimage resistant if, given a hash
value, it is hard to find a message that hashes to this value.
More formally, the advantage of an adversary A with oracle access to H is defined
as follows:
Definition 2.4 (Preimage Resistance). Let H be a hash function and A be an
adversary. Then, we define the preimage advantage of A against H as
AdvpreH (A) = Pr
[
Y
$
← {0, 1}n,M ← AH,Y : H(M) = Y
]
,
and
AdvpreH (q, t) = maxA
{
AdvpreH (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all preimage adversaries that ask at most q oracle
queries and run in time at most t.
A method for finding preimages that works for any hash function is the brute-force
attack, i.e., one hashes random messages until the hash value Y is reached. Assuming
that the output of the hash function is uniformly balanced, an adversary is expected
to try 2n distinct messages in order to be successful.
2nd-Preimage Resistance. A hash function H is 2nd-preimage resistant if, given a
hash value message pair (Y ,M) where Y = H(M), it is hard to find a fresh message
that also produces the same hash value. More formally, the advantage of an adversary
A with oracle access to H is defined as follows:
Definition 2.5 (2nd-Preimage Resistance). Let H be a hash function and A be
an adversary. Then, the 2nd-preimage advantage of A against H for a random mes-
sage M
$
← {0, 1}∗ is defined as
Adv2nd-preH (A) = Pr
[
Y ← H(M),M ′ ← AH,M,Y : H(M ′) = Y ∧M ′ 6=M
]
,
and
Adv2nd-preH (q, t) = maxA
{
Adv2nd-preH (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all 2nd-preimage adversaries that ask at most q
oracle queries and run in time at most t.
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2.2. Iterated Hash Functions
At CRYPTO’98, Damg˚ard [72] and Merkle [171] proposed – independently from
each other – an iterative approach to construct a collision resistant hash function
based on a fixed-input length compression function. This idea has influenced the
design of virtually all popular hash functions such as MD4 [201], MD5 [200], SHA-
0/1 [183, 185], and the SHA-2 family [184].
Definition 2.6 (Iterated Hash Function). Let F : {0, 1}h×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}h be
a compression function and let M = M1, . . . ,Mm be a message with Mi ∈ {0, 1}
n
for i = 1, . . . ,m. For a fixed inital value V0 ∈ {0, 1}
h, the iterated hash function
H : ({0, 1}n)∗ → {0, 1}h is defined as
Vi ← F(Vi−1,Mi), where Y = H(M) = Vm+1 with i = 1, . . . ,m
Usually, the message length in bits, denoted by |M |, is not necessarily a multiple
of n. Thus, a padding procedure is required. Note that it can also be applied if the
message length is already a multiple of n bits since it can serve as a pre-processing
function. This step is sometimes called message expansion. The most common
padding procedure is the so called 10∗-padding specified in [200].
Definition 2.7 (10∗-Padding). Suppose M is an ℓ-bit input message. Then,
b = n− (ℓ+ 1) (mod n)
denotes the number of appended zero bits. And the padded message is computed by
the following rule:
M ′ ←M || 1 || 0b,
where ’1’ denotes a single one-bit and ’0b’ denotes a sequence of b zero-bits.
There are numerous further padding rules known and the choice depends on the
application. More examples are given in [123, 213, 221].
Next, we discuss why the length of the message might also be included into the
padding as a security measure. Damg˚ard and Merkle independently provided theo-
rems in their papers that essentially show Theorem 2.8.
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Theorem 2.8 (Merkle-Damg˚ard Security [72, 171]). Suppose H is an iterated
hash function as in Definition 2.6 and F its underlying compression function. If the
initial chaining value V0 is fixed and if the padding procedure includes the message
length into the padding bits, it holds that
F is collision resistant =⇒ H is collision resistant.
Fixing the initial value and adding a representation of the message length, is
called MD-strengthening. Unfortunately, this result does not extend to pre- and 2nd-
preimage resistance. Recent results highlight some intrinsic limitations of theMerkle-
Damg˚ard approach. This includes being vulnerable to multi-collision attacks [129],
long 2nd-preimage attacks [135], and herding attacks [134]. Even though the prac-
tical relevance of these attacks is unclear, they highlight some security issues which
designers should take care of. Therefore, in recent years, research has put a focus on
designing constructions that preserve as many properties of the compression function
as possible, e.g., [9, 10, 23, 36, 41, 64, 91].
2.3. Generic Attacks
On one hand, the iterative structure of cryptographic hash functions makes it possible
to design time- and memory-efficient hash functions, and handling inputs of arbitrary
length. On the other hand, iterative modes of operation for compression functions
allow generic attacks; even for an ideal compression function, i.e., a random oracle.
Next, we give a brief introduction to generic attacks on hash functions.
Length-Extension Attacks. Given a Merkle-Damg˚ard -based hash function H. If
one can find a collision for two messagesM andM ’ withM 6=M ′, such that H(M) =
H(M ′), then, one can apply a length-extension attack. For any messageM ′′, one can
easily produce a collision for M || M ′′ and M ′||M ′′.
Multi-Collision Attacks. Joux [129] found that when iterative hash functions are
used, finding a set of 2k message all colliding on the same hash value (a 2k-multi-
collision) is as easy as finding k collisions for the hash function. After finding a colli-
sion in the compression function, one can find k of such collisions each starting from
the chaining value produced by the previous one-block collision. In other words, one
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has to find two distinct messages blocksMi andM
′
i with F(Vi−1,Mi) = F(Vi−1,M
′
i),
where F(·, ·) represents the compression function and Vi the chaining value. Then, it
is possible to construct 2k messages with the same hash value by choosing for block
i either the message block Mi or M
′
i . This attack can find 2
k-way internal multi-
collisions with a complexity of k · 2n/2 compression function calls. Joux also showed
that the concatenation of two different hash functions is not more secure against
collision attacks than the strongest one.
Herding Attacks. The herding attack [134] works as follows: An adversary A takes
2k chaining values which are fixed or randomly chosen. Then, A chooses O(2n/2−k/2)
message blocks. Next, A computes the output of the compression function for each
chaining value and each block. It is expected that for each chaining value there exists
another chaining value, such that both collide to the same value. Then, A stores the
message block that leads to such a collision in a table and repeats this process again
with the newly found chaining values. Once the adversary has only one chaining
value, it is used to compute the hash value to be published. To find a message whose
chaining value is among the 2k original values, the attacker has to perform O(2n−k)
operations. For such a message, the attacker can retrieve from the stored messages
the message blocks that would lead to the desired hash value. The time complexity
of this attack is about O(2n/2+k/2) operations for the first and O(2n−k) operations
for the second step.
Long 2nd-Preimage Attacks. Dean [74] found that fix points in the compression
function F , i.e., a point (Yi,Mi) ∈ {0, 1}
h×{0, 1}n with Yi = F(Yi,Mi), can be used
for a 2nd-preimage attack against long messages in time O(n·2n/2) and memory O(n·
2n/2). Kelsey and Schneier [135] extended this result and provided an attack to find a
2nd-preimage on aMerkle-Damg˚ard construction with MD-strengthening much faster
than the expected workload of O(2n). The complexity of the attack is determined by
the complexity of finding expandable messages. These are messages of varying sizes
such that all these messages collide internally for a given initial value. Expandable
messages can either be found using internal collisions or fix points between a single-
block message and a multi-block message. The complexity of the generic attack to
find a 2nd-preimage for a 2k-block message is about k · 2n/2+1 + 2n−k+1 compression
function calls.
Andreeva et al. [8] showed that a combination of the attacks from [74, 134, 135]
can be mounted on dithered hash functions, i.e., hash functions based on compression
functions with an additional input, which gives an adversary A more control on the
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2nd-preimage since A can choose about the first half of the message in an arbitrary
way. This attack can be done in time 2n/2+k/2+2 + 2n−k. Although, it is more
expensive than the attack of Kelsey and Schneier [135]. As a hash function designer,
one has to make the dithering as huge as possible, such that there are no small cycles.
Slide Attacks. Slide attacks are common in block-cipher cryptanalysis, but also
applicable to hash functions. Given a hash function H and two messages M and M ′,
where M is a prefix of M ′, one can find a slide pair of messages (M,M ′) such that
the last message block of the longer message M ′ performs only an additional blank
round, e.g., for sponge constructions. These two messages are then slide by one blank
round. This attack allows to recover the internal state of a slide pair of messages and
even to perform backward computation, as shown in [118].
Differential Attacks. The essential idea of differential attacks on hash functions [61],
as used to break MD5 [200] and SHA-0/1 [183, 185], is to exploit a high probability
input/output differential over some component of the hash function, e.g., in the form
of a ’perturb-and-correct’ strategy for the latter functions, exploiting high probability
linear/non-linear characteristics.
2.4. Keyed Hash Functions
In 1992, Tsudik introduced the concept of keyed hash functions which compress a
k-bit key and an input of arbitrary length to an output of fixed length [230]. From
start, they were used to generate MACs [17, 32, 223, 230].
Definition 2.9 (Keyed Hash Function). A keyed hash function H is a function
H : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, n, k ∈ N+.
Any hash function H(·) can be easily transformed into a keyed hash function H(·, ·)
by prepending the key to the message, i.e., H(K,M) = H(K || M) with K ∈ {0, 1}k
and M ∈ {0, 1}∗. In the following we use HK(M) and H(K,M) as synonymes.
Pseudorandom Function (PRF) Model. Let $n : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n be a random
oracle (random function). An n-bit keyed hash function HK , under a secret key
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K
$
← {0, 1}k, can be considered as secure, namely PRF-secure, if it is indistinguishable
from $. This security notion can be formalized by giving an adversary A either black-
box (oracle) access to HK (under a random key K) or to $. Suppose the choice is
based on the result of a fair coin toss. Let denote heads (’1’) the case where A gets
oracle access to the keyed hash function, and let denote tails (’0’) the case where A
gets oracle access to the random function. The task of A is to guess the result of the
coin toss after a certain amount of oracle queries. More formally, the advantage of A
can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.10 (PRF Advantage). Let $ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a random func-
tion and H : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a keyed hash function. Then, we define
the PRF advantage of an adversary A against H as
AdvPRFH (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K $← {0, 1}k : AH(K,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [A$(·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
and
AdvPRFH (q, t) = max
A
{
AdvPRFH (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all PRF adversaries that ask at most q oracle queries
and run in time at most t.
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An expert is a person who has made
all the mistakes that can be made in
a very narrow field.
Niels Bohr
A block cipher is a cryptographic primitive with a fixed input and output size, e.g.,
64 or 128 bit, to either encrypt or decrypt blocks of data. In modern cryptography,
block ciphers are the most common building blocks for symmetric encryption schemes.
They are omnipresent to provide confidentiality (data privacy) for both network
traffic [58, 78, 138, 196] and data storage [49, 89, 160]. Furthermore, several MACs
are based on block ciphers [19, 46, 125].
Definition 3.1 (Block Cipher). Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a family
of functions for some k, n ∈ N+. We denote E as a (k, n)-block cipher iff for any
K ∈ {0, 1}k it holds that
E(K, ·) is a permutation.
We denote the first input as key, the second input as message or plaintext, and the
output as ciphertext.
Mathematically, a (k, n)-block cipher E is a keyed family of permutations, i.e.,
a set of 2k n-bit permutations. Since for a fixed key K ∈ {0, 1}k, E(K, ·) is a
17
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Algorithm 1 Random Permutation P Implemented via Lazy Sampling
Init()
X ← ⊥
Y ← ⊥
D← ∅
R← ∅
P(M)
if X[M ] = ⊥ then
X[M ]
$
← {0, 1}n \R
Y [X[M ]]←M
D← D ∪ {X[M ]}
R← R ∪ {M}
end if
return C ← X[M ]
P−1(C)
if Y [C] = ⊥ then
Y [C]
$
← {0, 1}n \D
X[Y [C]]← C
D← D ∪ {C}
R← R ∪ {Y [C]}
end if
return M ← Y [C]
bijection, it has an inverse, namely E−1(K, ·), i.e., for all M ∈ {0, 1}n it holds
that M = E−1(K,E(K,M)). In this thesis we use E(K, ·) and EK(·) as synonyms.
Furthermore, we denote Block(k, n) as the set of all (k, n)-block ciphers. Note that
for each key, there exists 2n! n-bit permutations, and any permutation can be assigned
to a given key. Thus, we have a huge set of (2n!)2
k
possible block ciphers.
3.1. Security Notions
Ideal Cipher Model. Let Permn denote the family of all possible n-bit permuta-
tions. We denote by P
$
← Permn a random permutation. In the ideal cipher model
[48, 87, 139], the block cipher is modeled as a family of 2k random permutations P.
Let denote Pi the i-th element of P. Ideally, under a secret key a (k, n)-block cipher
should be computationally indistinguishable from P, i.e., it should not be possible to
distinguish EK from PK . Similar to the random oracle model, there are also separa-
tion results published for the ideal cipher model [44]. Hence, a cryptographic scheme
proven to be secure in the ideal cipher model does not preserve its security properties
– such as collision resistance – when instantiated with a real block cipher like the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [176] or the Data Encryption Standard (DES)
[186].
Pseudorandom Permutation (PRP) Model. Beside the artificial strong ideal cipher
model, the security of a block cipher can also be determined by the common notion
of a PRP. A family EK of n-bit permutations is called PRP when the input-output
behaviour of EK is computationally indistinguishable from that of an n-bit random
permutation. Next, we introduce the security notion of (strong) Indistinguishability
from a Pseudorandom Permutation (IND-PRP).
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Suppose, depending on the result of a coin toss, an adversary A has either black-
box access to a block cipher E ∈ Block(k, n) under a secret key K
$
← {0, 1}k,
or to an n-bit random permutation P which is independent from K. We denote
EK as IND-PRP-secure when A cannot distinguish between these two scenarios.
Let ‘1’ denote the real scenario where A has access to the block cipher and ‘0’ the
random scenario, where A has access to a random permutation, which is usually
implemented in an efficient way using the lazy-sampling technique (cf. Algorithm 1).
Then, Pr[K
$
← {0, 1}k : AEK(·),E
−1
K (·) ⇒ 1] denotes the success probability that A
guesses ‘1’ when in the real scenario. Then, the formal definition of the IND-PRP-
advantage is defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (IND-PRP-Advantage). Let E ∈ Block(k, n) be a block cipher
and P
$
← Permn a random permutation. Then, we define the IND-PRP advantage
of an adversary A as
AdvPRPE,E−1(A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K $← {0, 1}k : AEK(·),E−1K (·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [AP(·),P−1(·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
and
AdvPRPE,E−1(q, t) = maxA
{
AdvPRPE,E−1(A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all IND-PRP adversaries that run in time at most
t and ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption and decryption oracles.
PRP under Related-Key Attacks. In a related-key scenario we assume that an
adversary A has partial control over the secret key K
$
← {0, 1}k of a block cipher
E ∈ Block(k, n). Following the security notions of Lucks [154], the partial control
over the key is modeled as a key-transformation function ϕ : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}k. In this thesis we assume that ϕ(K, ·) is the XOR-operation. In contrast
to the IND-PRP security model, in the Pseudorandom Permutation under Related-
Key Attacks (PRP-RKA) model the adversary A has either access to the related-key
encryption oracle Eϕ(K,·)(·) or to a set of 2
k random permutations P ∈ Permkn,
where Permkn = Permn × . . .×Permn︸ ︷︷ ︸
2k times
. Depending on the setting, the first input is
either the key relation or an index that determines a specific random permutation,
and the second input is the plaintext. The PRP-RKA advantage is defined as follows:
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Definition 3.3 (PRP-RKA Advantage). Let E ∈ Block(k, n) be a block cipher
and let P
$
← Permkn be a family of random permutations. Let ϕ : {0, 1}
k×{0, 1}k →
{0, 1}k is a key transformation function, and K
$
← {0, 1}k. Then, we define the
PRP-RKA-advantage of an adversary A as
AdvPRP-RKAE,E−1 (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [AEϕ(K,·)(·),E−1ϕ(K,·)(·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [AP(·,·),P−1(·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
and
AdvPRP-RKAE,E−1 (q, t) = maxA
{
AdvPRP-RKAE (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all PRP-RKA adversaries that run in time at most
T and ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption and decryption oracles.
3.2. Tweakable Block Ciphers
The concept of tweakable block ciphers was introduced by Liskov et al. in [153]. The
design is based on a common block cipher, which is extended by a so called tweak. A
tweakable block cipher E˜ : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}u × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is defined as follows:
Definition 3.4 (Tweakable Block Cipher). Let E˜ : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}u×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n be a family of functions for some k, u, n ∈ N+. We denote E˜ as a tweakable
(k, u, n)-block cipher iff for any key tweak tuple (K,U) ∈ {0, 1}k × {0, 1}u it holds
that
E˜(K,U, ·) is a permutation.
We denote the first input as key, the second input as tweak and the third input as
message or plaintext, and the output as ciphertext.
We denote E˜−1K (U, ·) as the inverse of E˜K(U, ·), i.e., for all M ∈ {0, 1}
n it holds
that M = E˜−1K (U, E˜K(U,M)). Furthermore, we denote Block(k, u, n) as the set of
all tweakable (k, u, n)-block ciphers.
A tweakable block cipher E˜ ∈ Block(k, u, n) is considered to be secure if it is
computationally indistinguishable from a family of 2u random n-bit permutations.
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The formal definition of the IND-PRP advantage for tweakable block ciphers is similar
to Definition 3.3.
Definition 3.5 (IND-PRP Advantage). Let E˜ ∈ Block(k, u, n) be a tweakable
block cipher and let P
$
← Permkn be a family of random permutations. Suppose that
K
$
← {0, 1}k. Then, we define the IND-PRP advantage of an adversary A as
AdvIND-PRP
E˜,E˜−1
(A) =
∣∣∣Pr [AE˜K(·,·),E˜−1K (·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [AP(·,·),P−1(·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
and
AdvIND-PRP
E˜,E˜−1
(q, t) = max
A
{
AdvIND-PRP
E˜,E˜−1
(A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all IND-PRP adversaries that run in time at most
t and ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption and decryption oracles.
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Any sufficiently advanced technology
is indistinguishable from magic.
Arthur C. Clarke
A common requirement for cryptographic applications is to establish a secure channel
between a sender and a receiver – usually referred to as Alice and Bob – who share
a secret key. It may well be the case that sender and receiver represent the same
entity, e.g., the same person can first write sensitive data to an insecure storage,
and later read these data. Usually, a secure channel should provide data privacy
to prevent an eavesdropper from revealing any information about a message sent
from Alice to Bob, except its length. The cryptographic technique to ensure this
requierement is “encryption”. Sometimes, data authenticity/integrity is required,
i.e., an adversary should not be able to manipulate messages without being noticed.
This is cryptographically ensured by “authentication”. Nevertheless, most of the
time, users need both encryption and authentication: authenticated encryption (AE).
An authenticated encryption scheme is a special kind of an encryption scheme that
encrypts plaintext to authenticated ciphertexts.
Nonce. Goldwasser and Micali [117] formalized encryption schemes as stateful or
probabilistic: otherwise, the data privacy is lost. Rogaway [204, 206, 208] proposed a
unified point of view, by defining a cryptographic scheme as an always-deterministic
algorithm that takes a user-supplied state called nonce (a number used once). We
assume that an adversary is nonce-respecting when not stated otherwise. This type of
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adversary has full control over a nonce with the restriction to never choose the same
value twice. This limitation only holds for encryption queries. Thus, an adversary is
allowed to use a nonce multiple times when query the decryption oracle.
Deterministic Authenticated Encryption (DAE). In [209], Rogaway and Shrimp-
ton addressed authenticated encryption schemes which provide security against re-
peated nonces . Furthermore, the authors shaped the notion of misuse-resistance and
they proposed Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV) as a solution. SIV and related
schemes (Bivariate Tag Mixing (BTM) [126] and Hash Block Stealing (HBS) [127])
actually provide excellent security against nonce-reusing adversaries. Though, they
are inherently off-line, i.e., for encryption, one must either keep the entire plaintext
in memory, or read the plaintext twice. This renders such deterministic approaches
only practical for small messages.
On-line Authenticated Encryption (OAE). It is folklore that application program-
mers are used to process messages in an on-line manner. Hence, to seamlessly in-
tegrate authenticated encryption schemes into a typical software architecture, they
should be on-line, i.e., plaintexts and ciphertexts are split into conveniently-sized
blocks, and the i-th ciphertext block can be written before the (i + 1)-th plaintext
block has to be read. An AE scheme fulfilling the on-line requirement is referred to
as an OAE scheme.
4.1. Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
Schemes
An authenticated encryption scheme is a triple Π = (K, E ,D) of three algorithms.
1. The key-generation algorithm K takes no input and returns a randomly chosen
key K from the key space {0, 1}k.
2. The deterministic encryption algorithm
E : {0, 1}k × ({0, 1}n)∗ × ({0, 1}n)∗ → ({0, 1}n)∗ × {0, 1}r
maps a key-header-message tuple (K,H,M) to a ciphertext-tag-tuple (C, T )
3. The deterministic decryption algorithm
D : {0, 1}k × ({0, 1}n)∗ × ({0, 1}n)∗ → {({0, 1}n)∗,⊥}
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maps a header-ciphertext-tag-tuple (H,C, T ) either to the authentic plaintext,
if the input is valid, or returns ⊥.
Usually, AE schemes operate on n-bit blocks, where n is the block length of the
underlying primitive, e.g., a block cipher. This is reflected by the notion ({0, 1}n)∗
where M ∈ ({0, 1}n)m implies that the message M consists of m message blocks,
m−1 blocks of n-bit and a final message block Mm that can contain less then n-bits,
i.e., M =M1, · · · ,Mm with |Mi| = n and |Mm| ≤ n with i = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
It always holds that |M | ≤ |C| + |T | where C denotes the ciphertext and T the
(authentication) tag. Note that OAE schemes require a nonce N ∈ {0, 1}v. In our
notation N is a mandatory part of the header, whereas the optional part consists of
associated data or meta data of the plaintext, e.g., the TCP/IP header. Usually, for
the sake of simplification, the nonce size v matches the block size n of the underlying
primitive, e.g., a (k, n)-block cipher.
An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) scheme ensures pri-
vacy and integrity for the plaintext; in addition, it ensures the integrity of the header.
This renders those schemes useful in settings where the associated data of messages
is predictable.
4.2. Generic Composition
An AE scheme can be generated by combining a secure encryption scheme with a
secure MAC. Given two independent keys K and L, the common literature lists three
construction approaches for such a generic composition [22].
Encrypt-and-Mac. Encrypt the plaintext M and append a MAC of the plaintext to
the ciphertext: EK(M) || MACL(M). Variants of this method are used in the
transport layer of the SSH protocol [242].
Mac-then-Encrypt. Append a MAC of the plaintext to the plaintext and then en-
crypt them together. Here, the output is EK(M || MACL(M)). Variants of
this method are used in the TLS protocol version 1.0 and 1.1 [76, 77].
Encrypt-then-Mac. Encrypt the plaintext to get a ciphertext and append a MAC of
this ciphertext: EK(M) || MACL(EK(M)). Variants of this method are used
in the IPSec protocol [137].
Out of these, only the Encrypt-then-Mac scheme is free of weaknesses [22]. Note that
this approach can fail trivially by key management errors: suppose the receiver side
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only updates the authentication key, but not the encryption key. Then, Encrypt-
then-Mac will decrypt a ciphertext into “authentic” random garbage. Therefore, it is
less error-prone to use a dedicated authenticated encryption scheme and not a generic
composition.
4.3. Security Notions
Authenticated encryption schemes require security notions for both privacy and in-
tegrity. Notions and their relations were introduced for deterministic schemes in [210]
and for nonce-based schemes in [22, 27, 133, 204, 208]. In this thesis we adopt the
notion of Chosen-Ciphertext Attack 3 (CCA3) security suggested in [210]. Similar to
the security definition of IND-PRP (cf. Definition 3.2), a CCA3 adversary A has to
distinguish between the real world, where it has oracle access to EK(·, ·) and DK(·, ·, ·)
of an AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D), and the random world, where A has access to the
oracles $(·, ·) and ⊥(·, ·, ·). The random oracle $(·, ·) returns a string of random bits,
whereas ⊥(·, ·, ·) always returns ⊥. Note that the equation |$(H,M)| = |EK(H,M)|
holds for all header-plaintext tuple (H,M). For the sake of simplification, we assume
that an adversary never asks a query to which the corresponding answer is already
known.
Definition 4.1 (CCA3 Advantage). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an authenticated en-
cryption scheme as described in Section 4.1. The advantage of an adversary A in
breaking Π is defined as
AdvCCA3Π (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),DK(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [A$(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
and
AdvCCA3Π (q, ℓ, t) = max
A
{
AdvCCA3Π (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all nonce-respecting CCA3-adversaries that run in
time at most t, ask total maximum of q queries to the encryption and decryption
oracles, and whose total query length is at most ℓ blocks.
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It is easy to see that we can rewrite the term given in Definition 4.1 as
AdvCCA3Π (A) =∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),DK(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1] (4.1)
+ Pr
[
K ← K : AEK(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A$(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1
]∣∣∣ . (4.2)
One can interpret (4.1) as the advantage that an adversary has on the integrity of
the ciphertext and (4.2) as the advantage an adversary has on the privacy. We use
this decomposition as a motivational starting point to define ciphertext integrity and
what we mean by an Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA)
adversary against authenticated encryption schemes.
Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA). Let Π = (K, E ,D)
be an authenticated encryption scheme and A an IND-CPA adversary. The task of
A is to distinguish the real world, where it is given oracle access to EK(·, ·) under
a secret key K ∈ {0, 1}k, from the random world, where A has access to a random
oracle $(·, ·) which returns, consistent, random ciphertexts, as described earlier in this
section. If no such adversary A can perform significant better than random guessing,
then, Π protects the privacy of encrypted messages. The IND-CPA advantage is
defined as follows:
Definition 4.2 (IND-CPA Advantage). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an authenticated
encryption scheme as described in Section 4.1. Then, the IND-CPA advantage of a
nonce-respecting adversary A is defined as
AdvIND-CPAΠ (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [A$(·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
and
AdvIND-CPAΠ (q, ℓ, t) = max
A
{
AdvIND-CPAΠ (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all nonce-respecting IND-CPA-adversaries that run
in time at most t, ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption oracle, and
whose total query length is not more than ℓ blocks.
Integrity of Ciphertext (INT-CTXT). The security notion INT-CTXT is defined
by the game-playing approach [29], where the advantage of an adversary is measured
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Algorithm 2 INT-CTXT Game
Initialize()
K
$
← K
win← false
Q← ∅
Finalize()
return win
Encrypt(H,M)
(C, T )← EK(H,M)
Q ∪ {(H,C, T )}
return (C, T )
Verify(H,C,T )
M ← DK(H,C, T )
if ((H,C, T ) /∈ Q) ∧ (M 6= ⊥)
then
win← true
end if
return M
as the success probability of winning a (cryptographic) game G. Each game consists
of three functions: An initialization function Initialize(), a finalization function
Finalize(), and oracle functions. Any adversary A that is playing a game calls
the Initialize() function first. In the following, A then makes some queries to the
encrypt and decrypt oracles, and finally, A ends the game by invoking Finalize().
To A, every function of a game is a black box, i.e., it has no access to internal
variables. An adversary wins the game if and only if Finalize() returns true. We
denote Pr[AG ⇒ 1] as the probability that the adversary wins the Game G.
An AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) protects the ciphertext integrity against an adversary
A when it is not able to come up with a fresh authentic ciphertext tuple (H,C, T ),
i.e., DK(H,C, T ) 6= ⊥, where (H,C, T ) is not the result of a previous query of A.
The INT-CTXT advantage based on the the Game GINT-CTXT (cf. Algorithm 2)
is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.3 (INT-CTXT Advantage). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an authenticated
encryption scheme as introduced in Section 4.1, and let GINT-CTXT denote the game
from Algorithm 2. Then, the INT-CTXT advantage of a nonce-respecting adversary
A is defined as
AdvINT-CTXTΠ (A) = Pr
[
AGINT−CTXT ⇒ 1
]
,
and
AdvINT-CTXTΠ (q, ℓ, t) = max
A
{
AdvINT-CTXTΠ (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all nonce-respecting INT-CTXT-adversaries that
run in time at most t, ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption and
decryption oracles, and whose total query length is at most ℓ blocks.
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Upper-Bounding the CCA3 Advantage. Bellare and Namprempre showed in [22]
that an authenticated encryption scheme that is both IND-CPA- and INT-CTXT-
secure, is also CCA3-secure. This notable observation is formalized as follows:
Theorem 4.4 (CCA3 Advantage [22]). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an authenticated
encryption scheme as introduced in Section 4.1, and let A be a nonce-respecting
CCA3Π adversary that runs in time t, and makes q queries with a total length of at
most ℓ blocks. Then, there exists an IND-CPAΠ-adversary Ap and an INT-CTXTΠ
adversary Ac such that
AdvCCA3Π (A) ≤ Adv
IND-CPA
Π (Ap) +Adv
INT-CTXT
Π (Ac),
where both Ap and Ac run in time O(t) and make at most q queries.
Proof Sketch. By applying the triangle inequality on Definition 4.1, we haveAdvCCA3Π (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),DK(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [A$(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),DK(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [A$(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣
For a key K
$
← K, we design two adversaries Ap and Ac so that∣∣∣Pr [AEK(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [A$(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ AdvIND-CPAΠ (Ap)∣∣∣Pr [AEK(·,·),DK(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [AEK(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ AdvINT-CTXTΠ (Ac).
Ap: Adversary Ap runs A and answers A’s queries to the function Encrypt and
Decrypt by using its own Encrypt oracle or returning ⊥, respectively. Ap outputs
whatever A outputs.
Ac: Adversary Ac runs A, and answers A’s queries to the function Encrypt by
using its own Encrypt oracle. It submits A’s queries to the Decrypt oracle to its
own Verify oracle and, regardless of the response, returns ⊥. Note that the Verify
oracle sets win to true if and only if a fresh Decrypt query of Ac is valid. 
29
4. Authenticated Encryption Schemes
4.4. Game-Based Proofs
The majority of the upcoming proofs in this paper are based on common game-playing
arguments. In this thesis, all games are written in a language similar to L that was
introduced by Bellare and Rogaway in [28]. The basic concept of this proof technique
is called game hopping. It is a formalized way to transform a cryptographic scheme
into an ideal scheme, e.g., a random function by a series of minor modifications. We
denote G0, . . . , Gn as a series of games, where G0 denotes the initial game and Gn
the final game. As usual, our adversary A has only black-box access to any Game
Gi. Thus, the advantage of A to distinguish Game Gi from Game Gj is given by
Adv
Gj
Gi
(A) =
∣∣Pr [AGi ⇒ 1]− Pr [AGj ⇒ 1]∣∣ .
Game-playing proofs become handy when it is hard to compute AdvGnG0 (A) in a
straightforward manner. The difference between subsequent games Gi and Gi+1 is,
by construction, easy to compute. Finally, from the common triangle inequality, we
have Adv
Gi+2
Gi
(A) ≤ Adv
Gi+1
Gi
(A) +Adv
Gi+2
Gi+1
(A), and thus,
AdvGnG0 (A) ≤
n∑
i=1
AdvGiGi−1(A).
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Misusing Authenticated Encryption Schemes
You are never too old to set another
goal or to dream a new dream.
C. S. Lewis
During the past decade, many AE schemes were proposed – usually with a formal
proof of their respective CCA3 security. Up to now, CCA3 proofs used to rely on two
common assumptions: (1) nonce-respecting adversaries, and (2) secure underlying
primitives. While both aspects are well-understood in theory, they are hard to guar-
antee in practice. Thus, security issues were overlooked or ignored in various cases
and security applications were put at high risk. In this thesis we highlight two blind
spots in the established security definitions: nonce misuse and decryption misuse.
5.1. Nonce Misuse
The standard requirement for encryption schemes – authenticated or not – is to
prevent leakage of any information about the plaintext except for its length. A
stateless deterministic authenticated encryption scheme cannot fulfill this security
requirement since an adversary can easily detect, if a plaintext was encrypted multiple
times or not. Thus, the user must provide a fresh additional auxiliary input (called
nonce) for each encryption. We speak of a nonce misuse, if a nonce value is reused.
In theory, the concept of nonces is simple. In practice, it is challenging to ensure
that nonces never repeat. Flawed implementations of nonces are ubiquitous [51, 122,
146, 214, 239], but, apart from implementation failures, cases exist where software
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developers cannot always prevent nonce reuse. For example, a persistently stored
counter that is increased and written back each time a new nonce is needed may be
reset by a backup – usually after some previous data loss. Similarly, the internal
and persistent state of an application may be duplicated when a virtual machine is
cloned, etc.
Our analysis in Section 6.1 shows that almost all previously published OAE schemes
cannot longer ensure the privacy, integrity, or both for encrypted messages when
threatened by a nonce-ignoring adversary.
Ideally, an adversary that is given the encryption of two (equal-length) plaintexts
M1 andM2 cannot even decide ifM1 =M2 or not. When a nonce is used more than
once, deciding if M1 = M2 becomes easy. Deterministic encryption schemes, such
as SIV [209], ensure that they do not leak any other additional information about
plaintexts, even when exposed to a nonce-reusing adversary. In the case of on-line
encryption, where the i-th ciphertext block is independend of all message blocks Mj
with j > i, it is unavoidably to leak information beyond M1 = M2. The adversary
can compare any pair of ciphertexts for their Longest Common Prefix (LCP), and
then derive the longest common prefix of their corresponding plaintexts. We propose
to call an (on-line) AE scheme misuse resistant if the only information an adversary
can obtain from ciphertexts are their lengths, and the LCP of its plaintexts. In the
following we first formally define the length of the LCP.
Definition 5.1 (Length of the Longest Common Prefix (LLCP)). Let
M,M ′ ∈ ({0, 1}n)∗ denote two messages. Then, we define the length of the longest
common n-prefix of M and M ′ as
LLCPn(M,M
′) = max
i
{
M1 =M
′
1, . . . ,Mi =M
′
i
}
.
For a non-empty set Q of elements of ({0, 1}n)∗, we define
LLCPn(M,Q) = max
X∈Q
{LLCPn(M,X)} .
On-line Permutation (OPerm). We aim for larger permutations that not only per-
mute single blocks but can handle messages of multiple blocks. Such a permutation,
from {0, 1}na to {0, 1}na for a > 1, is (n-)on-line if the i-th block of the output is
completely determined by the first i blocks of the input. Let OPermn denote the set
32
5.1. Nonce Misuse
Algorithm 3 Random On-Line Permutation Implemented via Lazy Sampling
Init()
XI ← ⊥
YI ← ⊥
DI ← ∅
RI ← ∅
P(M)
for i← 1, . . . , |M |/n do
I ←M1, . . . ,Mi−1
Z ← XI [Mi]
if Z = ⊥ then
Z
$
← {0, 1}n \DI
XI [Mi]← Z
YI [Z]←Mi
RI ← RI ∪ {Z}
DI ← DI ∪ {Mi}
end if
Ci ← Z
end for
return (C1, . . . , C|M |/n)
P−1(M)
for i← 1, . . . , |C|/n do
I ← C1, . . . , Ci−1
Z ← YI [Ci]
if Z = ⊥ then
Z
$
← {0, 1}n \RI
YI [Ci]← Z
XI [Z]← Ci
DI ← DI ∪ {Z}
RI ← RI ∪ {Ci}
end if
Mi ← Z
end for
return (M1, . . . ,M|C|/n)
of all on-line permutations from ({0, 1}n)∗ to ({0, 1}n)∗. It is easy to extend the def-
inition with a state space {0, 1}v. Let OPermvn denote the set of all functions from
{0, 1}v × ({0, 1}n)∗ → ({0, 1}n)∗. Then, for each G ∈ OPermvn and N ∈ {0, 1}
v,
the function G(N, ·) is an (n-)on-line permutation. We define an On-line Pseudo-
random Permutation (OPRP) as a family of n∗-bit on-line permutations with the
property that the input-output behaviour of a randomly chosen member of this fam-
ily is computationally indistinguishable from a set of 2v n∗-bit random permutations
P(·, ·)
$
← OPermvn. An efficient lazy-sampling implementation of a random on-line
permutation is given in Algorithm 3. Note that in the first iteration the prefix I is
always set to the empty string ǫ since neither M0 nor C0 exists.
Since AE schemes do not only output ciphertexts but also authentication tags,
our encryption oracle has to simulate the computation of an authentication tag by
returning a random bitstring that matches the length of the tag. Thus, our encryption
oracle OP processes a header-message tuple (H,M) as follows:
1. Compute C ← P(H,M).
2. Compute T
$
← {0, 1}r.
3. Append some random bits to C if necessary so that the equation |EK(H,M)| =
|C|+ |T | always holds.
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4. Finally, output the ciphertext-tag tuple (C, T ).
To achieve length preserving encryption, i.e., |M | = |C| for all messagesM ∈ {0, 1}∗,
OAE schemes usually have a special treatment for the last message block, e.g., cipher-
text stealing where the final message block Mm is padded with the ciphertext block
Cm−1. Thus, it is quite easy to distinguish such an OAE scheme from the encryption
oracle OP. At first, we can send any encryption query (H,M) withM =M1, . . . ,Mm
to the encryption oracle. Then we query (H,M ′) where M ′ = M || Z for any
Z ∈ {0, 1}n. Let (C, T ) denote the output of our first query and (C ′, T ′) the output
of the second query. Then we output 1 if Cm 6= C
′
m, and 0 otherwise. Thus, we have
to update the definition of the random encryption oracle OP by an intermediate Step
1b: Replace the final ciphertext block (Cm) by a random bitstring when EK treats
the final message block special.
Definition 5.2 (IND-OPRP Advantage). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an OAE scheme,
and let P
$
← OPermn+n . Then, we define the IND-OPRP advantage of a nonce-
ignoring adversary A as
AdvIND-OPRPΠ (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [AOP(·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
and
AdvIND-OPRPΠ (q, ℓ, t) = max
A
{
AdvIND-OPRPΠ (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all IND-OPRP adversaries that run in time at most
t, ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption oracles, and whose total query
length is at most ℓ blocks.
In the spirit of the CCA3 security definition (cf. Definition 4.1), we introduce the
notion of On-line Chosen-Ciphertext Attack 3 (OCCA3) security.
Definition 5.3 (OCCA3 Advantage). Suppose Π = (K, E ,D) is an OAE scheme,
and let P
$
← OPermn be a random on-line permutation. Then, we define the OCCA3
advantage of a nonce-ignoring adversary A as
AdvOCCA3Π (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),DK(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [AOP(·,·),⊥(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
and
AdvCCA3Π (q, ℓ, t) = max
A
{
AdvCCA3Π (A)
}
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as the maximum advantage over all nonce-ignoring OCCA3 adversaries that run in
time at most t, ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption and decryption
oracles, and whose total query length is at most ℓ blocks.
Using similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.4, one can show that for any
(q, ℓ, t)-bounded adversary A, there exists a (q, ℓ, O(t))-bounded Ap such that∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),⊥(·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [AOP (·,·),⊥(·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ AdvIND-OPRPΠ (A).
Corollary 5.4 (Bound for the OCCA3 Advantage). Suppose Π = (K, E ,D) is
an OAE scheme. Then, it holds that
AdvOCCA3Π (q, ℓ, t) ≤ Adv
IND-OPRP
Π (q, ℓ, t) +Adv
INT-CTXT
Π (q, ℓ, t).
5.2. Decryption Misuse
The decryption algorithm of an authenticated encryption scheme either outputs a
plaintext, or the bot symbol ⊥, depending on whether a ciphertext is authentic or
not. A decryption misuse describes the event that information about the would-be
plaintext of an invalid ciphertext leaks. An adversary might use this leaked informa-
tion to break the privacy (or integrity) of an AE scheme. A generic way to get rid of
this problem is the Decrypt-Then-Mask approach by Fouque et al. [105], where the
would-be plaintext is blinded after decryption by XORing it with a pseudorandom
sequence of bits generated by a Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG). After
successful authentication, the blinding is removed. Unfortunately, this technique is
not applicable in low-end environments since required temporary storage for the de-
crypted data may just not exist. In high-speed environments, e.g., optical networks,
the increased latency for the waiting period that is required until the plaintext au-
thenticity has been established may be prohibitive.
We strive for an authenticated encryption scheme where any change to a valid
ciphertext causes its entire post-decryption plaintext to be pseudorandom. Such a
scheme is clearly decryption-misuse resistant since the decryption of a manipulated
ciphertext results in uncontrollable random noise. Unfortunately, this strong defini-
tion of decryption-misuse resistance and on-line encryption are mutually exclusive:
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If an adversary manipulates the i-th block of a ciphertext, an OAE scheme leaves
the previous (i − 1) blocks unchanged. Therefore, we will introduce two flavours
of decryption-misuse resistance, one for deterministic AE schemes and one for OAE
schemes.
Indistinguishability under Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA). For determin-
istic authenticated encryption schemes, we can adapt the CCA3 notion (see Defini-
tion 4.1) by slightly modifying the behavior of the decryption oracle. Let D̂ denote
the faulty version of the decrypt and verify algorithm D, i.e., D̂ omits the verifi-
cation and always returns the decryption for authentic as well as for unauthentic
ciphertexts. Thus, in the decryption-misuse setting, an adversary has to distinguish
(EK , D̂K) with K ← K from two independent random oracles ($
E , $D). Note that
the equation |EK(H,M)| = |$
E(H,M)| holds for header-message tuple (H,M) and
|D̂K(H,C, T )| = |$
D(H,C, T )| holds for all header-ciphertext-tag tuples (H,C, T ).
Furthermore, we assume that an adversary never asks a query for which the cor-
responding answer is already known. Then, we define the IND-CCA advantage as
follows:
Definition 5.5 (IND-CCA Advantage). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a determinisitc
AE scheme, and let the faulty decryption oracle D̂ be defined as above. Then, we
define the IND-CCA advantage of a nonce-respecting adversary A in breaking Π
with K ← K as
AdvIND-CCAΠ (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [AEK(·,·),D̂K(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [A$E (·,·),$D(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣
and
AdvIND-CCAΠ (q, ℓ, t) = max
A
{
AdvIND-CCAΠ (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all nonce-respecting IND-CCA adversaries that run
in time at most t, ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption and decryption
oracles, and whose total query length is at most ℓ blocks.
The following Lemma discloses the relation between the IND-CPA and the IND-CCA
security notions.
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Lemma 5.6 (IND-CCA =⇒ IND-CPA). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a deterministic
AE scheme, and let A be an IND-CPA adversary that runs in time t, and makes
q queries with a total length of at most ℓ blocks. Then, there exists an IND-CCA
adversary A′ such that
AdvIND-CPAΠ (A) ≤ Adv
IND-CCA
Π (A
′).
Proof. The adversary A′ runs A and answers A’s queries to its encryption oracle.
Furthermore, A′ outputs whatever A outputs. 
Indistinguishability under On-Line Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (IND-OCCA). We
can adapt the IND-CCA notion by replacing the random oracle for decryption ($D)
by a random permutation-based oracle ÔP with P
$
← OPermn+n . The construction
of this new oracle is quite similar to the construction of the OPerm-based encryp-
tion oracle OP from Section 5.1. Thus, ÔP processes a header-ciphertext-tag tuple
(H,C, T ) as follows: (1) It computes the plaintext M ← P(H,C) and if necessary,
replaces the final message block with random bits. (2) It appends random bits to
M if necessary, so that the equation |D̂K(H,C, T )| = |M | always holds, and finally,
outputs M .
Definition 5.7 (IND-OCCA Advantage). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an OAE scheme.
Then, we define for P
$
← OPermn+n the IND-OPRP advantage of a nonce-respecting
adversary A as
AdvIND-OCCAΠ (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),D̂(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [A$(·,·),ÔP(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
and
AdvIND-OCCAΠ (q, ℓ, t) = max
A
{
AdvIND-OCCAΠ (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all IND-OCCA adversaries that run in time at most
t, ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption and decryption oracles, and
whose total query length is at most ℓ blocks.
Remark. In 2014, Andreeva et al. introduced the notion of integrity of unverified
plaintext release INT-RUP [6]. In their model, an adversary A has access to an AE
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scheme Π = (K, E ,D,V) with separate decryption and verification algorithms D and
V , respectively. A wins if it can forge. Furthermore, the authors also introduced the
notion of plaintext awareness PA, where an adversary has to distinguish between the
real and a simulated world, where the decryption oracle is replaced by a simulator S
that has no access to the secret key. In addition, Andreeva et al. propose two different
notion of plaintext awareness, named PA1 and PA2. Both differ in the fact that the
simulator has aceess to the query history of EK in the former notion. Note that PA2
security implies PA1 security since every PA2-simulator is also a PA1-simulator.
We want to emphasize that despite the close relations of our work to that by [6],
both are results of completely independent efforts. Analyzing the relations among our
and their notions and unifying them is still an open research topic.
5.3. Robustness
This section concludes this chapter by answering the question whether an authenti-
cated encryption scheme in this thesis is considered robust or not.
Deterministic Authenticated Encryption Schemes. It is not hard to tell if a de-
terministic AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) is robust or not. It is robust iff it is CCA3-
secure in the nonce-respecting and nonce-misuse setting, and IND-CCA-secure in
the decryption-misuse setting. The following corollary upper bounds the Nonce- and
Decryption-Misuse Attack (NDMA) advantage of a nonce-ignoring adversary A. It
can be derived from Theorem 4.4, which tells us that IND-CPA plus INT-CTXT se-
curity implies CCA3 security, and Lemma 5.6, which states that IND-CCA security
implies IND-CPA security. Thus, NDMA security implies robustness.
Corollary 5.8 (NDMA Advantage). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a deterministic AE
scheme. Let A be a nonce-ignoring NDMA adversary that runs in time t, and asks
at most q queries with a total length of at most ℓ blocks. Then, there exists a nonce-
ignoring IND-CCA adversary Ap and a nonce-ignoring INT-CTXT adversary Ac
such that
AdvNDMAΠ (A) ≤ Adv
IND-CCA
Π (Ap) +Adv
INT-CTXT
Π (Ac),
where both Ap and Ac run in time O(t) and make at most q queries with a total
length of at most ℓ blocks.
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On-Line Authenticated Encryption Schemes. We denote an OAE scheme Π =
(K, E ,D) robust iff it is (1) CCA3-secure in the nonce-respecting setting, (2) OCCA3-
secure in the nonce-misuse setting, and (3) IND-OCCA-secure in the decryption-
misuse setting. In the following we introduce the definition of an Indistinguishability
under On-Line Chosen-Ciphertext Attack 2 (IND-OCCA2) advantage, which is a
generalisation of the IND-OCCA advantage by replacing the nonce-respecting adver-
sary with a nonce-ignoring adversary. It is basically the same as the generalisation of
the IND-CPA advantage by introducing the IND-OPRP advantage. For the follow-
ing definition, we borrow the notion of the encryption oracle OP and the decryption
oracle D̂ from the Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
Definition 5.9 (IND-OCCA2 Advantage). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an OAE
scheme. Then, we define for P
$
← OPermn+n the IND-OCCA2 advantage of a
nonce-ignoring adversary A as
AdvIND-OCCA2Π (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K ← K : AEK(·,·),D̂(·,·,·) ⇒ 1]− Pr [AOP (·,·),ÔP (·,·,·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
and
AdvIND-OCCA2Π (q, ℓ, t) = max
A
{
AdvIND-OCCA2Π (A)
}
as the maximum advantage over all IND-OCCA2 adversaries that run in time at
most t, ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption and decryption oracles,
and whose total query length is at most ℓ blocks.
It is easy to see that IND-OCCA2 securtiy implies IND-OPRP security by using
similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 5.6. Therefore, the notion of IND-OCCA2
covers nonce-misuse restricted to data privacy. Now, we put all bits and pieces of this
Chapter together and unite them to the following definition of the On-line Nonce-
and Decryption-Misuse Attack (ONDMA) advantage:
Definition 5.10 (ONDMA Advantage). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an OAE scheme.
Then, we define the ONDMA advantage of a nonce-ignoring adversary A as
AdvONDMAΠ (A) = Adv
IND-OCCA2
Π (A) +Adv
INT-CTXT
Π (A),
and
AdvONDMAΠ (q, ℓ, t) = max
A
{
AdvONDMAΠ (A)
}
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as the maximum advantage over all ONDMA adversaries that run in time at most
t, ask a total maximum of q queries to the encryption and decryption oracles, and
whose total query length is at most ℓ blocks.
Note that any random OPerm which is only queried once cannot be distinguished
from a random function since it is impossible to exploit the common-prefix charac-
teristic of an on-line permutation. Thus, for any nonce-respecting adversary, it is
impossible to distinguish the IND-CPA from the IND-OPRP setting. This implies
that we can call an ONDMA-secure OAE scheme robust.
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6
Robustness of Authenticated Encryption Schemes
To invent, you need a good
imagination and a pile of junk.
Thomas A. Edison
6.1. Nonce-Misuse Resistance
In this section we analyze the nonce-misuse resistance of existing OAE schemes. Note
that none of them claims nonce-misuse resistance, and efficient misuse attack does
not automatically invalidate the security of those schemes. Nevertheless, ensuring
that an implemented authenticated encryption scheme is resistant against misuse
attacks is a difficult task for implementors, especially when the software is running
in environments like inside a virtual machine.
A summary of our analysis including a brief discussion is given at the end of this
chapter.
6.1.1. Generic Attacks
In the following we introduce two generic attack patterns on which the majority of
the nonce-misuse attacks are based on.
Repeated-Keystream Attack Pattern. Assume that the encryption routine E of
an on-line authenticated encryption scheme Π = (K, E ,D) generates a keystream
S = FK(N) of length |M |, i.e., |S| = |M |, depending on a secret key K and a nonce
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N . The ciphertext of a message M is typically computed by C = S ⊕M , where S is
generated by applying a block cipher in counter mode [30, 147, 164]. Assume that A
is a nonce-ignoring IND-OPRP adversary, with access to an encryption oracle, that
tries to distinguish real from random by comparing the difference of two single-block
messages with that of their ciphertexts. It easy to see that A’s advantage is almost
1− 2−n. A formal definition of A is given in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Repeated-Keystream Adversary
(C, T )← O(M,N) { first encryption query with (N,M)
$
← {0, 1}v × {0, 1}n) }
(C ′, T ′)← O(M ′, N) { second encryption query with (M ′
$
← {0, 1}n \M) }
return (M ⊕M ′ = C ⊕ C ′)
Linear-Tag Attack Pattern. Common stateful authenticated encryption schemes
such as Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [164] or Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) [85],
apply the Encrypt-then-Mac paradigm (cf. Section 4.2), i.e., they compute a tag T
by:
T = FK(N)⊕GK(M),
where N is the nonce, M is the plaintext, FK is a key-dependent function and GK
is a key-dependent permutation with C = GK(M). Suppose Π = (K, E ,D) is such a
stateful scheme. This enables an efficient nonce-ignoring adversary A to mount an
INT-CTXT attack with an advantage of 1 by solving a simple linear equation system.
A formal definition of A is given in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Linear-Tag Adversary
(C, T ) ← E(N,M) { first encryption query with (N,M)
$
← {0, 1}v × {0, 1}n) }
(C ′, T ′) ← E(N ′,M ′) { second encryption query with (N ′ 6= N) ∧ (M ′ 6=M) }
(C ′′, T ′′)← E(N,M ′) { third encryption query with T ′′ = FK(N)⊕GK(M
′) }
return D(N ′, C, T ⊕ T ′ ⊕ T ′′) { forgery since T ⊕ T ′ ⊕ T ′′ = FK(N
′)⊕GK(M) }
6.1.2. Misuse Attacks against Previously Published Authenticated
Encryption Schemes
CWC, GCM, CCM, EAX, and CHM. Usually, common two-pass OAE schemes,
Carter–Wegman Counter (CWC) [147], GCM [164], CCM [85], EAX [30], and CENC
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with Hash-based MAC (CHM) [124], use the Counter (CTR) mode as their un-
derlying encryption operation [30, 85, 124, 164]. These schemes are vulnerable to
repeated-keystream attacks. Four of them, CHM, CWC, GCM, and EAX, are de-
signed according to the Encrypt-then-Mac paradigm, and are thus vulnerable to the
linear-tag attacks. The designers of CCM follow the Mac-then-Encrypt approach,
which seems to defend against linear-tag attacks. Though, forgery attacks against
CCM were presented in [106].
RPC. Related Plaintext Chaining (RPC) [55] combines two coommen modes of
operations: CTR and Electronic Codebook (ECB). Given an n-bit block cipher E
under a key K and a v-bit nonce N , RPC takes an (n − v)-bit plaintext block Mi
and computes the ciphertext block
Ci ← EK(Mi || (N + i) mod 2
v).
Authentication is performed locally for each ciphertext block: During decryption,
RPC computes (Mi || Xi) = E
−1
K (Ci) and accepts Mi as authentic iff
Xi = (N + i) mod 2
v.
In the nonce-misuse setting, the same sequence of counter values is used for different
messages. This makes it easy to attack the privacy – especially when encrypting
messages of m ·(n−v)-bit blocks. Then, RPC degrades intom independent electronic
code books.
More precisely, any adversary that obtains two authentic m-block ciphertexts,
(C01 , . . . , C
0
m) and (C
1
1 , . . . , C
1
m) with the same nonce N , can forge 2
m new authentic
ciphertexs (C
σ(1)
1 , . . . , C
σ(m)
m ) with σ(i) ∈ {0, 1} since authenticity is verified locally
for each C
σ(i)
i .
CCFB. Similar to RPC, the Counter-CipherFeedback (CCFB) mode [156] is a com-
bination of CTR and Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode. Given an (n − a)-bit nonce N
and (n− a)-bit plaintext blocks M1 . . . ,Mm CCFB works as follows:
Initial Step: C0 ← N
Encryption: For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: (Zi || Ti)← EK(Ci−1 || i), Ci ←Mi ⊕ Zi
Authentication: (∗, Tm+1)← EK(Cm || m+ 2), T ←
m+1⊕
1
Ti
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Note that the first ciphertext block C1 is essentially the plain encryption of M1 in
CTR Mode. Thus, a variant of the repeated-keystream attack (cf. Algorithm 4) is
also applicable to CCFB. Moreover, the following variant of the linear-tag attack
pattern (cf. Algorithm 5) applies to CCFB:
1. Encrypt the plaintext M1 under N to (C1,T ).
2. Encrypt the plaintext M ′1 6=M1 under N
′ 6= N to (C ′1, T
′).
3. SetM ′′1 ←M
′
1⊕C
′
1⊕C1. EncryptM
′′
1 under N
′ to (C ′′1 , T
′′). Observe C ′′1 = C1.
4. The triple (N,C ′1, T ⊕ T
′ ⊕ T ′′) is a valid forgery.
IAPM, OCB1–3, and TAE. Given a nonce N and a secret key K, Integrity Aware
Parallelizable Mode (IAPM) [130] encrypts a message M = (M1, . . . ,Mm) to a ci-
phertext C = (C1, . . . Cm) and an authentication tag T as follows.
Initial Step: Generate m+ 2 pseudorandom values s0, s1, . . . , sm+1 depending on N
and K, but not on the message M .
Encryption: For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : Ci ← EK(Mi ⊕ si)⊕ si.
Authentication: T ← EK(sm+1 ⊕ M̂)⊕ s0 with M̂ =
m⊕
i=1
Mi.
When encrypting messages of m blocks, IAPM behaves like a set of m independent
instances of the common ECB mode. Hence, IAPM is vulnerable to the same forgery
attack as the one that applies to RPC. An adversary who can encrypt two messages
M and M ′ under the same nonce only has to take care that they produce the same
checksum M̂ = M̂ ′ to create a valid forgery since than we have
T = EK(sm+1 ⊕ M̂)⊕ s0 = EK(sm+1 ⊕ M̂ ′)⊕ s0.
All three versions of the Offset Codebook (OCB) mode family (i.e., OCB1 [208],
OCB2 [205], and OCB3 [148]) and Tweakable Authenticated Encryption (TAE) [153]
work similar to IAPM, and thus the same attack also applies to them.
IACBC. Given a nonce N and a secret key K, Integrity Aware Cipher Block
Chaining Mode (IACBC) [130] encrypts the message M = (M0, . . . ,Mm) to C =
(C1, . . . , Cm) and an authentication tag T as follows:
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Initial Step: Generate m+1 values s0, s1, . . . sm depending on N and K, but not on
the Message M and compute C0 ← x0 ← EK(N).
Encryption: For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: xi ← EK(Mi ⊕ xi−1), Ci ← xi ⊕ si.
Authentication: T ← EK(xm ⊕ M̂)⊕ s0 with M̂ =
m⊕
i=1
Mi.
The following attack distinguishes IACBC from a random on-line permutation and
also provides an existential forgery.
1. Encrypt M1 under the nonce 0 to (C0, C1, T ).
2. Encrypt the nonce 0 under M = (C0, C0, C0, C0) to (C
′, T ′).
3. Set C ′′ = (C0, C
′
1, C
′
2, T
′)
Note that (C ′′, T ) is a valid encryption of M = (C0, C0) since it holds that
C0 ⊕ C0 = C0 ⊕ C0 ⊕ C0 ⊕ C0.
XCBC-XOR. Given a nonce N and secret keys K and K ′, eXtended Ciphertext
Block Chaining with XOR (XCBC-XOR) [113] encrypts a messageM = (M1, . . . ,Mm)
to a ciphertext C = (C1, . . . , Cm) and an authentication tag T as follows:
Initial Step: Generate m + 1 values s0, . . . , sm depending on N and K
′, but not on
the plaintext (M1, . . . ,Mm).
Encryption:
1. C0 ← EK(N); x0 ← EK′(N);
2. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: xi ← EK(Mi ⊕ xi−1), Ci ← (xi + si) mod 2
n.
Authentication: T ← EK(M̂ ⊕ xm) + s0 (mod 2
n) with M̂ = x0 ·
m⊕
i=1
Mi.
The following attack provides an existential forgery:
1. Encrypt the message (0n, 0n, 0n) under the nonce N to (C0, C1, C2, C3, T ).
2. Then, (C0, C1, C2, T
′ = C3) is a valid forgery.
The best IND-PRP attack we found for XCBC-XOR has a workload of O(2n/4)
instead of O(1). Note that for this reuse-nonce chosen-plaintext attack, we ignore
the authentication tag.
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1. Generate 2n/4 encryptions of messagesMα1 under the same nonce N to C1. Let
denote Cα1 the encryption of the α-th message M
α
1 with α = 1, . . . , n/4.
Statistically, we can expect one pair (M i1,M
j
1 ) with i 6= j such that the least
significant n/2 bits of Ci1 and C
j
1 are equal.
2. Generate 2n/4 encryptions of messages (M i1,M
α
2 ) and (M
j
1 ,M
α
2 ) underN , where
the n/2 least significant bits of all message blocks Mα2 are equal.
Statistically, we can expect one pair (Mk2 ,M
ℓ
2) with k 6= ℓ such that C
k
2 = C
ℓ
2
holds.
3. Choose an arbitrary M3. Encrypt (M
i
1,M
k
2 ,M3) and (M
j
1 ,M
ℓ
2 ,M3) under N
to (Ci1, C
k
2 , C
i,k
3 ) and (C
j
1 , C
ℓ
2, C
j,ℓ
3 ).
Observe Ci,k3 = C
j,ℓ
3 .
6.2. Decryption-Misuse Resistance
In this section we analyze the decryption-misuse resistance of previously published
authenticated encryption schemes. Similar to the nonce-misuse setting, none of them
claims decryption-misuse resistance. Hence, our presented attacks do not invalidate
their claimed security.
BTM, CCM, CHM, CWC, EAX, GCM, HBS, and SIV These schemes use the
CTR mode as their underlying encryption operation. Thus, they are vulnerable to
decryption-misuse attacks. Assume (C, T ) is the encryption of M . Then, we can
determine the would-be plaintext M ′ of the unauthentic tuple (C ′, T ) since – for the
same counter value – it must hold that C ⊕ C ′ = M ⊕M ′. This observation can be
exploited by an efficient IND-CCA adversary.
IAPM, OCB1–3, RPC, and TAE. These OAE schemes behave like the ECB mode
and are therefore vulnerable in the decryption-misuse setting. Assume two unauthen-
tic ciphertexts that only differ in the i-th block. The decryptions of those produce
two messages that also differ only in the i-th block. Thus, these schemes are not
IND-CCA-secure.
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CCFB. This mode generates a keystream based on the previous ciphertext block
and a counter:
Ci = EK(Ci−1 || i)⊕Mi.
Thus, it must hold that Ci⊕C
′
i =Mi⊕M
′
i for Ci−1 = C
′
i−1. This observation can
be exploited by an IND-CCA adversary.
IACBC and XCBC-XOR. Both schemes are based on the concept of the Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode, i.e., the i-th message block Mi depends only on the
ciphertext blocks Ci−1 and Ci. Therefore, the decryption of the two nonce-ciphertext-
tag triples (N,C1 || C2 || C3, T ) and (N,C
′
1 || C2 || C3, T ) with C1 6= C
′
1 produces
two messages that share the same final message block. In general, schemes based on
the CBC approach are not IND-CCA secure in the decryption-misuse setting.
COPA. In 2013, Andreeva et al. introduced COPA [7], a nonce-misuse resistant
and parallelizable OAE scheme inspired by McOE (cf. Chapter 8). It combines
the XOR-Encrypt-XOR (XEX) encryption with the Encrypt-Mix-Encrypt (EME)
approach. Therefore, two block-cipher calls are needed to process a single message
block.
Initial Step: Y0 ← EK(N), L← EK(0),∆0 = 3L, and ∆1 = 2L.
Encryption: For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: Xi ← EK(Mi ⊕ 2
i−1∆0), Yi ← Xi ⊕ Yi−1,
Ci ← EK(Yi)⊕ 2
i−1∆1.
Tag Generation: Xm+1 ← EK(M̂ ⊕ 2
m−132L), Ym+1 ← Xm+1 ⊕ Ym with M̂ =
m⊕
i=1
Mi, and
T ← EK(Ym+1)⊕ 2
m−17L.
Let Ma 6=Mb be two distinct message blocks. Then, we define Ya = EK(Ma⊕∆0)⊕
L⊕ Y0 and Yb = EK(Mb ⊕∆0)⊕ L⊕ Y0.
1. Encrypt (N,Ma,Mc) to (Ca, C(a,c)) with
Xc = EK(Mc ⊕ 2∆0),
Y(a,c) = Ya ⊕Xc, and
C(a,c) = EK(Y(a,c))⊕ 2∆1.
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2. Encrypt (N,Mb,Mc) to (Cb, C(b,c)) with
Xc = EK(Mc ⊕ 2∆0),
Y(b,c) = Yb ⊕Xc, and
C(b,c) = EK(Y(b,c))⊕ 2∆1.
3. Decrypt (Ca, C(b,c)) to (Ma,M(a,bc)). It applies that
Y(b,c) = E
−1
K (C(b,c) ⊕ 2∆1), and
X(a,bc) = Y(b,c) ⊕ Ya = Yb ⊕Xc ⊕ Ya.
4. Decrypt (Cb, C(a,c)) to (Mb,M(b,ac)). It applies that
Y(a,c) = E
−1
K (C(a,c) ⊕ 2∆1), and
X(b,ac) = Y(a,c) ⊕ Yb = Ya ⊕Xc ⊕ Yb = X(a,bc).
From X(a,bc) = X(b,ac) follows that M(a,bc) = M(b,ac). This observation can be used
to distinguish COPA from a random OPERM with probability 1− 2−n.
In the following we extend the IND-OPRP attack on COPA into an INT-CTXT
attack. The first three queries of this attack are identical to those in the IND-OPRP
attack. With their help, we can form a collision in the chaining values for two
messages (Ma,M(a,bc)) and (Mb,M(a,bc)) since it must hold that X(a,bc) = X(b,ac).
Thus, we can apply a common length-extension attack to create an existential forgery:
4. Encrypt (Ma,M(a,bc),Md) to (Ca, C(a,bc), Cd, T ), where T is the authentication
tag.
5. Then, craft the existential forgery (Ca, C(b,ac), Cd, T ).
6.3. Results Summary
As it turned out, we actually found nonce and decryption-misuse attacks for all
previously published OAE schemes. Table 6.1 summarizes our results. For over a
decade, it has been common knowledge how to design a secure, an efficient, and
stateless MAC [17, 125]. Therefore, it is surprising that none of the analyzed on-
line schemes provide integrity protection. Only CCM offers some weak integrity
protection against nonce-ignoring adversaries, but it does not provide any privacy
protection.
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Outlook. In the following we present two novel families of OAE scheme: COFFE
and McOE. Their designs were inspired by the results of our robustness studies
that we summarized in this chapter. The former scheme is the first OAE scheme
based on a hash function. It suits very well for resource-restricted devices and offers
INT-CTXT security even in the nonce-misuse scenario. McOE is the first published
robust OAE scheme.
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Scheme Nonce Misuse Decryption Misuse
privacy integrity
on-line
CCFB [156] O(1) O(1) O(1)
CHM [124] O(1) O(1) O(1)
COPA [7] N/A N/A O(1)
CWC [147] O(1) O(1) O(1)
EAX [30] O(1) O(1) O(1)
GCM [164] O(1) O(1) O(1)
IACBC [130] O(1) O(1) O(1)
IAPM [130] O(1) O(1) O(1)
OCB1 [208] O(1) O(1) O(1)
OCB2 [205] O(1) O(1) O(1)
OCB3 [148] O(1) O(1) O(1)
RPC [55] O(1) O(1) O(1)
TAE [153] O(1) O(1) O(1)
XCBC-XOR [113] O(2n/4) O(1) O(1)
off-line
BTM [126] N/A N/A O(1)
CCM [85] O(1) ≪ 2(n/2) [106] O(1)
HBS [127] N/A N/A O(1)
SIV [209] N/A N/A O(1)
Table 6.1.: Workloads of our robustness studies on previously published authenticated
encryption schemes. Almost all attacks achieve an advantage close to 1.
The workloads cover the computational effort, the amount of required
memory, as well as the time complexity. Note that we classify CCM as
off-line because the message-encryption process requires prior knowledge
of the message length.
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Insight is the first condition of Art.
George Henry Lewes
In this Chapter we aim to provide authenticated encryption in constrained imple-
mentation environments where communication security is required, such as devices
connected to the Internet of Things (IoT). Designing a sound authenticated en-
cryption scheme is in fact challenging, but designing sound authenticated encryption
scheme for constraint environments is a science of its own. Typically, restricted IoT
devices have (very) limited computational power and no direct hardware support
for any cryptographic primitives, so that all cryptography must be implemented in
software. There is only limited memory available to hold executable object code on
these processors, so it is imperative to provide the needed cryptographic services in
the most compact way possible. One way to achieve this compactness is through
the careful implementation of cryptographic primitives. However, it is also possible
to facilitate compactness for an overall system by minimizing the number of primi-
tives that must be included in an implementation. In this work we present a design
for an on-line authenticated encryption (AE) scheme suitable for restricted devices
using a standardized or soon-to-be standardized hash function, e.g., SHA-1 [183],
SHA-2 [184], or SHA-3 [34]. Implementations of this scheme can omit a block cipher
mode of operation; this is a useful approach since the code size for the block cipher
is typically greater than that of the hash function, and hash functions are used in
public key cryptography as well.
We focus on the challenge of providing an authenticated encryption scheme that
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is easily accessible to developers. To provide this accessibility, we take the approach
of defining a hash function mode of operation. That is, our AE scheme uses a
cryptographic hash function as its only primitive, and does not require direct access to
any hash function internals such as the compression function. We chose this approach
based on feedback from the practice community. Hash function implementations
are widely available, but these implementations do not provide interfaces to the
compression function.
Note that to provide data privacy and data integrity, we transform the given hash
function into a keyed hash function (PRF. On systems using restricted devices, due to
the limited resources, it is desirable to minimize the cost of the code and the circuits
for encrypting a message block [11], i.e., keep the size of the cryptographic footprint
small. This means that we want only one costly operation per message block. We
denote a scheme satisfying this property as a Rate-1 scheme. For example, the GCM
authenticated encryption mode is not a Rate-1 AE scheme, since it needs not only one
block cipher call per message block, but also an additional galois field multiplication
per message block, rendering GCM to be a Rate-2 AE scheme. Another example
would be a Feistel-based scheme which requires at least three or four block cipher
calls rendering such a scheme to a low-performance Rate-3 or Rate-4 scheme.
Since the implementation of an encryption scheme can be error prone (e.g., [51, 122,
146, 214, 239] it would be desirable to provide a second line of defense to minimize the
security fallout. A further preferable goal for our construction is to provide built-in
resistance against side-channel attacks. Actually, the overlaying protocols, using an
AE scheme, are responsible to provide this goal in an adequate form, e.g., TLS [78]
and IPsec [120, 137] generate a new key for each session minimizing the number
of measurements which can be done on the secret key. Obviously, an adversary
can do a certain amount of measurements (depending on the size of the message)
on the session key, but revealing the session key only compromises security for this
specific encryption/decryption/authentication. Note that it does not compromise the
currently used secret key. But, nevertheless, we provide side-channel resistance even
if a protocol may fail to provide this kind of security.
We started our research by analyzing existing authenticated encryption schemes,
where the block cipher within these schemes can be easily replaced by a keyed hash
function. Unfortunately, none of those fulfill our requirements (see Table 7.1). As one
can see, SpongeWrap [38] seems to be a very promising candidate, since it only lacks
of built-in side-channel resistance. But, it belongs to the class of compression func-
tion based AE schemes, which yields to the fact that the internal used compression
function can be seen as the real primitive to be used both for hashing and for authenti-
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Scheme On-line Side-Channel Res. Rate-1
COFFE (this work) X X X
CHM [124] X X X
CWC [147] X X X
EAX [30] X X X
GCM [164] X X X
Generic Composition [22] X X X
HBS [127] X X X
SIV [209] X X X
Table 7.1.: Comparison of selected authenticated encryption schemes that can be
instantiated with a hash function.
cated encryption. This is basically not a technical problem, but, while cryptographers
know what is meant by the internal compression function, typical standards, such as
the SHA-2 standard [184], do not formally define it. So, without an explicit specifi-
cation of a “new” cryptographic primitive, engineers (non-cryptographers) would not
be likely to properly implement the authenticated encryption scheme. Also, while
on many constrained devices “jumping” to the address of the internal compression
function may be easy, this may be not the case for all such devices. In fact, we did
consider this approach at the beginning of our research. It would even allow us to
design a more efficient AE scheme than the one we actually propose. But, due to
the reasons discussed here, we made a decision against a purely compression function
based AE scheme in favour of a hash function based AE scheme.
Outlook. In Section 7.1 we give a formal specification of Ciphertext Output Feed-
back Faithful Encryption (COFFE). In Section 7.2 we introduce a practical instan-
tiation based on SHA-224. In Section 7.3 we show that COFFE is secure in the
standard PRF model and in addition, it provides INT-CTXT security in the nonce-
misuse setting. Finally, Section 7.4 summarize our contribution.
7.1. Specification
Ciphertext Output Feedback Faithful Encryption (COFFE) is inspired by the CFB
and Output Feedback (OFB) modes of operation [84]. It uses the chaining value Vi
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Figure 7.1.: Illustration of the encryption and authentication process of COFFE,
where C0 denotes the first α/4 post-decimal hex digits of the number π.
and the previous ciphertext block Ci−1 as inputs for the computation of the subse-
quent ciphertext block Ci (see Figure 7.1). The integrity of the ciphertext does not
depend on the uniqueness of a nonce, but only on the security of the underlying n-bit
hash function H. The definition of COFFE is given in Algorithm 6; both functions
Encrypt and Decrypt consist of the following four steps:
Step 1: Session Key Generation. COFFE is following the domain separation ap-
proach. Domain 0 is used to generate the session key S (short-term key) which is
derived from the secret key K (long-term key) and the nonce N as shown in Lines 10
and 20 of Algorithm 6. Note that the lengths of the key |K| and nonce |N | are
encoded as single- or two-byte values. The actual encoding depends on the size of
the key. Nevertheless, the domain always describes the least significant byte of the
input. For practical applications, we recommend to use a key size of n bits, where
n denots the output size of the underlying hash function H. The session-key gener-
ation provides a built-in side-channel resistance since hash function do not have key
schedules. Thus, COFFE can update K for every new message without additional
performance costs.
The term ’0∗’ – which is used in each call to the hash function H – denotes a
zero-padding, where the number of zeros depends on (1) the input size of the under-
lying compression function and (2) the internal message padding. Thus, it is always
chosen such that one needs only one compression function call for one hash function
invocation, which complies with our Rate-1 design goal. Therefore, we consider a
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Algorithm 6 COFFE
Encrypt(N , H, M)
10: S ← H(K || N || 0∗ || |K| || |N | || 0)
11: (x, V0)← ProcessHeader(H)
12: (C, Vm)← ProcessMessage(S, V0,M, x)
13: T ← H(S ⊕ Vm || Cm || 0
∗ || LT || |Mm|+ 5)
14: return (C, T )
Decrypt(N , H, C, T )
20: S ← H(K || N || 0∗ || |K| || |N | || 0)
21: (x, V0)← ProcessHeader(H)
22: (M,Vm)← ProcessCiphertext(S, V0, C, x)
23: T ′ ← H(S ⊕ Vm || Cm || 0
∗ || LT || |Cm|+ 5)
24: if T 6= T ′ then
25: M ← ⊥
26: end if
27: return M
constant σ-bit input for H, producing an n-bit output with σ ≥ n.
Step 2: Header Processing. In this step we describe the processing of the asso-
ciated data H, which can be of arbitrary length. For the sake of optimization, we
invoke the hash function H only if indispensable, i.e., when the header is larger than
the output length of H. This allows us to process messages with a small header, e.g.,
IP packets, much faster by simply applying the 10∗-padding. The domain x indicates
the length of the original header before the processing. A formal description of our
length-dependent header processing is given next:
(x, V0)← G(H) :=

1, H || 10∗ if |H| < n,
2, H if |H| = n,
3,H(H) else.
The goal of G is to achieve pair-wise distinct tuples (x, V0) for pair-wise distinct values
H and H ′. Under the assumption that there is no collision for the hash function G,
we have
H 6= H ′ =⇒ (x, V0) = G(H) 6= G(H
′) = (x′, V0
′),
not necessarily meaning that x 6= x′.
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Algorithm 7 ProcessMessage/ProcessCiphertext
ProcessMessage(S, V0,M, x)
10: C0 ← ToHex(π)
11: V1 ← H(S ⊕ V0 || C0 || 0
∗ || x)
12: C1 ←M1 ⊕ V1
13: for i = 2, . . . ,m do
14: Vi ← H(S ⊕ Vi−1 || Ci−1 || 0
∗ || 4)
15: Ci ←Mi ⊕ Vi
16: end for
17: return C
ProcessCiphertext(S, V0, C, x)
20: C0 ← ToHex(π)
21: V1 ← H(S ⊕ V0 || C0 || 0
∗ || x)
22: C1 ← C1 ⊕ V1
23: for i = 2, . . . ,m do
24: Vi ← H(S ⊕ Vi−1 || Ci−1 || 0
∗ || 4)
25: Mi ← Ci ⊕ Vi
26: end for
27: return M
Step 3: Plaintext/Ciphertext Processing. COFFE is generating a keystream for
either encryption or decryption. Since our scheme is designed to comply with the
requirements of the use of standardized building blocks, it works with hash functions
like SHA-1 and SHA-2. Thus, the input of the compression function is usually limited
to less than 2n bits, due to the message padding. Note that the n-bit session key S
and the domain separation value are mandatory inputs and hence, we have only less
then n bits remaining for the message input. To provide adequate security against
forgery attacks, we need to additionally process two out of three of the following
values: keystream block Vi−1, message block Mi−1, and ciphertext block Ci−1. More
precisely, if we only use Vi−1 in the next iteration step, the tag would become message-
independent, i.e., the tag would not provide any integrity at all. Furthermore, if we
use only Ci−1 or Mi−1, omitting Vi−1, the tag value would only depend on the last
ciphertext or plaintext block, respectively. We decided to use the inputs to H in the
following manner:
• n-bit value S ⊕ Vi−1
• δ-bit domain-separation value
• (α < n− δ)-bit ciphertext block Ci−1.
Our approach puts the hash function under a lot of stress since it violates the PRF-
independency assumption. Thus, we require H to be indistinguishable from a PRF
in the related-key model. More precisely, an adversary has partial control over the
key-input to H, resulting in a chance to produce a collision S ⊕ Vi−1 = S
′ ⊕ Vj−1
for two distinct keys S 6= S′. Our security analysis in Section 7.3 shows that our
approach still satisfies the birthday-bound security.
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Let M = M1, . . . ,Mm denote the message, where m =
⌈
|M |/α
⌉
is the number of
message blocks processed. Here, all but the last blocks of M and C are of size α
bits. The final blocks of M and C consist of at most α bit. Then, the encryption
and decryption process of COFFE is defined in Algorithm 7, where ToHex(π) (see
Lines 10 and 20) outputs the first α/4 post-decimal numbers of π interpreted as hex
values (C0 = 0x1415926 . . .).
Step 4: Tag Generation. In the final step we derive the authentication tag from
the final chaining value Vm and the final ciphertext block Cm as shown in Lines 13
and 23 of Algorithm 6. Note that the length of the tag is constrained by the output
size of H, e.g., at most n bits. The last domain allows a user to authenticate the
header without any message to encrypt. Thus, |Mm| can become zero, but for H,
|Mm|+ 5 is always in the range [5, . . . , n+ 5].
7.2. COFFE-SHA-224 – A Practical Instantiation
In this section we discuss a practical instantiation of COFFE using SHA-224 as the
underlying hash function – called COFFE-SHA-224. First, we justify our usage of
SHA-224 over SHA-256.
Hash Function Choice. For the practical instantiation of COFFE, we searched
for a standardized hash function which is suitable for restricted devices, where the
usual size of a register is at most 32 bits. Thus, we made our choice in favour of
a 32-bit-optimized hash function, which renders SHA-224 and SHA-256 reasonable
candidates. Both SHA-224 and SHA-256 share the same compression function f :
{0, 1}256×{0, 1}512 → {0, 1}256. It compresses a 256-bit chaining value and a 512-bit
message block into a 256-bit output value. These two hash-function standards differ
in two properties: 1) they use different initial values, and 2) SHA-224 truncates
the output of the final compression function invocation while SHA-256 does not.
Following the Merkle-Damg˚ard paradigm [72, 171], SHA-224 and SHA-256 apply the
secure 10∗-padding followed by a 64-bit value encoding the message length. Thus,
the maximum possible input size to fit our requirements would be 512−1−64 = 447
bits. Due to the sake of simplification, we consider only byte-aligned values and we
assume all values to be encoded as octet-strings. Thus, we can only process message
blocks with a size up to only 440 bits, i.e., 55 bytes. Using SHA-256 implies a 256-bit
chaining value and thus, only 184 bits were left for the remaining input, including
the domain separation byte and the previous ciphertext block. Furthermore, the tag
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generation step requires two additional input bytes – the length of the last message
block β and the tag length |T |. Hence, we can process 160-bit message blocks. Since
the size of the hash value of SHA-224 is reduced by 32 bits in comparison to the usage
of SHA-256, we can process message blocks of 192 bits, which leads to an estimated
performance speedup of about 20% in comparison to SHA-256. Furthermore, the
224-bit session key used in SHA-224 is sufficient to make practical attacks infeasible.
This makes SHA-224 a logical choice for COFFE.
Parameter Choice. Here, we introduce a sound parameter choice for COFFE-SHA-
224 depending on the used hash function SHA-224. The first step is to replace the
function H from Algorithm 6 by SHA-224. This obviously leads to a size of 224 bits
for the chaining values Vi. Based on our discussion above, we can process message
blocks of up to 192 bits, i.e., we need only one byte to encode the domain specifier
for the tag generation (|Mm|+ 5 < 256). On one hand, the internal state of COFFE
is larger than those of other common published authenticated encryption schemes
like GCM, OCB, or EAX, which usually support a block size of 128 bits. On the
other hand, COFFE employs a slightly worse ratio between the block size and the
size of the internal state. Nevertheless, due to the larger block size, the performance
of COFFE is still reasonable, i.e., approximately 85% of SHA-224. To ensure an
adequate security, we set the default parameter of the size of the secret key to 224
bits. Therefore, we have up to 192 bits left for the nonce.
7.3. Security
This section describes the CCA3 security (cf. Definition 4.1) of COFFE considered
under the reasonable assumption that the size of the secret key K can be larger or
equal to the size of the session key S, i.e., |K| ≥ |S|. Therefore, at first we show
the IND-CPA security of COFFE when considering a nonce-respecting adversary
(cf. Definition 4.2), and then, we proof the INT-CTXT-security of COFFE against
generalize the adversary by allowing it to reuse a nonce (cf. Definition 4.3).
Note that the length of the secret keyK can differ from the length of the session key
S. If this is the case, we can partitionH into two keyed hashfunctions: H1 : {0, 1}
|K|×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n for the generation of the session key and H2 : {0, 1}
|S| × {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}n for the processing of the message and the generation of the authentication tag.
Due to the domain separation, the partitioning of H is still valid if |K| = |S|, i.e.,
the domain of the session key generation is always 0 and the domain of the message
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processing is always 4. In this section, for simplification, we define
AdvPRFH∗ (q + ℓ, O(t)) = max
{
AdvPRFH1 (q,O(t)),Adv
PRF-RKA
H2 (q + ℓ, O(t))
}
.
Theorem 7.1 (CCA3 Security of COFFE). Suppose Π = (K, E ,D) is the
COFFE scheme as defined in Algorithm 6, i.e., K is the key derivation function,
E = EncryptAndAuthenticate and D = DecryptAndVerify. Then,
AdvCCA3Π (q, ℓ, t) ≤
5ℓ2 + 3q2
2n
+ 2 ·AdvPRFH∗ (q + ℓ, O(t))
+
2ℓ2 + 3q2
2n
+
q
2|T |
+ 2 ·AdvPRFH∗ (q + ℓ, O(t))
≤
7ℓ2 + 6q2
2n
+
q
2|T |
+ 4 ·AdvPRFH∗ (q + ℓ, O(t)).
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 7.3. 
Lemma 7.2 (IND-CPA-security of COFFE). Let Π = (K, E ,D) denote the
COFFE scheme as defined in Algorithm 6. Then,
AdvIND-CPAΠ (q + ℓ, t) ≤
(ℓ+ q)2 + 2ℓ2 + 2q2
2n
+ 2 ·AdvPRFH∗ (q + ℓ, O(t))
≤
5ℓ2 + 3q2
2n
+ 2 · 2 ·AdvPRFH∗ (q + ℓ, O(t))
Proof. This proof is using common game-playing arguments. At first, we replace
the function H1 by a random n-bit function. The advantage therefore can be upper
bounded by
AdvPRFH1 (q,O(t)).
Furthermore, we can also replace the functionH2 by a random n-bit function since the
adversary has partial control over the key S⊕Vi. The advantage of this can be upper
bounded by the PRF-RKA Advantage which is defined similar to the PRP-RKA
Advantage (see Definition 3.3). Thus, we have
AdvPRF-RKAH2 (q + ℓ, O(t)).
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In the following we always consider the full output length n of the tag generation
step, i.e., even if |T | is smaller than n, we skip the truncation step for the proof.
This is valid since showing IND-CPA security for the tag generation step without
truncation implies IND-CPA security for the tag generation with truncation. From
each adversary A with an advantage of ǫ attacking the truncated version we can
construct an adversary A′ with the same advantage ǫ attacking the untruncated
version. The algorithm A′ is a simulator that forwards all queries from A to the
encryption oracle, truncates the tag output of the oracle responses before forwarding
them to A, and returns the same result as A.
In the following we denote V ji as the i-th keystream block of the j-th query and
mj as the length of the j-th message in blocks. Let Q be the query history of the
adversary, where the subset Q|Vi,T consists of all the output values of H2, i.e., all
chaining values V ji and authentication tags T
j with i = 1, . . . ,mj and j = 1, . . . , q.
We can say that COFFE is IND-CPA-secure if the produced keystream and the tag
values within the query history are indistinguishable from a sequence of distinct n-bit
random values, where the length of this sequence is limited to ℓ+ q. It is easy to see
that the probability of a collision between two values can be upper bounded by
(ℓ+ q)2
2n
.
To complete our proof, we have to estimate the probability Pr[Dist] that all values
within the listQ|Vi,T are distinct. Therefore, we upper bound the probability Pr[Coll]
for a collision of at least two of the values within this list since
Pr [Dist] = 1− Pr [Coll] .
To upper bound Pr[Coll], we first consider the input parameter of H2 represented
by the quadruple zji = (S
j , V ji , C
j
i , d
j
i ) where the domain d
j
i is either 4 or |Mm| + 5.
Note that we ignore the 0∗-padding which leads to a higher success probability for
an adversary. Let (i, j) and (i′, j′) be two distinct input tuples. In the following, we
refer to the event zji = z
j′
i′ as input collision. This event implies that either a collision
for H2 occured or we have found a collision for the values S
j ⊕ T ji = S
j′ ⊕ T j
′
i′ .
For our case analysis (cf. Table 7.2), we encode the difference between two input
tuples zji and z
j′
i′ using a five-bit value. For example, the value “10110” defines the
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Case Event Case Event Case Event Case Event
00000 trivial 01000 – 10000 1 11000 2,4
00001 3 01001 – 10001 1 11001 3
00010 3 01010 – 10010 1 11010 3
00011 3 01011 – 10011 1 11011 3
00100 – 01100 3 10100 3 11100 1,3
00101 – 01101 3 10101 3 11101 3
00110 – 01110 3 10110 3 11110 3
00111 – 01111 3 10111 3 11111 3
Table 7.2.: This table illustrates the case analysis for the proof of Lemma 7.2, where each
case with a non-zero probability is covered by at least one event. The case“11000”
is covered by two events depending on the considered domains (Event 2 covers
the domain 1,2, and 3; Event 4 covers all other domains). The second special
case “11100” is covered by Event 1 if Sj = Sj
′
and by Event 3 if Sj 6= Sj
′
.
following case:
10110 :=

j 6= j′
V ji = V
j′
i′
Sj ⊕ V ji 6= S
j′ ⊕ V j
′
i′
Cji 6= C
j′
i′
dji = d
j′
i′ .
Note that Table 7.2 contains a complete case analysis since all possible cases are cov-
ered. The cases which occur with a zero probability are obviously impossible and
marked by ’–’. The reason for the occurrence of these cases is a violation of the
XOR-relation between the values Sj and V ji or S
j′ and V j
′
i′ , respectively. For exam-
ple, (Sj = Sj
′
∧V ji = V
j′
i′ )∧(S
j⊕V ji 6= S
j′⊕V j
′
i′ ) is an impossible case. Case “00000”
implies that a collision must have happened before in the same query and is already
covered by other cases. In the following we analyze four events which cover all cases
with a non-zero probability from Table 7.2.
After asking at most q queries, we check the query history Q of the adversary –
which contains all queries and their results – for the occurrence of bad events. We
let the adversary win immediately if one of the bad events becomes true. Let denote
Aα the α-th event. The occurrence of an event Aα implies that no event Aβ with
β ∈ {1, . . . , α− 1} occurred before. Hence, the order of the events matters.
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Event 1: Collision of two Session Keys. The first case describes the scenario
where an adversary finds two values Sj and Sj
′
, generated using H1, with j 6= j
′ and
Sj = Sj
′
. The probability for this event can be upper bounded by
q2/2n.
Event 2: Input Collision – Associated Data. In this case we consider an adversary
which finds two colliding pairs (V j0 ⊕ S
j , xj) and (V j
′
0 ⊕ S
j′ , xj
′
) with j 6= j′. A pair
collides if it holds that (V j0 ⊕ S
j = V j
′
0 ⊕ S
j′) ∧ (xj = xj
′
). The occurence of this
event leads to two colliding inputs for H2 in the first iteration. Observe that if no
collision occurs, all V ji are independent random values. The probability for this case
can be upper bounded by
q2
2n
.
Event 3: Output Collision. For this case we consider an adversary which finds two
values V ji = V
j′
i′ with (i, j) 6= (i
′, j′). The probability for this event can be upper
bounded by
ℓ2/2n.
Event 4: Input Collision – Message and Tag. Here, we consider an adversary
which finds two tuples (V ji , S
j) and (V j
′
i′ , S
j′) with V ji ⊕ S
j = V j
′
i′ ⊕ S
j′ . This leads
to two colliding inputs for H2. Note that we assume that the adversary did not find
an output collision before. The probability for this event can be upper bounded by
ℓ2/2n.
Our claim follows by adding up the individual bounds. 
Lemma 7.3 (INT-CTXT Security of COFFE). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be the
COFFE scheme as defined in Algorithm 6. We assume the adversary to be nonce-
ignoring, i.e., it is able to choose two nonces N j = N j
′
with j 6= j′. Then,
AdvINT-CTXTΠ (q, ℓ, t) ≤
2ℓ2 + 3q2
2n
+
q
2|T |
+ 2 ·AdvPRFH∗ (q + ℓ, O(t)).
Proof. Our bound is derived by game-playing arguments. Consider Games G1-G3 of
Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3, and a fixed adversary A asking at most q queries with a
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1 In i t i a l i z e ( )
2 K
$
← K()
3 Q,B0,B1,B2,B3,B4,B5 ← ∅
4 win ← fa l se
5 Finalize ( )
6 return win
100 Encrypt(N,H,M) Game G1
101 S ← H(K || N || 0∗ || |K| || |N | || 0)
102 (x, V0)← G(H)
103 C0 ← ToHex(π)
104 I ← S ⊕ V0
105 V1 ← H2(I || C0 || 0∗ || x)
106 C1 ← V1 ⊕M1
107 for i = 2, ...,m do
108 I ← S ⊕ Vi−1
109 Vi ← H2(I || Ci−1 || 0∗ || 4)
110 Ci ← Vi ⊕Mi
111 I ← S ⊕ Vm
112 T ← H2(I || Cm || 0∗ || |T | || |Mm|+ 5)
113 Q← (N,H,C, T )
114 return (C, T )
120 Decrypt(N,H,C, T ) Game G1
121 S ← H(K || N || 0∗ || |K| || |N | || 0)
122 (x, V0)← G(H)
123 C0 ← ToHex(π)
124 I ← S ⊕ V0
125 V1 ← H2(I || C0 || 0∗ || x)
126 M1 ← V1 ⊕ C1
127 for i = 2, ...,m do
128 I ← S ⊕ Vi−1
129 Vi ← H2(I || Ci−1 || 0∗ || 4)
130 Mi ← Vi ⊕ Ci
131 I ← S ⊕ Vm
132 T ′ ← H2(I || Cm || 0∗ || |T | || |Cm|+ 5)
133 i f (T = T ′) ∧ (N,H,C, T ) 6∈ Q then
134 win ← true
135 return ⊥
Figure 7.2.: Game G1 for the proof of Lemma 7.3.
total length of at most ℓ blocks. We assume that the adversary never asks a query
for which the answer is already known. The functions Initialize and Finalize are
identical for all games in this proof. Let G0 denote the INT-CTXT Game as defined
in Algorithm 2 (cf. Section 4.3). Therefore, we have
AdvINT-CTXTΠ (A) ≤ Pr
[
AG0 ⇒ 1
]
.
In G1, the encryption- and decryption-placeholders are replaced by their generic
COFFE counterparts as of Algorithm 6 and, using similar arguments as in the proof
for Lemma 7.2, we can partition H into two independent PRFs H1 and H2. Thus,
Pr
[
AG0 ⇒ 1
]
≤ Pr
[
AG1 ⇒ 1
]
+ 2 ·AdvPRFH∗ (q + ℓ, O(t)),
where
AdvPRFH∗ (q + ℓ, O(t)) = max
{
AdvPRFH1 (q,O(t)),Adv
PRF-RKA
H2 (q + ℓ, O(t))
}
.
We now discuss the differences between G1 and G2. The sets B0, . . . ,B5 are initial-
ized as empty sets (cf. Line 3 of Figure 7.2) and collect fresh values as follows:
• B0 collects all fresh values V0, where |H| > n in Lines 207 and 247.
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Algorithm 8 LLCP’
Input: Q {Query History}, N {Nonce}, H {Header}, M {Message}
p← 0
for all (N ′, H ′,M ′) ∈ Q do
if (N = N ′) ∧ (H = H ′) then
p← max {p,LLCP(M,M ′)}
end if
end for
return p
• B1 collects all fresh pairs (V0, S, x) in Lines 212 and 252.
• B2 collects all fresh values I = V0 ⊕ S in Lines 213 and 253.
• B3 collects all fresh pairs (S ⊕ Vi, Ci) with i = 1, . . . ,m − 1. This is done in
Lines 221 and 261
• B4 collects all fresh values Vi with i = 1, . . . ,m in Lines 215, 225, 255, and 265.
• B5 collects all fresh pairs (S ⊕ Vm, Cm). This is done in Lines 233 and 270.
In Lines 201 and 241, the LLCP ′ oracle is inquired as defined in Algorithm 8.
Finally, the variable bad is set to true if one of the if-conditions in Lines 205, 210,
219, 223, 228, 245, 250, 259, 263, or 268 is true. None of these modifications affect
the values returned to the adversary and therefore,
Pr[AG1 ⇒ 1] = Pr[AG2 ⇒ 1].
It follows that
Pr
[
AG2 ⇒ 1
]
≤ Pr
[
AG3 ⇒ 1
]
+
∣∣Pr [AG2 ⇒ 1]− Pr [AG3 ⇒ 1]∣∣
≤ Pr
[
AG3 ⇒ 1
]
+ Pr
[
AG3sets bad
]
. (7.1)
We now proceed to upper bound the two terms contained in Equation (7.1) – in right
to left order.
The success probability of Game G3 does not differ from the success probability of
Game G2 unless one of the following cases occur, where each case causes a bad event,
i.e., the variable bad is set to true. In the following, the indices j and j′ denote the
j-th and j′-th query with j, j′ = 1, . . . , q, respectively.
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200 Encrypt(N,H,M) Game G2 and G3
201 p← LLCP′(Q|N,H,M , (N,H,M))
202 S ← H1(K || N || 0∗ || |K| || |N | || 0)
203 (x, V0)← G(H)
204 i f (x = 3) then
205 i f (H /∈ Q|H and V0 ∈ B0 ) then
206 bad← true V0
$
← {0, 1}n \B0
207 B0 ← B0 ∪ {V0}
208 C0 ← ToHex(π)
209 I ← S ⊕ V0
210 i f ((V0, S, x) /∈ B1 and I ∈ B2)
211 bad← true I
$
← {0, 1}n \B2
212 B1 ← B1 ∪ {(V0, S, x)}
213 B2 ← B2 ∪ {I}
214 V1 ← H2(I || C0 || 0∗ || x)
215 B4 ← B4 ∪ {V1}
216 C1 ← V1 ⊕M1
217 for i = 2, ...,m do
218 I ← S ⊕ Vi−1
219 i f ((I, Ci−1) ∈ B3 and i > p) then
220 bad← true I
$
← {0, 1}n \B3
221 B3 ← B3 ∪ {(I, Ci−1)}
222 Vi ← H2(I || Ci−1 || 0∗ || 4)
223 i f (Vi ∈ B4 and i > p) then
224 bad← true Vi
$
← {0, 1}n \B4
225 B4 ← B4 ∪ {Vi}
226 Ci ← Vi ⊕Mi
227 I ← S ⊕ Vm
228 i f ((I, Cm) ∈ B5) then
229 bad← true I
$
← {0, 1}n \B5
230 B5 ← B5 ∪ {(I, Cm)}
231 T ← H2(I || Cm || 0∗ || |T | || |Mm|+ 5)
232 Q← (N,H,C, T )
233 return (C, T )
240 Decrypt(N,H,C, T ) Game G2 and G3
241 p← LLCP′(Q|,N,H,C , (N,H,C))
242 S ← H1(K || N || 0∗ || |K| || |N | || 0)
243 (x, V0)← G(H)
244 i f (x = 3) then
245 i f (H /∈ Q|H and V0 ∈ B0 ) then
246 bad← true V0
$
← {0, 1}n \B0
247 B0 ← B0 ∪ {V0}
248 C0 ← ToHex(π)
249 I ← S ⊕ V0
250 i f ((V0, S, x) /∈ B1 and I ∈ B2)
251 bad← true I
$
← {0, 1}n \B2
252 B1 ← B1 ∪ {(V0, S, x)}
253 B2 ← B2 ∪ {I}
254 V1 ← H2(I || C0 || 0∗ || x)
255 B4 ← B4 ∪ {V1}
256 M1 ← V1 ⊕ C1
257 for i = 2, ...,m do
258 I ← S ⊕ Vi−1
259 i f ((I, Ci−1) ∈ B3 and i > p) then
260 bad← true I
$
← {0, 1}n \B3
261 B3 ← B3 ∪ {(I, Ci−1)}
262 Vi ← H2(I || Ci−1 || 0∗ || 4)
263 i f (Vi ∈ B4 and i > p) then
264 bad← true Vi
$
← {0, 1}n \B4
265 B4 ← B4 ∪ {Vi}
266 Mi ← Vi ⊕ Ci
267 I ← S ⊕ Vm
268 i f ((I, Cm) ∈ B5) then
269 bad← true I
$
← {0, 1}n \B5
270 B5 ← B5 ∪ {(I, Cm)}
271 T ′ ← H2(I || Cm || 0∗ || |T | || |Cm|+ 5)
272 i f (T = T ′) and (N,H,C, T ) 6∈ Q then
273 win ← true
274 return ⊥
Figure 7.3.: Games G2 and G3 for the proof of Lemma 7.3.
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Case 1 (Collision – Initial Chaining Value): In Lines 206 and 246 the initial chain-
ing value V0 is set to a new random value if the function G returns the same V0
twice for two distinct values Hj 6= Hj
′
with j 6= j′ and Hj , Hj
′
> n, i.e., in the
case when x = 3. The probability for such a collision can be upper bounded by
q2/2n.
Case 2 (Input Collision – Domain 1, . . . ,3): In Lines 211 and 251 the value I is set
to a new random value if there is a non-trivial input collision between two input
values Ij = Sj ⊕ V j0 and I
j′ = Sj
′
⊕ V j
′
0 with x
j = xj
′
, so that Ij = Ij
′
with
j 6= j′. We can upper bound the success probability for this case by
q2/2n.
Case 3 (Input Collision – Domain 4): In Lines 219 and 259 we test for a non-trivial
input collision (Sj⊕V ji , C
j
i ) = (S
j′ ⊕V j
′
i′ , C
j′
i′ ) with (i, j) 6= (i
′, j′). The success
probability for this case can be upper bounded by
ℓ2/2n.
Case 4 (Output Collision – Domain 4): In Lines 223 and 263 we test if the adver-
sary has found a non-trivial collision of the form V ji = V
j′
i′ with (i, j) 6= (i
′, j′).
The success probability can be upper bounded by
ℓ2/2n.
Case 5 (Input Collision – Domain 5): In Lines 228 and 268 we test for a non-trivial
input collision (Sj ⊕ V jm, C
j
m) = (Sj
′
⊕ V j
′
m′ , C
j′
m′) with j 6= j
′. We can upper
bound the success probability for this case by
q2/2n.
By adding up the individual bounds, it follows that
Pr
[
AG3sets bad
]
≤
2ℓ2 + 3q2
2n
.
The adversary wins Game G3 iff the variable win is set to true, i.e., the if-condition
in Line 272 holds. This implies that the adversary can win only with a fresh query
to the Decrypt oracle, which leads to T = T ′, where T ′ is computed as shown in
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Line 271. Lines 268 and 269 ensure that the input for the hash function H2 in Line
271 is always a fresh value, i.e., it was never asked before. Since H2 is a PRF, the
probability for T = T ′ can be upper bounded by
1/2|T |.
As we allow the adversary to ask at most q queries, the success probability for Game
G3 can be upper bounded by
Pr
[
AG3 ⇒ 1
]
≤ q/2|T |.
Our claim follows by adding up the individual bounds. 
7.4. Results Summary
In this Chapter we presented COFFE, a novel hash function based OAE scheme
which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first scheme that fulfills our stated re-
quirements. It can be part of a minimal cryptographic suite that includes hashing and
digital signatures. Because it is an AEAD scheme, it could be used in the AEAD in-
terface of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [198] that has been
identified by the IETF Constrained Application Working Group as suitable for appli-
cations for the IoT. In the standard model, COFFE provides the regular INT-CTXT
and IND-CPA security plus INT-CTXT security in the nonce-misuse setting. Finally,
it is resistant against side-channel attacks, which is usually a matter of the imple-
mentation of a cryptosystem, rather than of the cryptosystem itself. Nevertheless,
we provide side-channel resistance even if an implementation lacks to provide this
kind of security.
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McOE: A Family of Robust
On-Line Authenticated Encryption Schemes
If I have seen further it is by
standing on the shoulders of Giants.
Isaac Newton
In recent years, cryptographers developed misuse-resistant schemes for authenticated
encryption [126, 127, 210]. These guarantee excellent security even against general
adversaries which are allowed to reuse nonces. Their disadvantage is that encryption
can be performed in an off-line way, only. In this chapter we introduce a novel family
of robust OAE schemes called McOE. Apart from the generic composition Encrypt-
then-Mac (EtM), none of the ISO/IEC 19772:2009 schemes – in fact, no previously
published authenticated encryption scheme at all – achieves both to be on-line and
robust (cf. Table 8.1). In this table we classify a variety of provably secure block
cipher based authenticated encryption schemes with respect to their on-line-ability
and against which adversaries (nonce-respecting vs. nonce-ignoring) they are proven
to be secure.
Encrypt-then-Mac (EtM). Since EtM is not a concrete scheme but a generic con-
struction, there are some challenges left in order to make it fully on-line-secure:
First, an appropriate on-line cipher has to be chosen. Second, a suitable, on-line-
computable, secure, and deterministic MAC must be selected. And, third, the generic
EtM scheme requires at least two independent keys to be secure. Since two schemes
are used in parallel, it is likely to squander resources in terms of run time and – im-
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Type CCA3-secure Robust
on-line CCFB CHM COFFE CWC EAX GCM IACBC IAPM McOE-X
McOE-G McOE-X OCB1-3 RPC TAE XCBC McOE-G
off-line CCM BTM HBS SIV
Table 8.1.: Classification of provably secure block cipher based authenticated encryp-
tion schemes.
portant for hardware designers – in terms of space. Since EtM first has to be turned
into an OAE scheme by making the appropriate choices, we do not consider it in our
analysis.
Design Principles for AE Schemes. The question of how to provide authenticated
encryption (without stating that name), when given a secure on-line cipher, is studied
in [15], the revised and full version of [14]. The first approach in [15] only provides
security if all messages are of the same length. The second approach repairs that by
prepending the length of the message, at the cost of being off-line since the length
must be known at the beginning of the encryption process. Their approach is to
prepend and append a random value N to a message M and then to perform the on-
line encryption of (N ||M ||N). This looks promising, but the same N is used for two
different purposes, putting different constraints on the generation of N . For privacy,
it suffices that N behaves like a nonce, not requiring secrecy or unpredictability. Even
if N is not a nonce, but the same N is used for the encryption of several messages,
all the adversary can determine are the lengths of common plaintexts prefixes, as
we required for nonce reuse. On the other hand, authenticity actually assumes a
secret or unpredictable N rather than a nonce. If the adversary A can guess N before
choosing a message, A asks for the authenticated encryption of (M ||N). Then, A
can predict the authenticated encryption of M without actually asking for it.
The general structure of McOE is based on the Tweak Chain Hash (TCH) from
[153] which itself is adapted from the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) construction [170].
Thereby, McOE replaces the random N by a proper nonce and the key-dependent
tag computation value τ , performing a nonce-dependent on-line encryption of (M ||τ).
The encryption can also depend on some associated data, which turns McOE into a
family of schemes for on-line AEAD.
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K KKKK
N M1 Mm−1
Mm || τ
α
τ
E˜ E˜E˜E˜E˜
C1 Cm−1
Cm || T
α
S
S
τ
0n
T β || Z
Figure 8.1.: The generic McOE construction. Tα and τα denote the lower α bits and
T β and τβ denote the upper β bits of T , respectively. Furthermore, S is
given by E˜K(1
n, |M |).
Outlook. In Section 8.1 we introduce the generic specification of the McOE family
based on a tweakable block cipher, and in Section 8.2 we analyze its security. Section
8.3 introduces two practical instance of the McOE family, called McOE-X and
McOE-G. In Section 8.4 we present some performance benchmarks of both instances,
and finally, Section 8.5 gives a brief summary about our contribution.
8.1. Generic Specification
The structure of McOE bases on the TC3 construction, a tweakable block cipher
based encryption scheme, (cf. Figure 8.1), which was presented by Rogaway and
Zhan [211]. A formal definition of McOE is given in Algorithm 9. Both functions
Encrypt and Decrypt consist of the following three steps:
Step 1: ProcessHeader. In this step we describe the processing of the header H,
which can be of arbitrary length. In the case when the length of the header is not
a multiple of the block size n, we apply the common 10∗-padding. Furthermore, H
has to consist of at least one block since the tag computation value τ depends on it.
Hence, the whole header can be seen as a nonce. In the following, the lowest n−Mm
bits of τ are denoted by τα. A formal definition of the header processing is given in
Algorithm 10
Step 2: Plaintext/Ciphertext Processing. The plaintext/ciphertext blocks (except
for the final block, which is discussed in step 3) are processed in a straightforward way
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Algorithm 9 McOE
Encrypt(H, M)
1: m← |M |/n
2: (U, τ)← ProcessHeader(H)
3: for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
4: Ci ← E˜K(U,Mi)
5: U ←Mi ⊕ Ci
6: end for
7: S ← E˜K(1
n, |Mm|)
8: X ← (Mm || τ
α)⊕ S
9: Y ← E˜K(U,X)
10: (Cm || T
α)← Y ⊕ S
11: U ← X ⊕ Y
12: (T β || Z)← E˜K(U, τ)
13: T ← Tα || T β
14: return (C1, . . . , Cm, T )
Decrypt(H, C, T )
21: m← |C|/n
22: (U, τ)← ProcessHeader(H)
23: for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
24: Mi ← E˜
−1
K (U,Ci)
25: U ←Mi ⊕ Ci
26: end for
27: S ← E˜K(1
n, |Cm|)
28: Y ← (Cm || T
α)⊕ S
29: X ← E˜−1K (U, Y )
30: (Mm || τ
′)← X ⊕ S
31: U ← X ⊕ Y
32: (T ′||Z)← E˜K(U, τ)
33: if τ ′ = τα and T β = T ′ then
34: return (M1, . . . ,Mm)
35: end if
36: return ⊥
Algorithm 10 ProcessHeader
Input: H {Header}
Output: U {Tweak}, τ {Tag Computation Value}
1: U ← 0n
2: for i = 1, . . . , |H|/n do
3: τ ← E˜K(U,Hi)
4: U ← Hi ⊕ τ
5: end for
6: return (U, τ)
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by the underlying tweakable block cipher E˜ or its inverse E˜−1 (cf. Algorithm 9, Lines
3–6 and Lines 23–26). The tweak U is computed by XORing the previous ciphertext
block Ci−1 and plaintext block Mi−1. The length of the final plaintext/ciphertext
block is between 1 bit and n bits since McOE allows to process arbitrary length
messages. A tweakable block cipher allows only to process n-bit message blocks.
Therefore, we process the final plaintext block Mm as follows: At first we pad it to
n bits by appending τ , before we XOR the padded value with the encryption of Mm
encoded as n-bit value with 1n as tweak (see Algorithm 9, Line 7). The final message
block can be computed by inverting this procedure (see Algorithm 9, Lines 27–28).
Step 3: Tag Generation/Verification. A common technique to support length-
preserving encryption is Ciphertext Stealing (CTS) [69]. Unfortunately, this approach
contradicts the on-line property of McOE since it requires to process the final block
before its predecessors. Therefore, we introduce a novel method, called Tag Splitting
(TS), where the n-bit tag T is split into an upper part Tα consisting of the α Most
Significant Bits (MSBs) of T and a lower part T β consisting of the β Least Significant
Bits (LSBs) of T . Note that α+β = n always holds. Furthermore, α can be 0 if Mm
is already an full n-bit block.
The final ciphertext block Cm together with the upper part of the authentication
tag Tα is derived from the padded message block M ′m = Mm || τ
α by applying (the
XEX block cipher mode introduced by Liskov et al. in [152]), i.e., (Cm || T
α) =
E˜K(U,M
′
m ⊕ S) ⊕ S, where U is the current chaining value and S = E˜K(1
n, |Mm|)
(see Algorithm 9, Lines 7–10). This step implements length-preserving encryption
since it ensures that |M | = |C| always holds. Moreover, for the sake of optimization,
the masking value S can often be computed in advance for all possible message
lengths. This allows to process the final blocks without an additional invocation of
the tweakable block cipher. The lower part of the authentication tag is computed
by the encryption of τ (see Algorithm 9, Line 12). The remaining α bits of the
encryption (Z) are discarded. The straightforward verification of the authentication
tag is given in Lines 29–34 of Algorithm 9.
8.2. Security Analysis
In this section we show that McOE is a robust OAE scheme, in the standard model.
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Theorem 8.1 (ONDMA Security). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be the McOE scheme as
defined in the previous section with E = Encrypt and D = Decrypt from Algo-
rithm 9. Then, for q ≤ 2n/2−2, we have
AdvONDMAΠ (q, ℓ, t) ≤
(q + ℓ+ 3)2 + 2(q + ℓ) + q2
2n−1 − q
+
q
2n/2 − q
+ 2AdvIND-PRP
E˜,E˜−1
(2q + ℓ, O(t)).
Proof. The proof follows from Lemmas 8.2 and 8.3. 
Lemma 8.2 (IND-OCCA2 Security). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a McOE scheme as
defined in the previous section with E = Encrypt and D = Decrypt from Algo-
rithm 9 where the tag verification process (Lines 31–33 and 35–36) is omitted. Then,
for all M ∈ ({0, 1}n)∗, we have
AdvIND-OCCA2
1
Π (q, ℓ, t) ≤
(q + ℓ+ 3)2 + 2(q + ℓ) + q2
2n − q
+AdvIND-PRP
E˜,E˜−1
(2q + ℓ, O(t)).
Proof. The basic idea of this proof is to show that the absence of non-trivial collisions
in the tweak values (U) implies IND-CCA-security.
This proof borrows ideas from [211], proof of Theorem 3, and moreover, uses com-
mon game-playing arguments. The advantage of an adversary A to distinguish Gi
from Gj is given by
Adv
Gj
Gi
(A) =
∣∣Pr [AGi ⇒ 1]− Pr [AGj ⇒ 1]∣∣ .
Let the tuple (E , D) denote the initial Game G0. The Game G1 is equal to the
game G0 except that the tweakable block cipher E˜ is replaced by a set of pseudo
random permutations P
$
← Permnn – which can be implemented efficiently via lazy
sampling. To process a total amount of q encryption and decryption queries requieres
ℓ+ 2q unique invocations of the tweakable block cipher. Thus, we have
AdvG1G0(A) ≤ Adv
IND-PRP
E˜
(2q + ℓ, O(t)).
Game G1 is transformed into Game G2 as follows. First, we add a set Q, the query
history, collecting all output tuples (H,M,C, T ) consisting of a headerH, the authen-
tication tag T , the message M , and the corresponding ciphertext C (see Figure 8.2
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Lines 226 and 251). Then, the LLCP-oracle is called to compute the LCP between
the current query and all previously asked queries (Figure 8.2 Lines 203 and 233).
This is required to determine if a specific part of the message is a common prefix.
Furthermore we add three additional sets B1 −−B3 which are initialized as follows:
B1 = {0
n, 1n},B2 = ∅, and B3 = ∅. Set B1 collects all tweaks U that are computed
during the encryption or decryption process (see Figure 8.2 Lines 207, 213, 224, 237
and 243). Set B2 collects the input tuple (U,X) for the encryption of the final mes-
sage block – consisting of the masked final message block X and the corresponding
tweak U (see Figure 8.2, Line 219). Similarly, the set B3 collects the input tuples
(U, Y ) for the decryption of the final message block – consisting of the masked final
ciphertext block Y and the corresponding tweak U (see Figure 8.2 Line 249). Finally,
the variable bad is set to true if one of the if-conditions in lines 205, 211, 217, 222,
236, 241 or 247 is true. None of these modifications affect the values returned to the
adversary, and therefore, we have
Pr
[
AG1 ⇒ 1
]
= Pr
[
AG2 ⇒ 1
]
.
In Game G3 we eliminate the effects of bad events – immediately after setting
the variable bad to true. After every collision between two chaining values occurs,
the current value is replaced by a fresh value (see Figure 8.2 Lines 206, 212, 223,
236, and 242). Furthermore, the encryption of the masked final plaintext block is
replaced when an input collision for P occurs (see Figure 8.2 Line 218). Finally, the
decryption of the masked final ciphertext block is replaced when an input collision for
P−1 occurs (see Figure 8.2 Line 248). Since G2 and G3 only differ when the variable
bad is set to true, we have
AdvG3G2(A) = Pr
[
AG3sets bad
]
.
We upper bound the probability for this event by a case analysis.
Collision in B1. In this case the adversary must have found either a collision for
P(V,W )⊕W (i.e., it has found two input tuples (V,W ) 6= (V ′,W ′) such that
P(V,W ) ⊕W = P(V ′,W ′) ⊕W ′) or it must have found a preimage of 0n or
1n. In both cases the variable bad would have been set to true, and it follows
from [47] that the success probability for this event can be upper bound by
(q + ℓ+ 2)(q + ℓ+ 3)
2n − q
+
2(q + ℓ)
2n − q
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200 Encrypt(H,M) Game G2 and G3
201 m← |M |/n
202 h← |H|/n
203 p← LLCP(Q|H,M , (H,M))
204 (U, τ)← ProcessHeader(H)
205 i f ((p < h) and (U ∈ B1))
206 bad← true; U
$
← {0, 1}n \B1
207 B1 ← B1 ∪ {U}
208 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1
209 Ci ← P(U,Mi)
210 U ←Mi ⊕ Ci
211 i f ((p < h+ i) and (U ∈ B1))
212 bad← true; U
$
← {0, 1}n \B1
213 B1 ← B1 ∪ {U}
214 S ← P(1n, |Mm|)
215 X ← (Mm || τα)⊕ S
216 Y ← P(U,X)
217 i f ( (U,X) ∈ B2 )
218 bad← true; Y
$
← {0, 1}n
219 B2 ← B2 ∪ {(U,X)}
220 (Cm || Tα)← Y ⊕ S
221 U ← X ⊕ Y
222 i f (U ∈ B1)
223 bad← true; U ← {0, 1}n \B1
224 B1 ← B1 ∪ {U}
225 (Tβ || Z)← P(U, τ)
226 Q← Q ∪ {(H,M,C, T )}
227 return (C, T )
230 Decrypt(H,C, T ) Game G2 and G3
231 m← |C|/n
232 h← |H|/n
233 p← LLCP(Q|H,C , (H,C))
234 (U, τ)← ProcessHeader(H)
235 i f ((p < h) and (U ∈ B1))
236 bad← true; U
$
← {0, 1}n \B1
237 B1 ← B1 ∪ {U}
238 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1
239 Mi ← P−1(U,Ci)
240 U ←Mi ⊕ Ci
241 i f ((p < h+ i) and (U ∈ B1))
242 bad← true; U
$
← {0, 1}n \B1
243 B1 ← B1 ∪ {U}
244 S ← P(1n, |Cm|)
245 Y ← (Cm || Tα)⊕ S
246 X ← P−1(U, Y )
247 i f ( (U,X) ∈ B3 )
248 bad← true; X
$
← {0, 1}n
249 B3 ← B3 ∪ {(U, Y )}
250 (Mm || τα)← X ⊕ S
251 Q← Q ∪ {(H,M,C, T )}
252 return M
Figure 8.2.: The IND-OCCA2 games G2 and G3 for the proof of Lemma 8.2. Game
G3 contains the code in the box while G2 does not.
Collision in B2. In this case we can assume that no bad event has occurred so far.
Therefore, the adversary can only win if it finds two colliding message blocks
Mm and M
′
m sharing the same common prefix, i.e., M = M1, ...,Mm−1,Mm
and M = M1, ...,Mm−1,M
′
m with Mm 6= M
′
m. Now, we have to upper bound
the success probability for the event
(Mm || τ
α)⊕P(1n, |Mm|) = (M
′
m || τ
α)⊕P(1n, |M ′m|).
Note that the equation above can hold only for |Mm| 6= |M
′
m|. Since P(1
n, ·) is
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a random permutation, we can upper bound the success probability of A by
q2
2n−1 − q
.
Collision in B3. This case is similar to the previous one, and therefore, we can upper
bound the success probability of an adversary by
q2
2n−1 − q
.
By adding up the individual bounds it follows that
Pr
[
AG3sets bad
]
≤
(q + ℓ+ 3)2 + 2(q + ℓ) + q2
2n − q
.
Let the tuple (O1P,1, Ô
1
P−1,1) denote the final game G4 where O
1
P and Ô
1
P−1 comply
with the encryption and decryption oracles from Definition 5.5. Note that in G3
the chaining value U cannot collide and it is not possible to compute a preimage for
any query. This implies that P is always invoked with a fresh tweak input, except
two queries share a common prefix. Furthermore, we ensure by Lines 218 and 223
that both the final message block tag value is always a fresh random value. The
same arguments hold for the decryption oracle. Thus, G3 and G4 have identical
input-output behaviours and we have,
AdvG4G3(A) = 0.
Our claim follows by adding up the individual bounds. 
Lemma 8.3 (INT-CTXT Security). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a McOE scheme as
in the previous section with E = Encrypt and D = Decrypt from Algorithm 9.
Then, for q ≤ 2n/2−2 we have
AdvINT-CTXTΠ (q, ℓ, t) ≤
(q + ℓ+ 3)2 + 2(q + ℓ) + q2
2n − q
+
q
2n/2 − q
+AdvIND-PRP
E˜,E˜−1
(2q + ℓ, O(t)).
Proof. Our bound is derived with the help of game-playing arguments. Consider
Games G1-G3 of Figures 8.3 and 8.4 and a fixed adversary A asking at most q queries
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1 In i t i a l i z e ( )
2 K
$
← K()
3 B1 ← {0n, 1n}
4 Finalize ( )
5 return win
100 Encrypt(H,M) Game G1
101 m← |M |/n
102 h← |H|/n
103 U ← 0n ;
104 for i = 1, . . . , h do
105 τ ← E˜K(U,Hi)
106 U ← Hi ⊕ τ
107 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
108 Ci ← E˜K(U,Mi)
109 U ←Mi ⊕ Ci
110 S ← E˜K(1
n, |Mm|)
111 X ← (Mm || τα)⊕ S
112 Y ← E˜K(U,X)
113 (Cm || Tα)← Y ⊕ S
114 (Tβ || Z)← E˜K(U, τ)
115 Q← Q ∪ {(H,M,C, T )}
116 return (C1 || . . . || Cm, Tα || Tβ)
140 Verify(H,C, T ) Game G1
141 m← |C|/n
142 h← |H|/n
143 U ← 0n
144 for i = 1, . . . , h do
145 τ ← E˜K(U,Hi)
146 U ← Hi ⊕ τ
147 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
148 Mi ← E˜
−1
K (U,Ci)
149 U ←Mi ⊕ Ci
150 S ← E˜K(1
n, |Mm|)
151 Y ← (Cm || Tα)⊕ S
152 X ← E˜−1K (U, Y )
153 (Mm || τ ′)← X ⊕ S
154 U ← X ⊕ Y
155 (T ′||Z)← E˜K(U, τ)
156 i f (τ ′ = τα and Tβ = T ′ and
157 (H,C, T ) /∈ Q|H,C,T )
158 win← true
159 Q← Q ∪ {(H,⊥, C,⊥)}
160 return ⊥
Figure 8.3.: Game G1 for the proof of Lemma 8.3.
with a total length of at most ℓ blocks. The functions Initialize and Finalize are
identical for all games in this proof. Let G0 denote as the INT-CTXT Game defined
in Algorithm 2. Definition 4.3 states that
AdvINT-CTXTΠ (A) ≤ Pr
[
AG0 ⇒ 1
]
.
In Game G1, the encrypt and verify placeholders are replaced by their McOE coun-
terparts including two mentionable tweaks which does not effect the success proba-
bility of any adversary. First, the oracle Verify returns win instead of (M 6= ⊥), and
second, the query history collects additional data which is required to compute the
LCP in the Games G2 and G3.
We now discuss the differences between G1 and G2. The set B1 is initialized
with {0n, 1n} before it collects all new tweak values U that are computed during
the encryption or verification process (in Lines 210, 216, 227, 250, 256, and 267).
Furthermore, set B2 collects the input tuples (U,X) consisting of the masked final
message blockX and the corresponding tweak U (see Figure 8.4, Line 222). Similarly,
the set B3 collects the input tuples (U, Y ) consisting of the masked final ciphertext
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block U and the corresponding tweak U (see Figure 8.4, Line 262).
In Lines 203 and 243, the LLCP oracle is inquired. Finally, the variable bad is set
to true if one of the if-conditions in Lines 208, 214, 220, 225, 248, 254, 260 or 265
holds. None of these modifications affect the values returned to the adversary and
therefore
Pr
[
AG1 ⇒ 1
]
= Pr
[
AG2 ⇒ 1
]
.
For our further discussion, we require another Game G4 which is explained in more
detail later in this proof1. It follows that
Pr
[
AG2 ⇒ 1
]
≤ Pr
[
AG3 ⇒ 1
]
+
∣∣Pr [AG2 ⇒ 1]− Pr [AG3 ⇒ 1]∣∣
≤ Pr
[
AG3 ⇒ 1
]
+ Pr
[
AG3sets bad
]
≤ Pr
[
AG4 ⇒ 1
]
+
∣∣Pr [AG3 ⇒ 1]− Pr [AG4 ⇒ 1]∣∣
+ Pr
[
AG3sets bad
]
.
Next, we upper bound the three terms in the line above from right to left. Using
similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 8.2 we can upper bound Pr
[
AG3sets bad
]
by
(q + ℓ+ 3)2 + 2(q + ℓ) + q2
2n − q
.
Now, we describe the new Game G4, which is equal to G3 except that the block
cipher E˜ is replaced by a set of random permutations P
$
← Permnn – which can be
implemented efficiently via lazy sampling. To process a total amount of q encryption
and decryption queries implies at most ℓ + 2q unique invocations of the tweakable
block cipher. Thus, we have
AdvG1G0(A) ≤ Adv
IND-PRP
E˜,E˜−1
(2q + ℓ, O(t)).
Finally, we have to upper bound the advantage for the adversary A to win the Game
G4. A can win this game only if the condition in Line 269 (resp. Line 469 for Game
G4) holds. Without loss of generality, we assume that A does not ask a question if the
answer is already known. This implies that (H,C, T ) 6∈ Q|H,C,T . We formally adjust
Line 269 (i.e., choose as the tag computation operation either P or P−1) such that
we always have enough randomness left for our result. For the sake of simplicity, we
denote the two final chaining values by Um and Um+1. For our analysis, we distinguish
between two main scenarios: (1) |Mm| = n, and (2) |Mm| 6= n
1Since the difference is minor, we do not provide an extra figure.
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200 Encrypt(H,M) Game G2 and G3
201 m← |M |/n
202 h← |H|/n
203 p← LLCP(Q|H,M , (H,M))
204 U ← 0n
205 for i = 1, . . . , h
206 τ ← E˜K(U,Hi)
207 U ← Hi ⊕ τ
208 i f (U ∈ B1 and p < i) then
209 bad← true; U
$
← {0, 1}n \B1
210 B1 ← B1 ∪ U
211 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1
212 Ci ← E˜K(U,Mi)
213 U ←Mi ⊕ Ci
214 i f ((p < h+ i) and (U ∈ B1))
215 bad← true; U
$
← {0, 1}n \B1
216 B1 ← B1 ∪ {U}
217 S ← E˜K(1
n, |Mm|)
218 X ← (Mm || τα)⊕ S
219 Y ← E˜K(U,X)
220 i f ( (U,X) ∈ B2 )
221 bad← true; Y
$
← {0, 1}n
222 B2 ← B2 ∪ {(U,X)}
223 (Cm || Tα)← Y ⊕ S
224 U ← X ⊕ Y
225 i f (U ∈ B1)
226 bad← true; U
$
← {0, 1}n \B1
227 B1 ← B1 ∪ {U}
228 (Tβ || Z)← E˜K(U, τ)
229 Q← Q ∪ {(H,M,C, T )}
230 return (C1 || . . . || Cm, Tα || Tβ)
240 Verify(H,C, T ) Game G2 and G3
241 m← |C|/n
242 h← |H|/n
243 p← LLCP(Q|H,C,T , (H,C, T ))
244 U ← 0n
245 for i = 1, . . . , h
246 τ ← E˜K(U,Hi)
247 U ← Hi ⊕ τ
248 i f (U ∈ B1 and p < i) then
249 bad← true; U
$
← {0, 1}n \B1
250 B1 ← B1 ∪ U
251 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1
252 Mi ← E˜
−1
K (U,Ci)
253 U ←Mi ⊕ Ci
254 i f ((p < h+ i) and (U ∈ B1))
255 bad← true; U
$
← {0, 1}n \B1
256 B1 ← B1 ∪ {U}
257 S ← E˜K(1
n, |Mm|)
258 Y ← (Cm || Tα)⊕ S
259 X ← E˜−1K (U, Y )
260 i f ((p < h+m) and ((U, Y ) ∈ B3 ) )
261 bad← true; X
$
← {0, 1}n \B1 ⊕ Y
262 B3 ← B3 ∪ {(U, Y )}
263 (Mm || τ ′)← X ⊕ S
264 U ← X ⊕ Y
265 i f ((p < h+m) and (U ∈ B1))
266 bad← true; U
$
← {0, 1}n \B1
267 B1 ← B1 ∪ {U}
268 (T ′||Z)← E˜K(U, τ)
269 i f (τ ′ = τα and Tβ = T ′ and
270 (H,C, T ) /∈ Q|H,C,T )
271 win← true
272 Q ← Q∪ {(H,⊥, C,⊥)}
273 return win
Figure 8.4.: Games G2 and G3 for the proof of Lemma 8.3. Game G3 contains the
code in the box while G3 does not.
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Scenario 1: (|Mm| = n). For our analysis, we distinguish between two mutually
exclusive cases.
Case 1 (Um+1 ∈ B1):
In this case we first consider that Um+1 is not fresh. This implies that the
ciphertext (C1, . . . , Cm) must be part of a common prefix of a previous query.
The adversary can win only if T is a fresh value, i.e., not a part of a previously
occurred prefix. Since P is a set of random permutations, the upper bound is
then given by
Pr
[
P−1(Um+1, T ) = τ
]
= 0.
Case 2 (Um+1 /∈ B1):
If Um+1 is fresh, we can upper bound the success probability for one query by
1/(2n − q). Hence, for q queries, we can upper bound the success probability
by
q
2n − q
.
Due to the fact that Case 1 and Case 2 are mutually exclusive, we can upper bound
the success probability for q queries by
max
{
0,
q
2n − q
}
≤
q
2n − q
.
Scenario 2: (|Mm| 6= n). As in Scenario 1 we analyze two mutually exclusive cases.
Case 1 (Um+1 ∈ B1):
This case implies that the ciphertext-tag tuple (C1, . . . , Cm, T
α) must be part
of a prefix previously occured query. Hence, the adversary can win only if T β
is new. Though, it is impossible, i.e., for all ∀Z ∈ {0, 1}α it holds that
Pr
[
P−1(Um+1, T
β || Z) = τ
]
= 0
since P(Um+1, ·) is a random permutation.
Case 2 (Um+1 /∈ B1):
This case implies that Cm||T
α must be fresh. The probability that the condition
τ ′ = τα from Line 469 holds, can be upper bounded by
Pr
α
= max
Mm
{
Pr
[
P−1(Um, Cm || T
α) = (Mm || τ
α)
]}
≤
1
2(n−|Cm|) − q
.
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Hence, the probability for q queries can be upper bounded by q
2(n−|Cm|)−q
. From
the assumption Um+1 /∈ B1 follows that Um+1 is new. SinceP is a set of random
permutations, we can upper bound the probability that the condition T β = T ′
from Line 469 holds by
Pr
β
= max
Z
{
Pr
[
P(Um+1, τ) = T
β || Z
]}
≤
1
2|Cm| − q
.
Then, the probability for q queries can be upper bound by q/(2|Cm| − q).
The (total) success probability of this case depends on the length of |Cm|. So
we can distinguish between the following three subcases:
Subcase 2.1 (|Cm| < n/2):
In this case we can upper bound Prα by
1
2n/2−q
and Prβ by 1. Hence, the
total success probability for q queries is at most q
2n/2−q
.
Subcase 2.2 (|Cm| = n/2):
In this case we can upper bound Prα by
2
2n/2−2q
and Prβ by
1
2n/2−q
. Hence,
the total success probability for q queries is at most 2q
2
2n−1−q2 .
Subcase 2.3: (|Cm| > n/2):
In this case we can upper bound Prα by 1 and Prβ by
1
2n/2+1−q
. Hence,
the total success probability for q queries is at most q
2n/2+1−q
.
Since all three subcases are mutually exclusive, we can upper bound the success
probability for q ≤ 2n/2−2 queries by
max
{
q
2n/2 − q
,
2q2
2n−1 − q2
,
q
2n/2+1 − q
}
≤
q
2n/2 − q
.
Due to the fact that Case 1 and Case 2 are mutually exclusive, we can upper bound
the success probability for q queries by
max
{
0,
q
2n/2 − q
}
≤
q
2n/2 − q
.
Since both scenarios are mutually exclusive, we can upper bound the success proba-
bility for q queries by
q
2n/2 − q
.
Our claim follows by adding up the individual bounds. 
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For simplification, we provide an upper bound that is easier to grasp than the
original bound, but not as tight as the original bound given above.
Corollary 8.4 (Simplified ONDMA Bound). Lets assume that 16 ≤ q ≤ ℓ and
the IND-PRP advantage is at most ǫ for an adversary which amount of queries is at
most 2n/2−2. Then the following bound holds:
AdvONDMAΠ (q, ℓ, t) ≤
6ℓ2 + 9
2n−1 − q
+
q
2n/2 − q
+ 2ǫ.
Discussion. The proofs in this chapter show that any IND-CCA-secure on-line en-
cryption scheme can be easily transformed into a full-fleged robust OAE scheme by
simply (a) prepending the associated data and (b) appending the tag generation
procedure to the message.
8.3. Practical Instances
The generic McOE scheme is based on a tweakable block cipher E˜ ∈ Block(k, n, n).
Usually, an (efficient) tweakable block cipher is constructed out of a standard n-bit
block cipher [15, 63, 152, 205]. Threefish [90] is the only native tweakable block
cipher, published so far. Since the tweak size (128-bit) of Threefish is smaller than
its block size (256, 512 or 1024 bit) it does not match our requirements. In the
following we introduce two block cipher based instances of McOE: McOE-X and
McOE-G.
8.3.1. McOE-X
The McOE-X scheme uses a regular block cipher E ∈ Block(k, n) (e.g., AES [71])
which is converted to a tweakable block cipher, namely TX, by mixing the tweak
(i.e., the chaining value) into the key K by using the XOR operation (cf. Figure
8.5). A formal definition of TX follows.
Definition 8.5 (TX). Let E ∈ Block(k, n) be a block cipher, M,C, T ∈ {0, 1}n,
and K ∈ {0, 1}k. Then, the tweakable block cipher TX-E ∈ Block(k, n, n) is defined
by
TX-EK(U,M) := EK⊕U (M),
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K
M
C
E
U
Figure 8.5.: Constructed tweakable block cipher TX.
.
and its inverse is defined by
TX-E−1K (U,C) := E
−1
K⊕U (C).
Note that we can generalize the XOR operation between the key and the tweak by
a function ϕ : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. For any fixed key K, ϕ(K, ·) and the XOR
operation are injective. Therefore, we can replace the XOR operation by the function
ϕ. It is easy to see that a secure instance of TX requires related-key resistance for
the block cipher E since the adversary can partially control some relations among
the keys used in the computation. Thus, we have
AdvPRP(TX-E,TX-E−1)(q, t) = Adv
PRP-RKA
E,E−1 (q,O(t)).
Therefore, we can deduce the OCCA3 security of McOE-X from Theorem 8.1 and
thus, from Corollary 8.4.
Corollary 8.6 (McOE-X Security). For 16 ≤ q ≤ ℓ and q ≤ 2n/2−2 we have
AdvONDMAMcOE-X(q, ℓ, t) ≤
6ℓ2 + 9
2n−1 − q
+
q
2n/2 − q
+ 2AdvPRP-RKAE,E−1 (2q + ℓ, O(t)).
Key-Recovery Attack. In [165], Mendel et al. showed a key-recovery attack on
McOE-X with a birthday-bound complexity. The adversary is allowed to query the
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McOE-X encryption oracle E and to access the block cipher E itself. In general,
this is a reasonable assumption since we can assume E to be a common block cipher
like AES. The attack works as follows:
1. Choose an arbitrary value a, compute bi = EKi(a) for i = 1, . . . , q and store all
pairs (bi, ki) in a list L.
2. Choose an arbitrary constant value M1, and set M2 = a. Then, choose an
arbitrary nonce value Ni. Thus, set M = M1 || M2 and ask for C = E(Ni,M)
with C = C1 || C2.
3. If C2 ∈ L|b, compute the secret key by K = ki ⊕M1 ⊕ C1, otherwise, go back
to Step 2.
Let us denote q′ as the number of iterations for the loop described in Steps 2 and 3.
The total number of block cipher invocations ℓ is restricted to ℓ ≤ q + 4q′ since for
one query to E , four block cipher calls are necessary to compute the pair (C, T ). If
we choose ℓ ≈ 2n/2, there exists an adversary with a success probability of at most
1/2, which is able to recover the secret key K using the presented attack. Note that
this attack does only confirm with our security claim, but also requires more queries
then our security bound. Nevertheless, this attack shows that it is very crucial to
change the cipher key after ≪ 2n/2 invocations of the block cipher E . The proposed
attack can be avoided by increasing the key size to, e.g., 2n.
8.3.2. McOE-G
The McOE instance McOE-G updates the chaining value by applying an almost-
XOR-universal (ǫ-AXU) hash function H to the XOR result of the previous message
block and ciphertext block (see Figure 8.6). In our practical implementation, we
use the Galois-Field multiplication for H, i.e., the key K2 is multiplied with the
chaining value over GF(2128) defined by the low-weight irreducible polynomial g(x) =
x128 + x7 + x2 + x+ 1 as used in OCB [208] and GCM [164].
Definition 8.7 (TG). Let E ∈ Block(k, n) be a block cipher, and H : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be an ǫ-AXU hash function. Suppose M,C, T ∈ {0, 1}n and
(K1,K2) ∈ {0, 1}
k × {0, 1}n with K = K1 || K2. Then, the tweakable block cipher
TG-E ∈ Block(k + n, n, n) is defined by
TG-EK(U,M) = EK1(M ⊕HK2(U))⊕HK2(U),
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K1HK2
M
C
EU
Figure 8.6.: Constructed tweakable block cipher TG.
.
and its inverse is defined by
TG-E−1K (U,C) = E
−1(C ⊕HK2(U))⊕HK2(U).
Liskov et al. showed in Theorem 2 of [153] that TG is a secure tweakable block
cipher with
AdvPRP
TG-E,TG-E−1(q, t) ≤ 3q
2ǫ ·AdvPRPE,E−1(q,O(t)).
Therefore, we can deduce the ONDMA security of McOE-X from Theorem 8.1 and
from Corollary 8.4.
Corollary 8.8 (McOE-G Security). For 16 ≤ q ≤ ℓ and q ≤ 2n/2−2, we have
AdvOCCA3McOE-G(q, ℓ, t) ≤
6ℓ2 + 9
2n−1 − q
+
q
2n/2 − q
+ 6q2ǫ ·AdvPRPE,E−1(2q + ℓ, O(t)).
Remark. McOE-G is not secure if an adversary has oracle access to the internal
building blocks (i.e., the block cipher E and the ǫ-AXU hash functionH) [45]. Hence,
it is crucial that an adversary has only black-box oracle access to the tweakable block
cipher E˜.
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Block cipher Impl.
Message length in bytes
64 256 512 1024 4096 16384 32768
McOE-X-AES software 27.0 20.6 19.5 19.0 18.6 18.6 18.6
McOE-X-AES AES-NI 13.7 10.9 10.5 10.2 10.0 10.0 10.0
McOE-X-Threefish software 15.6 7.9 6.7 6.1 5.6 5.5 5.5
McOE-G-AES software 32.3 24.9 23.9 23.1 22.6 22.5 22.5
McOE-G-AES GF-NI/AES-NI 12.5 9.9 9.4 9.2 9.0 9.0 9.0
AES-CBC encryption software 18.6 18.0 16.4 15.5 14.2 11.4 11.4
AES-CBC encryption AES-NI 5.1 5.9 5.7 5.4 4.1 4.1 4.1
Table 8.2.: Performance values (cpb, single core), measured on a Core i5 540M for
AES-128 and Threefish-512.
8.4. Benchmarks
This section provides software-performance benchmarks of the two presented mem-
bers of the McOE family, i.e., McOE-X and McOE-G. All measurement results
are based on the real-time clock (RTC) and obtained by the median of 5,000 mea-
surements of the target function. The performance values are given in Cycles per
Byte (cpb). For the sake of comparison, we also provide performance benchmarks for
AES-CBC, a common encryption scheme without authentication, standardized by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [84]. The AES software
implementation is based on Gladman [111], whereas the hardware implementation
is based on the Intel AES-NI Sample Library [66]. The Threefish implementation is
based on the NIST/SHA-3 reference source as provided by the Skein authors [178].
Finally, the implementation of Galois-Field multiplication uses Intels carry-less mul-
tiplication instruction PCLMULQDQ that allows to compute the carry-less product of
two 64-bit operands in about 3.54 cpb [119]. Note that all performance benchmarks
are based on naive implementations based on reference code. Therefore, it is most
likely that the benchmarks can be further improved by the usage of sophisticated
optimization methods.
Target Platform. The benchmarks were performed on a single core of an Intel
Core i5-3210M CPU 2.50GHz computer. All software benchmarks were written in
C or ASM and compiled with the GNU C compiler (gcc) version 4.8.2 using the
optimization flag -O3.
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Results. The results of the 64-bit performance benchmarks are summarized in Table
8.2.
Further Implementation Results. Bogdanov et al. recently published a high-speed
implementation of McOE-G optimized for Haswell CPUs [50]. Their implementation
runs at about 6.24 cpb on a single core of an Intel Core i5-4300U CPU (1900 MHz)
processor. In addition, Bogdanov et al. also performed benchmarks in the multi-
message scenario. Here, McOE-G matches the performance of GCM at about 1.45
cpb. Their results show that scenarios exist where a conventional OAE scheme can
be replaced by a robust one without noticeable performance loss.
8.5. Results Summary
Originally, our research was inspired by the search for an authenticated encryption
scheme that can be used in a general-purpose cryptographic library. It should offer
by default a huge failure tolerance for practical software developers and still allow
being used in an on-line manner.
Since the well-known schemes (such as OCB and SIV) did not fit our requirements,
we developed McOE– the first robust OAE scheme. Furthermore, it is provably
secure in the standard model and fast enough for most common applications like
(full) hard-disk encryption or secure network communication. This renders McOE
a well-suited candidate for any general-purpose cryptographic library.
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Twisterπ – A Framework for Fast and Secure Hash
Functions
A person who never made a mistake
never tried anything new.
Albert Einstein
In this chapter we present Twisterπ, a framework for hash functions. It is an im-
proved version of Twister, one of the 51 accepted fist-round participants of the
SHA-3 Competition. Twisterπ is built upon the ideas of wide-pipe and sponge
functions. The core of this framework is a – very easy to analyze – Mini-Round,
providing both fast diffusion as well as collision-freeness. The total security level is
claimed to be not below 2n/2 for collision attacks and 2n for (2nd-) preimage attacks.
Twisterπ instantiations are secure against all known generic attacks. We also pro-
pose two instances Twisterπ-n for hash output sizes n = 256 and n = 512. These
instantiations are highly optimized for 64-bit architectures and run fast in hardware
and software. Furthermore, Twisterπ scales very well on low-end platforms.
Related Work. In the last decade, design flaws in popular hash functions such as
MD5 [200] and SHA-0 [185] were exposed, leading to a huge amount of attacks for
SHA-1 [183] [39, 40, 62, 80, 199, 234–236]. But, also newer hash functions, e.g.,
[12, 121, 140, 141] – which try to take care for weaknesses in the Merkle-Damg˚ard
construction itself – were broken soon after their publications [118, 162, 168, 192, 193].
Back then, some cryptographers were worried that the standardized SHA-2 [183,
184] family could also be vulnerable to state-of-the-art techniques in cryptanalysis.
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Therefore, in 2008, the NIST started the SHA-3 Competition [181] with the goal to
find a successor for the SHA-2 family. On October 2, in 2012, the NIST announced
Keccack [34], a sponge-function based software, as the winner of the SHA-3 Com-
petition. The concept of sponge functions [36] is given for example by a big internal
state that absorbs a message of infinite length and that later squeezes out a hash
value of variable size. In 2014, it will become the official SHA-3 standard.
Our Contribution. The design of secure and practical hash functions is of great
interest. Due to the SHA-3 Competition, many new proposals for hash functions have
been published during this process. In this chapter we present a new hash function
framework called Twisterπ. Our proposal is based on a sponge construction [37]
as well as on the wide-pipe approach [155]. The main goal is to present a fast and
secure hash function which is flexible to use and easy to analyze.
More precise, it uses XOR-sponges with a big internal state as proposed in [155].
The Grindahl design [141], which is the closest to our approach, but contains some
flaws which cannot be exploited in Twisterπ. We take advantage of the well studied
basic operations of AES [71] and adopt several of them, including some optimization
techniques.
Due to recent breakdowns of many proposed hash functions, we analyze the resis-
tance of Twisterπ against all known generic attacks on hash functions. We show
that the Twisterπ framework resists all of them if the size of the internal chaining
value is at least double the size of the hash output.
In 2009, Mendel et al. discovered a serious design flaw of Twister [166], the pre-
decessor of Twisterπ, leading to several attacks against Twister-512 [166]. Those
attacks are not transferable to Twisterπ-512 since it was especially designed to resist
them.
Outline. Section 9.1 points out the principles of Twisterπ. Section 9.2 specifies
Twisterπ and Section 9.3 briefly discusses its resistance against generic attacks.
Section 9.4 shows some optimization techniques related to the implementation of
Twisterπ on different platforms, and Section 9.5 provides software-performance
benchmarks. Section 9.6 introduces the differences between Twisterπ and its pre-
decessor Twister [93]. Finally, Section 9.8 summarizes our contribution.
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9.1. Design Principles of Twisterπ
In this section we explain our design purpose and point out the principles of the
Twisterπ design.
Security. The concept of Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) matrices allows us
to obtain a maximum of diffusion inside each column of the state matrix. Since the
message input is orthogonal with the diffusion of the state, i.e., a message word is
always injected into the last row of our state matrix, we allow a minimum of control
on the state for an adversary. Introducing a local feed-forward as well as the Blank-
Round (Twister-Round with no message input), furthe reduces the influence of an
adversary on the state.
Evolutionary. Throughout the last decade, a lot of hash functions using many dif-
ferent concepts have been broken. And often we had to learn that using newly
developed techniques lead to stronger attacks, which render pretended strong hash
functions weak.
The well-studied and analyzed block ciphers that were in the final round of the
AES Competition1 lead to some well established design principles offering a high
level of cryptographic knowledge. Therefore, Rijndael [70] can be seen as one of
the most studied block ciphers during this process and also in the time after. Its
concepts of simple byte-wise operations SubBytes, ShiftRows, and MixColumns, are
well-analyzed and it turns out that their combination can offer a high level of speed
and some form of provable security. We adopt a few of these concepts for Twisterπ
and we also learn from recent hash function breakouts.
Simplicity. A strong hash function should not be hard to analyze since not finding
an attack due to the algorithmic complexity does not mean that there is no simple
attack which breaks the whole function in an easy way. We therefore only use simple
and few components as building blocks for the Twister-Round. These components
have been studied before and are well known – but combining these components to
obtain a good hash function is new. Our clear design and straightforward structure of
Twisterπ makes cryptanalysis easy and serves the purpose that there are no simple
attacks which cannot be found due to a complex and unreadable algorithm.
1http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/
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Portability and Scalability. A main design criteria of Twisterπ is its application
to a wide range of applications. Due to its byte-wise operations, it scales very neat
on 8-, 16-, 32-, and 64-bit platforms. Twisterπ can be very efficiently applied on
smart cards with small 8-bit processors. We also offer an optimized version for 32-
bit and 64-bit environments. The portability will be enhanced by its low-memory
requirements, which makes Twisterπ even valuable for low-end platforms.
Analyzability. Twisterπ consists of well-known and well-analyzed components.
The security level of Twisterπ can be proven for the inner components, which is
more worth than just a security claim. Using the concept of an MDS matrix, lead
to a very fast diffusion. After only two Twister-Round invocations, a full diffusion
is guaranteed (if no feed-forward has taken place). This high level of diffusion makes
Twisterπ very close to a randomized hash function offering a high level of security.
9.2. Specification of the Twisterπ Hash-Function Family
Algorithm 11 Twisterπ
Input: M {Message to Hash}, n {Output Length}
Output: Y {Hash Value}
T ← 0
S ← Init(π)
S(1→) ← S(1→) ⊕ n
if n ≤ 256 then
T ← null
end if
M ′ ←M || 10∗
for i = 1, . . . , |M ′|/512 do
(S, T )← Twister-Round(S, T,M ′i)
end for
S ← State-Finalization(S, T, |M |, n)
return Y ← Output-Round(S, n)
In this section we specify the overall structure and the individual building blocks of
Twisterπ, a byte-oriented hash function family, operating on a square state matrix
S. The core primitive of each individual Twisterπ hash function is the underlying
compression function, Twister-Round, processing 512-bit message blocks together
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with a 512-bit state (i.e., the chaining value) and outputs a 512-bit value. Messages
are padded using the 10∗-Padding-Rule (cf. Definition 2.7) to become a multiple of
512 bits. The compression function is based on an AES-like round function Mini-
Round, processing a 64-bit message word. The 512-bit checksum T can be seen as
an optional parameter, only needed for computing a message digest greater than 256
bits, otherwise it is set to null. It serves as an additional state to preserve our
wide-pipe approach where the state is at least twice as large as the message digest.
In the following, Twister-Round (S,Mi) denotes the invocation of Twister-Round
where the parameter T is either null or omitted. Thus,
Twister-Round(S,Mi) = Twister-Round(S, null,Mi).
The finalization phase starts after the padded message was fully processed, i.e., the
message is completely absorbed by the state S. At first, the message length and
the checksum – if present – is absorbed into the state by the means of the State-
Finalization. Finally, the message digest is computed by following the design ideas
of the sponge function [36]; instead of presenting the complete internal state to the
attacker, the Output-Round computes as many 64 bit output slices as needed. A
description of Twisterπ in pseudo-code notation is shown in Algorithm 11. Next,
we give an in-depth description of the individual components of Twisterπ.
9.2.1. Context
The State S. Twisterπ operates on a square state matrix S = (Si,j), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 8,
consisting of eight rows and columns, where each cell Si,j represents one byte.
S1,1 S1,2 . . . S1,8
S2,1 S2,2 . . . S2,8
...
...
. . .
...
S8,1 S8,2 . . . S8,8
Note, S(i→) := (Si,1, . . . , Si,8) denotes the i-th row vector and S(j ↓) := (S1,j , . . . , S8,j)
the j-th column vector. similar to Blowfish [220], the initial state of Twisterπ is
given by the first 64 hex digits of the fractional portion of π. After the initialization
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the internal state S is given by the following matrix:
24 3F 6A 88 85 A3 08 D3
13 19 8A 2E 03 70 73 44
A4 09 38 22 29 9F 31 D0
08 2E FA 98 EC 4E 6C 89
45 28 21 E6 38 D0 13 77
BE 54 66 CF 34 E9 0C 6C
C0 AC 29 B7 C9 7C 50 DD
3F 84 D5 B5 B5 47 09 17
Checksum T . The checksum enlarges the state of Twisterπ-384 and Twisterπ-
512 to stick to our wide-pipe design [155] decision. In other words: using the check-
sum, we can double size of the internal state.
similar to the state S, the checksum T is represented by a square matrix T = (Ti,j),
1 ≤ i, j ≤ 8, consisting out of eight rows and columns, where each cell Ti,j represents
one byte.
T1,1 T1,2 . . . T1,8
T2,1 T2,2 . . . T2,8
...
...
. . .
...
T8,1 T8,2 . . . T8,8
We define a checksum-update operation as
T(i↓) = (3T(i↓))⊕ (T(i+1↓) ⊞ S(i↓)),
where ⊞ denotes an addition modulo 264. The initial checksum state is given by the
all zero state, i.e., Ti,j = 0 with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 8
9.2.2. Mini-Round
The Mini-Round (cf. Algorithm 12) is the basic building block of any Twisterπ
hash function. The design of this primitive follows the lead of the AES round trans-
formation and thus, prefers simple components over complex ones. The main purpose
of this non-linear permutation is to inject a message word W , (InjectMessage) and
to take care of the diffusion of the state matrix S. The core of the Mini-Round is
the MixColumns operation where S is multiplied with an MDS matrix to achieve a
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Algorithm 12 Mini-Round
Input: S {State}, W {Message word}
Output: S {Updated state}
S ← InjectMessage(S,W )
S ← AddTwistCounter(S)
S ← SubBytes(S)
S ← ShiftRows(S)
S ← MixColumns(S)
return S
proper diffusion. The Mini-Round is visualized in Figure 9.1. Twisterπ can han-
dle at most 264 Mini-Rounds. This limitation is caused by the AddTwistCounter
operation where a 64-bit counter is added. Each Mini-Round can process 64 bits
of message data. Therefore, with a native usage of a Mini-Round it is possible to
process up to 264 · 64 message bits. If this limitation becomes a real world issue in
the future, it is possible to increase the size of the TwistCounter to 128s bit with
almost no performance loss.
InjectMessage (IM). A 64-bit message word W is XOR-injected into the last row.
Let W = W [1], . . . ,W [8] where W [i] denotes the i-th significant byte of W , e.g.,
W [8] denotes the most significant byte of W . Then, we define the message-injection
process by
S(8→) ⊕W := S(8,1) ⊕W [1] || · · · || S(8,8) ⊕W [8].
AddTwistCounter (AC). The TwistCounter ctr is an unsigned 64-bit integer ini-
tialized by the maximum value, i.e., 0xFFFF_FFFF_FFFF_FFFF. It is XORed byte by
byte into the first row of the state S.
S(1→) ⊕ ctr := S(1,1) ⊕ ctr[1] || . . . || S(1,8) ⊕ ctr[8]
After successful addition, ctr is decreased by 1.
SubBytes (SB). This function is defined as a bijection
SubBytes : {0, 1}8 → {0, 1}8
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a SB(a)SubBytes
AddTwistCounter
ShiftRows
MixColumns
InjectMessage
Figure 9.1.: Illustration of a Mini-Round.
and is used as an S-box for each byte. It should, among other properties, be highly
non-linear. A discussion on how to obtain such cryptographically strong S-boxes (for
8x8 S-boxes) can be found in [241]. Twisterπ uses the well-known and intensively
studied AES S-Box which can be found in [71].
We define the SubBytes operation by
S(i,j) := SB(S(i,j)) with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 8.
ShiftRows (SR). ShiftRows is a cyclic left shift similar to the ShiftRows operation
of AES. It rotates Row j by (j−1) mod 8 bytes to the left. Suppose S←j(i→) denotes
the i-th row rotated by j bytes to the left. Then, the ShiftRows operation is defined
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by
S(i→) := S←i−1(i→) with 1 ≤ i ≤ 8.
MixColumns (MC). The MixColumns step is a permutation operation on the state.
It applies a N ×N -MDS A (a maximum distance separable matrix as defined below)
to each column, i.e., A · S(j ↓) for 1 ≤ j ≤ 8.
Definition 9.1 (MDS Matrix). An [n, k, d]-code with a generator matrix
G =
[
Ik×k Ak×(n−k)
]
is an MDS code if every square submatrix of A is non-singular, i.e., d 6= 0, where d
denotes the determinant of A. The matrix A is called an MDS matrix.
The MDS matrix chosen for Twisterπ is cyclic, i.e., its i-th row can be obtained
by a cyclic right rotation of (02 01 01 05 07 08 06 01) by i entries. It has a branch
number of 9 meaning that if two 8-byte input vectors differ in 1 ≤ k ≤ 8 bytes, the
output of the MixColumns operation differs in at least 9 − k bytes. More precisely,
the approximate probability that two 8-byte input words with DI different bytes
on predefined positions maps to two 8-byte output words with DO different bytes
on predefined positions by the MixColumns operation is given in Table 9.1. The
8× 8-MDS matrix used for all proposed instances of Twisterπ is:
MDS =

02 01 01 05 07 08 06 01
01 02 01 01 05 07 08 06
06 01 02 01 01 05 07 08
08 06 01 02 01 01 05 07
07 08 06 01 02 01 01 05
05 07 08 06 01 02 01 01
01 05 07 08 06 01 02 01
01 01 05 07 08 06 01 02

All of the byte-entries are considered to be elements of GF (28). An element of GF (28)
is represented by
∑7
i=0 ai2
i. The reduction polynomial R(x) of GF (28) is defined by
R(x) = x8 + x6 + x3 + x2 + 1.
A detailed discussion about the properties of MDS matrices/codes is given in [158].
101
9. Twisterπ – A Framework for Fast and Secure Hash Functions
DI/DO 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 1 - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞
1 - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ 1
2 - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ 2−8 0.99
3 - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ 216 2−8 0.99
4 - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ 2−24 216 2−8 0.99
5 - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ 232 2−24 216 2−8 0.99
6 - ∞ - ∞ - ∞ 2−40 232 2−24 216 2−8 0.99
7 - ∞ - ∞ 2−48 2−40 232 2−24 216 2−8 0.99
7 - ∞ 2−56 2−48 2−40 232 2−24 216 2−8 0.99
Table 9.1.: Column properties of the state matrix after multiplication with an MDS
matrix.
9.2.3. Compression Function
Mini
Round
Mini
Round
... Mini
Round
Mini
Round
Mini
Round
S
W1 W2 W7 W8 0
Figure 9.2.: Illustration of a Twister-Round.
The compression function
Twister-Round : {0, 1}512 × [{0, 1}512]× {0, 1}512 → {0, 1}512
maps three 512-bit input values (i.e., the state, an optional checksum and a message
block) to a 512-bit output value. It consists of nine Mini-Rounds. Each of the first
eight rounds absorbs a 64-bit word (i.e., W1, . . . ,W8) of the message block into the
state. The last Mini-Round is invoked with a virtual all-zero message word to limit
an adversaries control over the internal state of the hash function. Such a Blank-
Round is a common building component in the design of cryptographic hash functions
[35, 141, 180]. The individual Mini-Rounds are separated by a feed-forward operation
with the state before its invocation (cf. Figure 9.2) to guarantee the one-wayness of
Twister-Round since the remaining Mini-Round operations are invertible. The feed-
forward operation is defined by
S := S ⊕ Mini-Round(S,X),
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Algorithm 13 Twister-Round
Input: S {State}, T {Checksum}, W {Message Block}
Output: S {Updated State}, T {Updated Checksum}
1: for i = 1, . . . , 8 do
2: if T 6= null then
3: T(i↓) ← 3 · T(i↓) ⊕ (T(i+1)↓ ⊞ S(i↓))
4: end if
5: S ← Mini-Round(S,Wi)⊕ S
6: end for
7: S ← Mini-Round(S, 0)⊕ S
8: return (S,T )
whereX is either a message word or a sequence of 64 zero-bits. The optional checksum
for computing a message digest longer than 256 bits is updated before processing a
message word. A description of Twister-Round in pseudo-code notation is given in
Algorithm 13.
9.2.4. Post-Processing
This section describes the Twisterπ finalization process. It starts after the message
is completely processed by iterating the compression function over all message blocks.
The post-processing consists of the following two steps:
State Finalization. At first, to prevent length-extension attacks (see Section 2.3),
the state is updated by processing the bit-length |M | of the unpadded message M ,
encoded as a 64-bit value, together with the current state by means of a Mini-Round
(i.e., S ← Mini-Round(S, |M |)). Afterwards, the state finalization ends with either
a Blank-Round or the processing of the checksum with the state by means of a
Twister-Round, depending on the length of the message digest. In the latter case,
the checksum T is transformed in a 64-byte message block M = M [1], . . . ,M [64]
column by column where
(M [(i · 8)− 7], . . . ,M [i · 8])← T(i↓) with 1 ≤ i ≤ 8.
A formal definition of State-Finalization is given in Algorithm 14.
Message Digest Computation. The task of Output-Round is the computation of
the actual message digest from a given state S. A description in pseudo-code notation
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Algorithm 14 State-Finalization
S ← Mini-Round(S, |M |)
if n ≤ 256 then
S ← Mini-Round(S, 0)
else
S ← Twister-Round(S, null, T )
end if
is shown in Algorithm 15. For every 64 bits of the message digest, the current state is
first saved, and then updated by a Blank-Round followed by a feed-forward operation
with the saved state, and finally, an additional invocation of a Blank-Round (see Lines
3-6). A 64-bit output value is then obtained by XOR-ing the first column of S with
the first column of the saved state (see Line 7). This procedure is repeated until the
needed amount of message digest bits is obtained. The last output stream can be
varied between 32 bits and 64 bits by taking only the first half of the output value.
This allows to vary the output size for a huge amount of applications. Note that due
to Output-Round, Twisterπ can theoretically produce hash values up to 2
64 bits.
This limitation results from the initial step where the output length is written into
to first row of the state (cf. Algorithm 11). In some particular scenarios, long hash
values can become handy, e.g., full domain hashing [26]. Anyway, the security of
Twisterπ is limited by the state size.
Algorithm 15 Output-Round
Input: S {State}, n {Output Length}
Output: Y {Hash Value}
1: Y ← ∅
2: for i = 1, . . . , ⌈n/64⌉ do
3: X ← S
4: S ← Mini-Round(S, 0)⊕ S
5: S ← Mini-Round(S, 0)
6: Y ← Y || (S(1↓) ⊕X(1↓))
7: end for
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9.3. Security against Generic Attacks
In this section we give a brief discussion why Twisterπ is resistant to existing generic
attacks.
Length-Extension Attacks. The combination of the Twisterπ padding rule and
the processing of the message length in the post-processing phase avoids such type
of attacks. Another possible attack can be as follows:
For a known hash value H(M), one can compute the hash value H(M || Y || Z) for
any suffix Z if the length of an unknown message M is known as well as the padding
Y of M . Twisterπ is secure against such attacks due to two countermeasures: (1)
By knowing only the hash value, an attacker cannot easily determine the state S after
the last compression function call as it has only access to the hash value generated by
the Output-Round, which squeezes out some bits of the state by applying the output
transformation. The bits of the squeezing process do not leave enough information
to recover the internal state; (2) The multiple feed-forward does also prevent any
attacker to successfully gain any knowledge about prior state information. In each
squeezing process, one feed-forward is applied.
Multi-Collision Attacks. An instance of Twisterπ fully resists a multi-collision
attack if 8 · 82 = 512 ≥ n since the complexity is determined by k · 2512/2. All
instances of Twisterπ have this feature, although the state of Twisterπ-384 and
Twisterπ-512 is not big enough to prevent this attack by itself, but including the
checksum can be viewed as an enlargement of the state which then provides resistance
against this kinds of attacks.
Herding Attacks. For Twisterπ-256 (Twisterπ-512), we have an internal state
of 512 bits (|S|+ |T | = 1024) and with 512 > 3·256−52 = 381.5 bits (1024 >
3·512−5
2 =
765.5). The attack has the same complexity as for a (2nd-) preimage attack on a
random oracle. The complexity of this attack decreases with increased size of the
message. If the message is of size about 2ℓ, the complexity of the attack is 2(2n−5)/3−ℓ.
It is easy to see that all of our proposed instances of Twisterπ provides resistance
against this kind of attacks.
Long 2nd-preimage Attacks. Long 2nd-preimage attacks cannot be applied to the
Twisterπ framework for three reasons. First, in each Mini-Round, the Twist-
Counter ctr is added to the second column of the state S which does not allow to
105
9. Twisterπ – A Framework for Fast and Secure Hash Functions
find expandable messages. Second, Twisterπ uses multiple feed-forwards and third,
the internal chaining value is in general much larger than n. This makes it harder
to find collisions and fix points since we essentially have constructions similar to the
wide-pipe design [155].
Slide Attacks. The TwistCounter ctr prevents slide attacks since in each iteration
of the Mini-Round, a fresh value is injected into the state matrix which does not allow
an adversary to find slid pairs of messages. Furthermore, the last inserted message
block cannot be the all-zero block due to the padding rules. Thus, slide attacks are
not possible for Twisterπ.
9.4. Implementation Details
In this section we discuss issues related to the implementation of Twisterπ on differ-
ent platforms. Test vectors to verify a specific implementaion are given in Appendix
A.
In essence, our techniques for implementing this cryptographic hash function rely
on the following key sources of information:
• Optimization techniques as given in [71] and
• some of the new techniques on how to reduce the number of instructions for an
AES implementation as given in [33].
Most of the discussed issues are relevant for more than one platform.
Note that there are no multiplications of two arbitrary values of GF (28), but
only multiplications of a variable with some fixed constants. The latter is easier to
implement than the former – especially in the context of hardware and high-speed
software implementations.
9.4.1. 64-Bit Platforms
All steps of the round transformation, (i.e.,SubBytes, ShiftRows, and MixColumns)
can be combined in a single set of lookup tables, allowing for very fast implementa-
tions on processors with word length greater equal 64 bits. The following notations
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will be used for the elements at matrix position (i, j) and for (for 1 ≤ i, j < 8):
ai,j input state matrix element,
bi,j state matrix element after SubBytes,
ci,j state matrix element after ShiftRows,
di,j state matrix element after MixColumns.
After finishing the MixColumns operation, we have for 1 ≤ j ≤ 8:
d1,j
d2,j
d3,j
d4,j
d5,j
d6,j
d7,j
d8,j

=

02 01 01 05 07 08 06 01
01 02 01 01 05 07 08 06
06 01 02 01 01 05 07 08
08 06 01 02 01 01 05 07
07 08 06 01 02 01 01 05
05 07 08 06 01 02 01 01
01 05 07 08 06 01 02 01
01 01 05 07 08 06 01 02

×

SB[a1,j ]
SB[a2,j+1]
SB[a3,j+2]
SB[a4,j+3]
SB[a5,j+4]
SB[a6,j+5]
SB[a7,j+6]
SB[a8,j+7]

where SB : {0, 1}8 → {0, 1}8 denotes the S-Box operation, and where ’+’ denotes a
wraparound addition, e.g., j + 6 ≡ 2 for j = 4. This matrix multiplication can be
interpreted as a linear combination of all eight column vectors:
d1,j
d2,j
d3,j
d4,j
d5,j
d6,j
d7,j
d8,j

=

02
01
06
08
07
05
01
01

SB[a1,j ]⊕

01
02
01
06
08
07
05
01

SB[a1,j+1]⊕ . . .⊕

01
06
08
07
05
01
01
02

SB[a1,j+7].
We now define eight V -tables: V1, V2, . . . , V8:
V1[α] =

02
01
06
08
07
05
01
01

SB[α], V2[α] =

01
02
01
06
08
07
05
01

SB[α], . . . V8[α] =

01
06
08
07
05
01
01
02

SB[α].
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It follows that we can write the combined operation of SubBytes, ShiftRows, and
MixColumns as

d1,j
d2,j
d3,j
d4,j
d5,j
d6,j
d7,j
d8,j

= V1[a1,j ]⊕ V2[a1,j+1]⊕ . . . ⊕ V1[a1,j+7].
So, there are only 64-bit XOR operations involved in the computation of a Twister-
Round that can be implemented quite efficiently on most platforms.
9.4.2. 32-Bit Platforms
By splitting the 64-bit lookup tables V1, . . . , V8 into 32-bit chunks, it takes twice as
much operations as compared to the 64-bit variant. More general, this Twister-
Round implementation has the desirable feature of scaling down linearly in terms of
speed depending on the available word size of the platform.
9.4.3. Specific Remarks for 8-Bit Platforms
The performance on 8-bit processors is an important issue since most smart cards with
cryptographic applications are restricted to their usage. There are several options
for implementing Twisterπ, depending on whether the requirements demand for
minimum space (i.e., low memory for storing lookup tables) or maximum speed. If
minimum space is requested, the multiplication of two elements in GF (28) has to be
performed in software and should not be stored as a lookup table. Specific details for
such issues can be found in [71, Chapter 4.1.1]. If space limitations are not an issue,
the technique for implementing Twisterπ via lookup tables should be chosen as
discussed in Section 9.4.1 or by splitting them up into single operations as discussed
in Section 9.4.2. As all operations linearly scale down in terms of speed, i.e., a 64-bit
XOR can be easily implemented via eight times an 8-bit XOR, the running time is
eight times the running time on a 64-bit platform.
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9.4.4. Dedicated Hardware
Twisterπ is suited to be implemented in dedicated hardware. There are several
tradeoffs between chip area and speed possible. Since the implementation in software
on general-purpose processors is already very fast, the need for hardware implemen-
tation will probably be limited to very specific cases like:
1. Extreme high-speed chips with no area restrictions: The tables V1, . . . , V8 can
be hard-wired and the XOR operations can be conducted in parallel.
2. Compact coprocessors on smart cards: There can either be only the S-Box hard-
wired or, additionally (and if enough memory is available), the tables V1, . . . , V8
be generated at runtime.
3. If there is essentially no space to hard-wire anything, even the S-Box can be gen-
erated at runtime. Since Twisterπ uses the Rijndael S-Box, one can assemble
it using two transformations:
SB[α] = f(g(α)),
where g(α) is defined as
α→ α−1 in GF (28)
and f(α) is an affine transformation.
Note that there are finite-field multiplier over GF (2n) available in hardware that
execute in a single clock cycle. More information is available in , e.g., [188] or, for a
short summary, in [71].
9.5. Benchmarks
This section provides software-performance benchmarks for the Twisterπ reference
implementation. All measurement results are based on the real-time clock (RTC)
and obtained by the median of 5,000 measurements of the target function. The
performance values are given in cpb. For the sake of comparison, we also provide
performance benchmarks for SHA-256 and SHA-512, where we used the implemen-
tation from OpenSSL2 version 1.0.1e.
2http://www.openssl.org, last access: July 2013
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Bytes SHA-256 Twisterπ-256 SHA-512 Twisterπ-512
20 40.2 86.6 49.8 160.2
64 22.8 41.0 15.6 64.1
256 13.5 20.5 10.4 26.4
512 12.0 17.1 8.4 20.1
576 11.8 16.7 7.6 19.4
1024 11.5 15.3 7.5 16.9
1500 10.7 14.5 6.8 15.6
4096 10.6 14.0 6.8 14.4
10000 10.5 13.8 6.6 14.0
16384 10.3 13.7 6.6 13.9
32768 10.3 13.7 6.6 13.8
Table 9.2.: The benchmark results for 64-bit platforms in cpb on an Intel Core i5-
3210M CPU 2.50GHz; OS: Linux 3.9-1-amd64; Compiler: gcc 4.7.3.
Bytes SHA-256 Twisterπ-256 SHA-512 Twisterπ-512
20 137.3 223.9 456.0 415.4
64 71.7 105.3 142.7 165.8
256 39.4 53.0 92.6 68.6
512 34.0 44.3 74.9 52.5
576 33.4 43.3 66.6 50.7
1024 31.4 39.9 66.0 44.3
1500 30.0 37.9 59.7 41.1
4096 29.5 36.7 59.3 38.3
10000 29.1 36.0 57.9 37.0
16384 29.0 35.9 57.7 36.8
32768 29.0 35.8 57.4 36.5
Table 9.3.: The benchmark results for 32-bit platforms in cpb on an Intel Core i5-
3210M CPU 2.50GHz; OS: Linux 3.9-1-amd64; Compiler: gcc 4.7.3.
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Round Round Round
Maxi-Round
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Figure 9.3.: The compression function Twister-Round-256.
Target Platform. The benchmarking took place on a single core of an Intel Core
i5-3210M CPU 2.50GHz processor. All of the software benchmarking was written
in C or ASM and compiled with the GNU C compiler (gcc) version 4.7.3 using the
optimization flag -O3.
Implementation Remarks. Twisterπ was especially designed with 64-bit plat-
forms in mind by making it possible to aggregate eight times an 8-bit table lookup
into one single 64-bit table lookup.
Results. The results of the 64-bit and 32-bit performance benchmarks are summa-
rized in Tables 9.2 and 9.3, respectively.
9.6. From Twister to Twisterπ
The task of this section is to introduce the differences between Twisterπ and its
predecessor Twister [93]. All modifications have been taken into account as a
results of the external Twisterπ cryptanalysis from Mendel et al. [166]. A detailed
discussion on their findings is given in Section 9.7. The major change between the
two hash function families lies in the structure of the compression function. All
members of the Twisterπ family use the same compression function, independent
of the length of the message digest. On the other hand, the Twister family uses
two similar compression functions, (1) Twister-Round-256, for the computation of
message digest up to 256 bits and (2) Twister-Round-512 to compute message digests
longer than 256 bits. Both hash functions follow the Min-Max approach, i.e., either
three or four Mini-Rounds are pooled to a Maxi-Round. The feed-forward operation
(as visualized in Figure 9.3 and 9.4) is only performed after each Maxi-Round and not
after each Mini-Round since two consecutive Mini-Rounds without a feed-forward
in between guarante full diffusion – a nice property which unfortunately does not
imply either collision or preimage security. In Twisterπ, we perform a feed-forward
after each Mini-Round to thwart rebound attacks. Furthermore, in Twisterπ, we
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Round
Maxi-Round
Round Round Round
Maxi-Round
Round Round Round
Maxi-Round
Round Round Round
B1 B2 B3 B4 0 B5 B6 B7 B8 0
Mini-Mini-Mini-Mini-Mini-Mini-Mini-Mini-Mini-Mini-
Si−1 Si
Figure 9.4.: The compression function Twister-Round-512.
Type Compression Function Calls Memory Requirement
collision attack 2251 29
2nd-preimage attack 2384 264
preimage attack 2456 210
Table 9.4.: Cryptanalytic results for Twister-512 [166].
improved the checksum algorithm by a non-linear operation, namely multiplication
by 3. Finally, Twister injects the TwistCounter into the second column. Twisterπ
injects the TwistCounter into first row to circumvent a cancellation of a non-zero
difference between two message words W and W ′.
9.7. Untwisting the Myth – Cryptanalysis of Twister
This section consists of three parts. The first part introduces the preliminaries needed
for understanding differential cryptanalysis. The second part presents the cryptan-
alytic results for Twister-512 from Mendel et al. [166] – summarized in Table 9.4
– and the third part discusses why those attacks are not applicable to Twisterπ
anymore.
9.7.1. Preliminaries of Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis, introduced by Biham and Shamir at Crypto’90 [42], turned
out to be one of the most powerful techniques to attack cryptographic primitives
like hash functions and block ciphers. It follows differential trails that occur with
a significant probability, instead of looking at specific values. Next, we give a brief
introduction about the basic definitions that are needed in the following cryptanalysis
of Twister. The notions are borrowed from [219].
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Definition 9.2 (XOR Difference). Suppose x1 and x2 are two n-bit values. Then,
the (n-bit) XOR difference is defined by
∆x = x1 ⊕ x2.
Definition 9.3 (Differential Probability). Let F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a func-
tion. Suppose ∆x is an n-bit input difference and ∆y is an m-bit output difference.
Then, we define the differential probability by
Pr
[
∆x
F
→ ∆y
]
= 2−m
2n−1∑
i=0
(F (i)⊕ F (i⊕∆x) = ∆y).
In this thesis we name ∆x input difference, ∆y output difference and ∆x
F
→ ∆y
differential. Note that differentials with a differential probability of zero are called
impossible differentials.
Difference-Distribution Table (DDT). The number of right pairs of a differential
∆x
F
→ ∆y denoted as NF (∆x
F
→ ∆y) is the number of pairs which satisfy that an
input difference ∆x leads to an output difference ∆y. Usually, cryptanalysts are
interested in the number of right pairs for all possible input and output values of a
non-linear function, e.g., an S-box, which can be encoded as DDT.
Definition 9.4 (Difference-Distribution Table (DDT)). Let F be an n×m S-
Box. Then, the DDT of F is a 2n × 2m table whose entries are the number of right
pairs NF (∆x
F
→ ∆y) for all differentials ∆x
F
→ ∆y. The rows and columns of the
DDT are indexed by the input differences ∆x and output differences ∆y, respectively.
Due to the fact that the XOR operation is commutative, all entries of a DDT are
even values, and the sum of each row must be 2n. A toy example is given in Figure
9.5.
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F (x) =

1, x = 0
3, x = 1
2, x = 2
0, x = 3
∆x/∆y 0 1 2 3
0 4 0 0 0
1 0 2 2 0
2 0 2 0 2
3 0 4 0 0
Figure 9.5.: Example computation of a DDT for a 22 × 22 S-box.
AES S-box. The 28 × 28 AES S-box SB – which is also used in Twisterπ and
Twister – provides a nearly uniform distribution of XOR differentials. More pre-
cisely, the 65,536 entries of the SB-DDT are given by 33,150 entries 0, 32,130 entries
2, 255 entries 4, and one entry of 256 [219]. So, the probability that an entry chosen
uniformly at random contains a value greater than zero is about 1/2. A more formal
description of this observation is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 9.5 (Non-Zero Probability of the AES S-Box). Suppose SB is
the AES S-box, and let (∆x,∆y) a fixed tuple of input-output differences. Then,
it holds that
Pr
[
NSB(∆x
SB
→ ∆y) > 0
]
=
32386
65536
≈ 1/2.
9.7.2. Collision Attack on Twisterπ-512
The core of the collision attack is a semi-free-start collision attack for the compression
function based on a rebound attack presented at FSE’09 by Mendel et al. [167]
– about four months after the SHA-3 submission deadline. This attack was then
developed into a collision attack for the hash function using Wagner’s generalized
birthday attack [233].
Semi-Free-Start Collision Attack. This attack only considers the first Maxi-Round
of the Twister-Round-512 compression function. This operation updates the state
S0 by processing the first message words W1,W2, and W3 of a 512-bit message block
Mi by three consecutive invocations of the Mini-Round, i.e., S
′ = (Mini-RoundW3 ◦
Mini-RoundW2 ◦ Mini-RoundW1)(S
0) = Maxi-Round(S0,W1,W2,W3). Note that we
can further decompose a Mini-Round into its individual basic operations:
Mini-Round(S0,Wi) = (MC ◦ SR ◦ SB ◦AC ◦ IMWi)(S
0).
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MI
AC
SB
SR
MI
AC
SB
SR
MC
MI
MC
AC
MC
W1 W2 W3
S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S′
Inbound step Inbound stepOutbound step
Figure 9.6.: A schematic view of the semi-free-start collision attack of Twister-512.
Black state bytes are active.
Then, we have
S′ = Maxi-Round(S0,W1,W2,W3) =(MC ◦ SR ◦ SB ◦AC ◦ IMW3◦
MC ◦ SR ◦ SB ◦AC ◦ IMW2◦
MC ◦ SR ◦ SB ◦AC ◦ IMW1)(S
0).
The basic idea of the attack is to inject a message-word difference ∆W1 into the first
Mini-Round, which can be canceled by the message-word difference ∆W3 in the third
Mini-Round. The rebound attack can then be described by an inbound step and an
outbound step (cf. Figure 9.6). The inbound step propagates differences in W1 and
W3 forwards and backwards through the MixColumns operation with a probability of
1. The goal of the outbound step is to find matches for the resulting differences of
the SubBytes operation of the second round and propagate them outwards.
Inbound Step. Let S0, . . . , S6, and S′ be the internal states of Twister as shown in
Figure 9.6. First, a message word of eight active bytes, i.e., an XOR difference
unequal zero, is injected into the last row of the State S1 by means of the
InjectMessage operation followed by another message injection into the state
S5 to cancel out the remaining active bytes in the last row. Then, the two
active States S2 and S4 are computed by forward and backward computation,
respectively. The column property of the MixColumns operation and its inverse
(see Section 9.2.2) ensures that all 64 bytes of S3 and S4 are active.
Outbound Step. In this step, the adversary has to find a match for the input and
output differences of the SubBytes operation of the second Mini-Round. Note
that all 64 bytes of S3 and S4 are active. So, we have to estimate the effort
for the adversary in finding 64 matches. For a single S-box call, the probability
that a fixed ∆x
SB
→ ∆y exists is about 2−1 (see Proposition 9.5). For such a
differential, it is possible to assign at least two possible values to the S-box, due
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to the symmetry of XOR differences. Next, the adversary chooses a random
difference for the active Byte S2(8,1) and then, computes the first column of the
interim state S3. The probability of finding non-zero differentials for all entries
of this column is 2−8. After finding a match, the adversary continues with the
next column, until all columns are successfully processed. The complexity of
this step is less than 28 compression function calls.
After executing the outbound step, the adversary has found a differential match for
the SubBytes operation and can choose from at least 28 possible states for S3. Each
of those states can be computed forwards or backwards and produces a semi-free-
start collision for a Maxi-Round. Each computation determines as well the State S0
as the values and differences of W1 and W3, where the value of the message word W2
can be freely chosen.
Next, we show how this semi-free-start collision attack can be extended to a collision
attack on Twister-512.
Collision Attack on the Compression Function. At first, the adversary A computes
2224 semi-free-start collisions for the last Maxi-Round of Twister-Round-512 and
stores them in a list L. This has a time complexity of about 2224 compression function
calls. By varying the values for the massage word W7, A can gain additional 2
64
degree of freedom. After this pre-computations step, A randomly chooses some values
for the message words W1 − W5 and computes the input of the last Maxi-Round.
Statistically, the adversary finds a match in L after 2224 tries. The complexity for
this step of the attack is about 2/3 · 2224 compression function calls. In total, this
collision attack has a time complexity of at most 2225 compression function calls and
a memory complexity of 2224. The adversary can get rid of the memory complexity
by applying the memory-less variant of the meet-in-the-middle attack introduced by
Quisquater and Delescaille [195].
In the next paragraph we discuss how A can extend a collision for the compression
function into a genuine collision for Twister-512.
Collision Attack on the Hash Function. In addition to the 8 × 8 state matrix
S, Twister also has an 8 × 8 checksum matrix T which is updated immediately
before the processing of a message word by a Mini-Round. In the post-processing,
T is absorbed into the state via the compression function. Therefore, to construct
a collision for Twister-512, an adversary has to implement a collision for both
the chaining value represented by the state S and the checksum T . This can be
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done by applying the multi-collision attack introduced by Joux [129]. The effort to
construct 2t multi-collisions is t · α where α denotes the complexity for constructing
a single collision. A collision for the compression function of Twister-512 can be
constructed with a time complexity of about 2225. Thus, an adversary can construct
2256 collision with a time complexity of about 256 · 2225 = 2233 evaluations of the
compression function. The memory complexity for this attack is about 29 to store
the 2256 multi-collisions. Due to the birthday paradox, the probability that two out
of 2256 corresponding checksums are equal is greater than 1/2. Thus, we can assume
that the set of multi-collisions also contains a collision for Twister-512. The time
complexity to find a colliding checksum pair is about 2256 checksum computations,
i.e., 16 integer operations consisting of eight XOR operations and eight modular
additions per checksum computation. In contrast, a Twister-Round-512 evaluation,
omitting the checksum computation, can be done in 684 integer operations and 64
load/store operations. The individual numbers can be computed by adding up the
cost of the individual operations which are
• 3 · 8 XOR operations for the feed-forward operations,
• 10 · 1 XOR operations for the InjectMessage step,
• 10 ·64 XOR operations for a combined operation that consists of the SubBytes,
ShiftRows, and MixColumns step, and
• 10 · 64 table lookups for such a combined operation.
Thus, we can assume that the cost of evaluating the compression function is at least 32
times higher than the computation of a checksum, so, 2256 checksum computations has
an effort of at most 2251 compression function evaluations. The memory complexity
for this step is negligible when applying the memory-less variant of the birthday
attack [195].
9.7.3. 2nd-Preimage Attack on Twister-512
Let Si denote the state S after the invocation of the i-th Mini-Round within a
Twister-Round-512. The following 2nd-preimage attack has a minor limitation; it
only works for a given message-hash tuple (M ,Twister-512(M)), where the message
consists of at least 513 message blocks, i.e., |M | > 512 · 513. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that the message M consists of 513 message blocks. The process
of the 2nd-preimage adversary A can be described by the following six consecutive
steps:
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1. A applies the multi-collision attack to construct 2512 multi-collisions with a time
complexity of about 512·2225 = 2234 evaluations of the compression function and
a memory complexity of 29. After this step, A gets 2512 messages leading to the
same chaining value V512, i.e., the state after 512 iterations of the compression
function.
2. A chooses arbitrary values for the last message blockM ′513 with correct padding
and computes the chaining value V513, i.e., the state which is used as input for
the post-processing step.
3. A chooses arbitrary values for the first five columns of the checksum T ′, i.e.,
T ′(1↓), . . . , T
′
(5↓). Then, it computes the interim state S
6
F = V
′
513⊕S
3⊕S6 of the
last compression function call, Twister-Round-256(V ′513, T
′). From the first
preimage, A can compute S′ = Twister-Round-256(S0, T ), and then the value
S10 = S′ ⊕ S6F .
4. For each of the 264 possible values of T ′(8↓), A computes backwards the values
S′7 = InjectMessage(S′7, T ′(7↓)) and stores them in the list L.
5. For each of the 264 possible values of T ′(6↓), A computes forwards from S
6 to
the injection of the checksum word T ′(7↓), and then checks if the result matches
any element of the list L. Since A is still able to choose an arbitrary value for
T ′(7↓), it is sufficient to match all rows except the last. The probability that all of
those 448 bits – from the remaining seven rows – match, is about 2448−128 since
A has 2128 pairs to check. Statistically, A finds a match after 2320 iterations
of the Steps 3-5. So, we can upper bound the costs of finding such a pair by
about 2320+64 = 2384 compression function evaluations.
6. Once A found a 2nd-preimage for the iterative part of Twister-512, it has to
ensure that the checksum T ′ is valid. From the computation of Step 1, A has
access to 2512 checksums leading to the same chaining values V512,V513, and V514.
By applying a memory-less meet-in-the-middle-attack [195], the adversary can
construct the needed checksum value. The complexity for this attack is about
2257 checksum operations.
The introduced 2nd-preimage attack for Twister-512 has a time complexity of about
2384 and a memory complexity of 29+64. Due to the output transformation Output-
Round, the attack cannot be extended to a preimage attack on Twister-512 in a
straightforward way. But, in the next section we will present a sophisticated way to
use this attack as a key element of a preimage attack.
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Figure 9.7.: Inversion of the first 64-bit word of a Twister-512 hash value.
9.7.4. Preimage Attack on Twister-512
To construct a preimage for Twister-512, an adversary A has to invert the output
transformation OutputRound (see Section 9.2.4). Afterwards, it can apply the 2nd-
preimage attack former presented to construct a preimage. Suppose the adversary
has to find a preimage for the value Y = Y1 || . . . || Y8 where Yi denotes the i-th hash
word which was generated by the OutputRound function. Furthermore, we assume
without loss of generality that A produces a preimage M of 513 message blocks with
correct padding, such that Y = Twister-512(M). Let S1-S6 be the internal states
of Twister as shown in Figure 9.7, where S1 denotes the state after the invocation
of the function State-Finalization, i.e., V514. The OutputRound inversion attack
can be described by the following six consecutive steps:
1. A chooses an arbitrary value for the first column of S1 and sets the first column
of S6 using the first 64-bit hash word, i.e., S6(1↓) = S
1
(1↓) ⊕ Y1.
2. A computes forwards 64 bits from the state S1, the Byte S2(1,1), and the seven
Bytes S2(i,j) for 2 ≤ i ≤ 8 where j = 10− i.
3. A computes backwards from State S6 the first column of S5 and the diagonal
bytes of S4.
4. A chooses arbitrary values for the seven remaining diagonal bytes of State S1,
i.e., S1(2,2), . . . , S
1
(8,8). This determines the first column of S
2. Then, A computes
backwards the eight diagonal bytes S3(i,i) = S
1
(i,i) ⊕ S
4
(i,i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 8.
5. Next, A has to find a match of S2 and S3 through the MixColumns operation
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(cf. Figure (9.7). Note that the first column of S2 is already determined by the
previous step. First off all, A tests if the first Byte S3(1,1) matches, if not, A
starts over again from Step 1. Statistically, A finds a match after 28 iterations of
Steps 1-4. Then, it find matches for the remaining columns of S2 by executing
the following two steps:
a) A chooses for each column 2 ≤ i ≤ 8 arbitrary values for the remaining
seven Bytes S2(j,i) with 1 ≤ j ≤ 8 and j 6= 10 − i since S
2
(10−i,i) is already
fixed due to Step 2.
b) Then, A computes the MixColumns operation and checks if Byte S3(i,i)
matches, and repeates the previous step if not. This step has a time
complexity of 28 Mini-Round operations.
Note that each column can be modified independently. Therefore, this step
has a time complexity of about 8 × 28 = 211 Mini-Round operations. This
corresponds to about 28 compression function evaluations.
6. AfterA has found a match for all columns of S2, it computes S1 backwards from
S2. Note that the values fixed in Step 1 and Step 4 do not change anymore.
A can invert the OutputRound of Twister-512 by repeating Steps 1-6 about 2448
time. Thus, this inversion attack has a time complexity of about 2448+8 = 2456
compression function evaluations and a total memory complexity of 210. Now, A
can apply the 2nd-preimage attack of the previous section to the State S1 = V514 to
construct a preimage for Twister-512 which consists of 513 message blocks. This
preimage attack has a total time complexity of 2448+2456 ≈ 2456 compression function
operations and a total memory complexity of 210.
Remarks. None of the introduced collision, preimage, and 2nd-preimage attacks on
Twister-512 are practical due to the time complexity of at least 2384 compression
function calls. Nevertheless, they reveal non-random properties that are not present
in SHA-512. Due to the publication of those attacks, the committee of the SHA-3
Competition did not pass Twister-512 to the second round; a rightful choice.
9.7.5. Twisterπ Security Discussion
In this section we argue why the presented attacks on Twister-512 are not applicable
to Twisterπ-512.
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Collision Attacks. The semi-free-start collision attack exploits the invertibility of
a Maxi-Round. Twisterπ abandoned the concept of Maxi-Rounds and applies a
feed-forward after each Mini-Round. Thus, following the notations of Figure 9.6, we
have S6 = (AC ◦MI)(S5 ⊕ S2) instead of S6 = (AC ◦MI)(S5). Since S2 is a full
active state and the message word is injected in the last row, the interim state S6
has at least 56 active bytes. Therefore, it is no longer possible to achieve a state
containing an all-zero difference after three invocations of a Mini-Round. So, the ad-
ditional feed-forward operations thwart the proposed rebound attack. Furthermore,
this modification also thwarts the presented collision attack on Twister-512 since
it is just a sophisticated extension of the semi-free-start collision attack.
(2nd-) Preimage Attack. The preimage attack on Twister-512 presented in Sec-
tion 9.7.4 invokes the 2nd-preimage attack from Section 9.7.3. Thus, it is sufficient
to show why the 2nd-preimage attack is no longer applicable to Twisterπ-512.
Steps 3 and 4 of the 2nd-preimage attack on Twister-512, the adversary also
exploits the invertibility of a Maxi-Round to compute the interim states S10 and S′7.
The extra feed-forward operation would not allow to compute S10 without determin-
ing T(6↓), T(7↓), and T(8↓). But this would take away the freedom from an adversary
to choose an arbitrary value for T(7↓) and T(8↓), increasing the time complexity by
2128 from 2384 to 2512, which renders this attack not better than exhausting search.
9.8. Results Summary
We proposed a family of hash functions which overcomes several identified weaknesses
of the commonly used MD4/5 family of hash functions (MD4, MD5, SHA-0/1). By
using some of the well-analyzed building blocks and ideas of Rijndael, we obtained a
design for which we claim that no efficient differential collision structure exists. In
addition, we limit access to the internal structure and take care that any possible
difference quickly diffuses into the internal state. Furthermore, it is highly scalable as
there are – as proposed in, e.g.,Twisterπ-256 and Twisterπ-512 – many possible
ways to adopt our main building block, the Twister-Round.
Furthemore, we proposed two specific instantiations of the Twisterπ framework,
Twisterπ-256 and Twisterπ-512. The claimed security level for Twisterπ-256
with respect to collision resistance is 2128 and with respect to (2nd-) preimage re-
sistance 2256. For Twisterπ-512, the claimed security level for collision resistance
is 2256 and for (2nd-) preimage resistance 2512. The Twisterπ family of hash func-
tions exploits mathematical structures (i.e., MDS matrices) and, at the same time,
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has comparable speed to the SHA-2 family. Thus, instances of the Twisterπ fam-
ily are suitable for a huge range of applications from low-end 8-bit microcontroller
platforms up to high-end 64-bit software architectures.
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Talent hits a target no one else can
hit; Genius hits a target no one else
can see.
Arthur Schopenhauer
From the early 1960s [218] till now, the concept of textural passwords are dominant
in terms of human-computer authentication. In the context of this thesis we define a
password as a user-chosen secret, and thus, we also consider both a passphrase and
a Personal Identification Number (PIN) as a password. As observed by Wilkes in the
late 1960s [237], storing plain authentication passwords is insecure. Everybody that
is granted access to the password storage of a specific multi-user system, immediately
learns all user passwords, and can just impersonate any user by a legitimate login.
About a decade later, the UNIX system integrated some of Wilkes ideas [174] by de-
ploying a DES-based [175] one-way encryption function, called crypt. This function
is limited to passwords up to eight characters since the seven least significant bits
of each of the first eight characters of the password represents the 56-bit key of the
64-bit block cipher DES, which is used to encrypt iteratively – 25 times – a string of
64 zero-bits.
Under the assumption that crypt is preimage-secure, there is no efficient way to
recover the original password from its output, i.e., the password hash. Nevertheless,
this scheme can nowadays not longer be considered secure, due to its very small key
space of 56 bits. By the means of modern Graphical Processing Units (GPUs) with
hundreds of cores [67] – as embedded in all state-of-the art graphics cards – it is
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possible to recover the key in feasible time. For example, the advanced password-
recovery tool hashcat can process about 226 password candidates per second (c/s)
on a single AMD hd6990 graphics card [226]. An adversary with access to a GPU-
cluster with 128 nodes can compute a preimage in about four months. Thus, the
question of how to slow down such adversaries becomes a pressing one.
Memory is expensive; so, a typical GPU or other cheap massively-parallel hardware
with lots of cores can only have a limited amount of memory for each single core.
More importantly, each core will have only a very limited amount of fast memory
(cache). So, the way to prevent c-core adversaries from gaining some close-to-c-
times speed-up is by making a password scrambler not only intentionally slow on
standard sequential computers, but also intentionally memory consuming. Under
the preimage-security assumption, any adversary using c cores in parallel with less
than about c times the memory of a sequential implementation must experience a
strong slow-down. A formal definition of this property called sequential memory-
hardness is given in Section 10.3 (cf. Definition 10.3). The first password scrambler
that took this condition into account was scrypt [191].
In the light of the current situation, the designer of a modern password scrambler
is caught between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, the acceptance of a
password scrambler depends on its time and memory usage. Usually, user want
to log in without noticeable delay [231], and especially on embedded devices, such
as routers or switches, it is unlikely that the developers choose to implement a login
process that consumes a significant amount of expensive memory. On the other hand,
the more time and memory a password scrambler needs to compute a hash from a
password, the less efficient are guessing attacks such as exhaustive search. This is
the reason why the password processing takes some time for both kinds of users
legitimate ones and attackers. Thus, a good password scrambler P has to satisfy at
least the following three basic conditions:
(1) Given a password pwd , computing P(pwd) should be“fast enough” for the user.
(2) Computing P(pwd) should be “as slow as possible”, without contradicting the
previous condition.
(3) Given h = P(pwd), there must be no significantly faster way to test q password
candidates x1, x2, . . . , xq for P(Xi) = Y than by actually computing P(xi) for
each xi.
124
10.1. Background
Memory-Access Pattern and Outline. Note that a memory-consuming password
scrambler may suffer from a new problem. If the memory-access pattern depends
on the password, and the adversary can observe that pattern, this may open the
way to another kind of shortcut attack. For example, a spy process running on the
same machine as the password scrambler P (without access to the internal memory
of P) may gather information about the memory-access pattern by measuring cache
timings. This information can be used to greatly speed-up massively-parallel attacks
with low memory for each core. In Section 10.4 we show that this is actually an
issue for scrypt, and then, in Section 10.5 we present a fix by introducing Catena,
a new password scrambler framework which consumes lots of memory (like scrypt),
but does not have a password-dependend memory-access pattern. In Section 10.6 we
formally analyze the security of Catena framework and its memory consumption.
Section 10.7 presents a secure Key Derivation Function (KDF) based on Catena. In
Section 10.8 we introduce an instantiation of Catena, namely Catena-DBG, and
in Section 10.9 we analyze its security and memory-hardness. Finally, Section 10.10
summarizes our contribution.
10.1. Background
Since the introduction of crypt, storing the hash of a password and avoiding to store
the plain password itself has become the minimum standard for secure password-
based user authentication. But, even as late as 2012, major players like Yahoo and
CSDN (China Software Developer Network) seem to store plain user passwords [157].
Two important innovations from crypt were key stretching and salts. Key stretch-
ing is the answer to the typically low entropy of user-chosen passwords: The pass-
word scrambler is intentionally slow, but not too slow for the regular operation, e.g., a
password-based login. This makes exhaustively searching through all likely passwords
more expensive.
Salt. A salt refers to an additional random input for the password scrambler and is
stored together with the password hash. It enables a password scrambler to derive
lots of different password hashes from a single password as an initialization vector
enables an encryption scheme to derive lots of different ciphertexts from a single
plaintext. Since the salt must be chosen uniformly at random, it is most likely that
different users have different salts. Thus, it defends against attacks where password
hashes from many different users are known to the attacker, e.g., against the usage
of rainbow tables [182].
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Pepper. There are different ways to perform key stretching. One is to keep p bits of
the salt secret, turning them into pepper [159]. Both attackers and legitimate users
have to try out all 2p values the pepper can have (or 2p−1 on the average). Note that
a careless implementation of this approach could leak a few bits of the pepper via
timing information when trying out all possible values in a specific order. Thus, a
recommended approach would be to start at a random value and wrap around at 2p.
Kelsey et al. [136] analyzed another key stretching approach where a cryptographic
operation is iterated n times. Boyen proposed in [52] a user-defined implicit choice
of n by iterating until the user presses a “halt” button.
10.2. Related Work
Table 10.1 provides an overview of password scramblers that are or have been in
frequent use, compared to Catena. It indicates whether the password scrambler
supports salt, server relief, and client-independent updates. Furthermore, the table
lists all possible values of the cost factor (security parameter) including the default
values, the memory usage, and issues from which the considered password scrambler
may suffer from.
Hash Function Based Password Scramblers. Not long ago, md5crypt [132] has
been used in nearly all Free-BSD and Linux-based systems to scramble user pass-
words. It is based on the well-known MD5 hash function with a fixed number of
1,000 iterations. Due to the fact that CPUs and GPUs become more and more pow-
erful, md5crypt can now be computed too fast, e.g., over 5 million times per second
on an AMD HD 6990 graphics card [226]. Additionally, its own author does not con-
sider md5crypt secure anymore [132]. Common Linux distributions nowadays employ
sha512crypt [82], e.g., Debian, Ubuntu, and Fedora. It provides similar features as
md5crypt, but uses SHA-512 instead of MD5. Furthermore, the number of iterations
can be chosen by the user; default is 5,000 iterations. NTLMv1 [112] is a fast password
scrambler which is deployed to generate hash values for several versions of Microsoft
Windows passwords. It is very efficient to compute: One can check over nine bil-
lion password candidates per second on a single Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
graphics card [226]. For this and other reasons, we recommend that NTLMv1 should
not be used anymore, if possible.
The Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) has been specified
by the NIST [231]. It is widely used either as a KDF (e.g., in Wi-Fi Protected
Access (WPA), WPA2, OpenOffice, or WinZip) or as a password scrambler (e.g., in
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Password Scrambler Cost Factor Memory Server Client-Indep. Issues
Relief Updates
crypt [174] 25 small - - “too fast”
md5crypt [132] 1,000 small - - “too fast”
sha512crypt [82] 1,000–999,999 small - - small memory
NTLMv1 [112] 1 small - - “too fast”
PBKDF2 [231] 1–∞ small - - small memory
bcrypt [194] 24–299 4,168 bytes - - constant memory
scrypt [191] 1–∞ flexible, big - - cache-timing attacks
Catena (this work) 21–2∞ flexible, big X X new and untested
Table 10.1.: Comparison of contemporary password scramblers.
Mac OS X, and LastPass). The security of PBKDF2 is based on c iterations of Hash-
Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [17] instantiated with SHA-1, where c
is a user-chosen value which is given by default with c = 1, 000.
bcrypt. The bcrypt algorithm [194] is built upon the Blowfish block cipher [220].
Internally, Blowfish uses a slow key scheduler to generate an internal state of 4,168 bytes
for the key-dependent S-boxes (4×1, 024 bytes) and the round keys (72 bytes). Thus,
while bcrypt has not been designed with the intention to thwart parallelized attack-
ers by exhaustive memory usage, the state is sufficiently large to slow down bcrypt
significantly on current GPUs, e.g., it can only be computed about 4,000 times per
second on an AMD HD 7970 graphic card [226]. However, the state size is fixed – so
if future GPUs have a larger cache, it may actually run much faster. There is no
tunable parameter to increase the memory requirement. For key stretching, bcrypt
invokes the Blowfish key scheduler 2c times, e.g., OpenBSD uses c = 6 for users and
c = 8 for the superuser.
scrypt. Occupying a lot of memory hinders attacks using special-purpose hardware
(storage is expensive) and GPUs. We are aware of one single password-scrambler that
has been designed to fulfill this requirement: scrypt [191]. (There was HEKS [197],
but it has been broken by the author of scrypt [191].) As its core, scrypt uses the
sequentially memory-hard function ROMix, which can take G units of memory and
performs 2G operations. With only G/K units of memory, the number of operations
goes up to 2G ·K. In [191], Percival recommends G = 214 and G = 220 for password
hashing and key derivation, respectively. We will describe and analyze scrypt and
ROMix in Section 10.4.
127
10. Catena: A Memory-Consuming Password Scrambler
10.3. Memory-Related Properties
In this section we introduce a listing of desired properties a modern password scram-
bler should have – beyond salt and pepper. We start, by introducing the security
parameter g, called garlic. The notion of garlic reflects the property that incre-
menting this parameter by ’1’ doubles the memory usage and at least doubles the
computational time.
Memory-Hardness. To describe memory requirements, we adopt and slightly change
the notion from [191]. The intuition is that for any parallelized attack, using c cores,
the required memory per core is decreased by a factor of 1/c, and vice versa.
Definition 10.1 (Memory-Hard Function). For a memory-hard function F
which is computed on a Random Access Machine using S(g) space and T (g) op-
erations, it holds that
T (g) = Ω
(
G2
S(g)
)
,
where G = 2g.
Thus, for S(g) · T (g) = G2 with G = 2g, using c cores, it holds that
(1/c · S(g)) · (c · T (g)) = G2.
A formal generalization of this notion is given in the following.
Definition 10.2 (λ−Memory-Hard Function). For a λ-memory-hard function
F which is computed on a Random Access Machine using S(g) space and T (g) oper-
ations, it holds that
T (g) = Ω
(
Gλ+1
S(g)λ
)
,
where G = 2g.
Thus, if one has only 1/c of the memory available, one needs cλ processor units to
gain the same time-memory tradeoff, i.e.,
(1/c · S(g)λ) · (cλ · T (g)) = Gλ+1.
In the following we use S(g) and S as synonyms.
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Definition 10.3 (Sequential Memory-Hard Function). A sequential memory-
hard function is a function F with the following properties:
(a) F is memory-hard and
(b) there is no β > 0 such that F can be computed on a Parallel Random Access
machine with S∗(g) processors and S∗(g) space in expected time T ∗(g), where
S∗(g)T ∗(g) = O(T (g)2−β).
Password Recovery (Preimage Security). For a modern password scrambler it
must hold that the advantage of an adversary (modelled as a computationally un-
bounded but always-halting algorithm) for guessing a valid password should be rea-
sonable small, i.e., not higher than for trying out all possible candidates. Therefore,
given a password scrambler P, we define the password-recovery advantage of an ad-
versary A as follows:
Definition 10.4 (Password Recovery Advantage). Let s denote a randomly
chosen salt value and pwd a password randomly chosen from a source Q with m
bits of min-entropy. Then, given a hash value h← P(s, pwd), it holds that
AdvRECP,Q (A) = Prs
[
pwd← Q, h← P(s, pwd) : x← AP,s,h : P(s, x) = h
]
.
Furthermore, by AdvRECP (q) we denote the maximum advantage taken over all ad-
versaries asking at most q queries to P.
Client-Independent Update. According to Moore’s Law [173], the available re-
sources of an adversary increase continually over time – and so do those of the
legitimate user. Hence, a security parameter chosen once may be too weak after
some time and needs to be updated. This can easily be accomplished immediately
after the user has entered its password the next time. However, in many cases,
a significant amount of user accounts is inactive or rarely used, e.g., 70.1% of all
Facebook accounts experience zero updates per month [177], and 73% of all Twitter
accounts do not have at least one tweet per month [215]. Therefore, it is desirable
to be able to compute a new password hash (with some higher security parameter)
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from the old one (with the old and weaker security parameter), without having to
involve user interaction or otherwise having to know the password. We call this fea-
ture a client-independent update of the password hash. When key stretching is done
by iterating an operation, client-independent updates may or may not be possible,
depending on the details of the inner workings of a password scrambler. For example,
when the original password is one of the inputs for the final operation (see [191]),
client-independent updates are impossible.
Server Relief. A slow and – even worse – memory-demanding password-based login
process may be too much of a burden for many service providers. Server relief splits
the password-scrambling process into two parts: (1) a slow (and possibly memory-
demanding) one-way function F and (2) an efficient one-way function H. By default,
the server computes the password hash H(F(pwd , s)) from the password pwd and a
salt s. Alternatively, the server sends s to the client who responds x = F(pwd , s).
Finally, the server just computes H(x). While it is probably easy to write a generic
server-relief protocol using any password scrambler, none of the existing password
scramblers has been designed to naturally support this property.
Key Derivation Function (KDF). Beyond authentication, passwords are also used
to derive symmetric keys. Obviously, one can just use the output of the password
scrambler as a symmetric key – perhaps after truncating it to the required key size.
This is a disadvantage if one either needs a key that is longer than the password hash
or has to derive more than one key. Thus, it is prudent to consider a KDF as a tool
of its own right – with the option to derive more than one key and with the security
requirement that compromising some of the keys does not endanger the other ones.
Note that it is required for a KDF that the input and output behaviour cannot be
distinguished from that of a set of random functions.
Resistance against Cache-Timing Attacks. Password scramblers with a password-
dependent memory-access pattern risk to be vulnerable against cache-timing attacks.
Depending on the implementation and under certain circumstances, timing informa-
tion related to a given machine’s cache behavior may enable the adversary to ob-
serve which addresses have been accessed. This can be exploited to implement a
very efficient password-candidate sieve. Therefore, any password scrambler whose
memory-access pattern is independent from the password is not vulnerable against
cache-timing attacks.
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10.4. The scrypt Password Scrambler
Algorithm 16 describes the scrypt password scrambler and its core operation ROMix.
For pre- and post-processing, scrypt invokes the one-way function PBKDF2 to sup-
port inputs and outputs of arbitrary length. ROMix uses a hash function H with an
n-bit output where n is the size of a cache line (at current machines, often 512 bits).
To support hash functions with smaller output sizes, [191] proposes to instantiate
H by a function called BlockMix, which we will not elaborate on. For our security
analysis of ROMix, we modelled H as a random oracle.
ROMix takes two inputs: An initial state x which depends on both salt and pass-
word, and the array size G that defines the required storage. One can interpret
log2(G) as the garlic factor of scrypt. In the first phase (Lines 20–23), ROMix initial-
izes an array v, i.e., the array variables v0, . . . , vG−1 are set to x,H(x),H(H(x)), . . . ,
H(. . . (H(x))), respectively. In the second phase (Lines 24–27), ROMix updates x de-
pending on vj . The sequential-memory hardness comes from the way how the index
j is computed, depending on the current value of x, i.e., j ← x mod G. After G
updates, the final value of x is returned and undergoes the post-processing.
A minor issue is that scrypt uses the password pwd as one of the inputs for
post-processing (Line 12). Thus, it has to be in storage during the entire password-
scrambling process. This is risky if there is any chance that the memory can be
Algorithm 16 The scrypt Algorithm and its Core Operation ROMix [191].
scrypt
Input:
pwd {Password}
s {Salt}
G {Cost Parameter}
Output: x {Password Hash}
10: x← PBKDF2(pwd , s, 1, 1)
11: x← ROMix(x,G)
12: x← PBKDF2(pwd , x, 1, 1)
13: return x
ROMix
Input:
x {Initial State}
G {Cost Parameter}
Output: x {Hash Value}
20: for i = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
21: vi ← x
22: x← H(x)
23: end for
24: for i = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
25: j ← x mod G
26: x← H(x⊕ vj)
27: end for
28: return x
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Algorithm 17 ROMixMC
Input:
x {Initial State},
G {1st Cost Parameter},
K {2nd Cost Parameter}
Output: x {Hash Value}
1: for i = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
2: if i mod K = 0 then
3: vi ← x
4: end if
5: x← H(x)
6: end for
7: for i = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
8: j ← x mod G
9: ℓ← K(j/K)
10: y ← vℓ
11: for m = ℓ+ 1, . . . , j do
12: y ← H(y) { invariant: y ← vm }
13: end for
14: x← H(x⊕ y)
15: end for
16: return x
compromised during the time scrypt is running. Compromising the memory should
not happen anyway, but this issue could easily be fixed without any bad effect on
the security of scrypt, e.g., one could replace Line 12 of Algorithm 16 by x ←
PBKDF2(s, x, 1, 1).
10.4.1. Brief Analysis of ROMix
In the following we introduce a way to run ROMix with less than G units of storage.
Suppose we only have S < G units of storage for the values in v. For convenience,
we assume G is a multiple of S and set K ← G/S. As it will turn out, the memory-
constrained Algorithm ROMixMC (cf. Algorithm 17) generates the same result as ROMix
with less than G storage units and is Θ(K) times slower than ROMix. From the array
v, we will only store the values v0, vK , v2k, . . . , v(S−1)K – using all the S memory
units available.
At Line 9, the variable ℓ is assigned the biggest multiple of K less or equal j. By
verifying the invariant at Line 12, one can easily see that ROMixMC computes the same
hash value as the original ROMix, except that vj is computed on the fly, beginning
with vℓ. These computations call the random oracle on average (K − 1)/2 times.
Thus, the second phase of ROMixMC is about Θ(K) times slower than the second
phase of ROMix, and this dominates the workload for ROMixMC.
Next, we briefly discuss why ROMix is sequentially memory-hard (for the full proof
see [191]). The intuition is as follows: The indices j are determined by the output
of the random oracle H and thus, essentially, uniformly distributed random values
over {0, . . . , G − 1}. With no way to anticipate the next j, the best approach is to
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minimize the size of the “gaps”, i.e., the number of consecutively unknown vj . This
is indeed what ROMixMC does, by storing one vi every K’th step.
10.4.2. Cache-Timing Attacks
Algorithm 16 (scrypt/ROMix) revisited. What could possibly go wrong?
The Spy Process. As it turns out, the idea to compute an unpredictable index j
and then ask for the value vj , which is useful for sequential memory-hardness, is also
an issue. Consider a spy process running on the same machine as scrypt. This spy
process cannot read the internal memory of scrypt. But, as it is running on the
same machine, it shares its cache memory with ROMix. The spy process interrupts
the execution of ROMix twice:
1. When ROMix enters the second phase (Line 24 of Algorithm 17), the spy process
reads from a bunch of addresses, to force out all the vi that are still in the cache.
Thereupon, ROMix is allowed to run for another very short time.
2. Now, the spy process interrupts ROMix again. By measuring access times when
reading from different addresses, the spy process can figure out which of the vi
have been read by ROMix, in between.
So, the spy process can tell us the indices j for which vj has been read, and with this
information we can mount the following cache-timing attack.
The Preliminary Cache-Timing Attack. Let pwd ′ denote the current password can-
didate. Suppose x is the output of PBKDF2(pwd ′,salt,1,1). Then, we can apply the
following password candidate sieve:
1. Execute the first phase of ROMix, without storing the vi, i.e., skip Line 21 of
Algorithm 16.
2. Compute the index j ← x mod G.
3. If vj is one of the values that have been read by ROMix, then store pwd
′ in a
list.
4. Else, conclude that pwd ′ is a wrong password.
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This sieve can run in parallel on any number of cores, each core trying out another
password candidate pwd ′. Note that each core needs only a small and constant
amount of memory – the data structure to decide if j is one of the indices of the
value vj which has been read. Further, this can be shared between all the cores.
Hence, we can use exactly the kind of hardware that scrypt has been designed to
hinder.
Next, we discuss the gain of this attack. Let r denote the number of iterations
the loop in Lines 24–27 of ROMix has performed before the second interrupt by the
spy process. So, there are at most r indices j with vj being read. That means, we
expect this approach to sort out all but r/G candidates. If our spy process manages
to interrupt very soon after allowing it to run again, we have r ≪ G. This may
enable us to use conventional hardware to run full ROMix to search for the correct
password among the candidates on the list.
The Final Cache-Timing Attack. In this attack we allow the second interrupt to
arrive very late – maybe even as late as the termination time of ROMix. So, the loop
in Lines 24–27 of ROMix has been run r = G times. As it seems, each vi has been
read once. But actually, this is only true on the average; some vi have been read
more than once, and we expect about (1/e)G ≈ 0.37G array elements vi not being
read at all. So, applying the basic attack allows us to eliminate about 37% of all
password candidates – a rather small gain for such hard work.
In the following we introduce a way to push the attack further, inspired by Algo-
rithm 17, the memory-constrained ROMixMC. Our final cache-timing attack on scrypt
does only need the smallest possible amount of memory: S = 1,K = G/S = G, and
thus, we only have to store the single value v0. Like the second phase of ROMixMC,
we will compute the values vj on the fly when needed. Unlike ROMixMC, we will stop
execution whenever one of our values j is such that vj has not been read by ROMix
(according to the information from our spy process).
Thus, if the first vj has not been read, we immediately stop the execution without
any on-the-fly computation; if the first vj has been read, but not the second, we need
one on-the-fly computation of vj , and so forth.
Since a fraction, i.e., 1/e, of all values vi has not been read, we will need about
1/(1 − 1/e) ≈ 1.58 on the fly computations of some vj , each at the average price
of (G − 1)/2 times calling H. Additionally, each iteration needs one call to H for
computing x← H(x⊕ vj). Including the work for the first phase, with G calls to H,
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the expected number of calls to reject a wrong password is about
G+ 1.58 ·
(
1 +
G− 1
2
)
≈ 1.79G.
As it turns out, rejecting a wrong password with constant memory is faster than
computing ordinary ROMix with all the required storage, which actually makes 2G
calls to H, without computing any vi on the fly. We stress that the ability to abort
the computation, thanks to the information gathered by the spy process, is crucial.
10.4.3. Discussion
At the current point of time, our cache-timing attacks are theoretical. Even if one
manages to run a spy process on a machine using scrypt, the requirement to inter-
rupt ROMix twice at the right points of time is demanding. Nevertheless, even the
theoretical ability of mounting such attacks should be seriously taken into account.
The idea of attacking cryptographic algorithms from hardware side (side-channel
attacks) is not new [145], neither is the usage of a spy process for theoretical cache-
timing attacks [190]. In [31], Bernstein demonstrated practically how to recover AES
keys by using cache-timing information:
The problem lies in AES itself: it is extremely difficult to write constant-
time high-speed AES software [...]. Constant time low-speed AES software
is fairly easy to write but is also unacceptable for many applications.
Similarly, we argue that there is a problem in scrypt itself. One can certainly imple-
ment scrypt such that cache-timings do not leak information about the password.
But, we believe this would drastically reduce the performance of scrypt. As a com-
pensation – recall that password scramblers are intentionally slow, but must be “fast
enough” for the user – one would have to set the cost parameter G to some smallish
value. But, this would only make regular attacks more efficient since attackers can
use faster implementations. At the end of the day, this may defeat the entire point
of using scrypt at all.
Note that this cache-timing attack has even more severe consequences. It does
not only speed-up regular password-guessing attacks where the password hash is
already in possession of the adversary. It also enables an adversary A to recover a
password without knowing the password hash at all by just verifying the memory-
access pattern.
The core of the problem is the fact that ROMix reads a value vj , where the index
j ← x mod G depends on x and thus, on the password. It would be very convenient
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to have a password scrambler which is sequentially memory-hard and computes j in
some password-independent way, i.e., only depending on the loop index i. In the next
section we actually present such a λ-memory-hard password scrambler, Catena.
10.4.4. The Garbage-Collector Attack
Here we introduce another memory-based issue of the ROMix algorithm. Typical
attackers try plenty of password candidates in parallel, and this gets a lot more
costly if they need a huge amount of memory for each candidate. The defender, on
the other hand, will only compute a single hash, and the parameters (especially the
“garlic”) should be chosen such that the required amount of memory is easily available
to the defender.
But, memory-demanding password scrambling may also provide completely new
attack opportunities for the adversary. If we allocate a huge block of memory for
password scrambling, holding v0, v1, . . . , vG−1, this memory becomes “garbage” after
the password scrambler has terminated, and will be collected for reuse, eventually.
One usually assumes that the adversary learns the hash of the secret. The garbage-
collector attack assumes that the adversary additionally learns the memory content,
i.e., the values vi, after the termination of the password scrambler.
For ROMix, the value v0 = H(x) is a plain hash of the original secret x. Hence, the
garbage-collector adversary can bypass ROMix completely and search directly for x
with H(x) = v0, implying that each password candidate can be checked in time and
memory O(1). Thus, ROMix does not provide much defense against garbage-collector
attacks. As a possible countermeasure, one can simply overwrite v0, . . . , vG−1 after
running ROMix. But, this step might be removed by a compiler due to optimization,
since it is algorithmically ineffective.
10.5. Specification of Catena
In this section we introduce our password scrambler Catena. More detailed, we
first specify Catena and explain its properties regarding to password hashing, i.e.,
client-independent update and server relief. Afterwards, we present a instantiations
of Catena, called Catena-DBG.
A formal definition is shown in Algorithm 18, based on two building blocks: (1) the
cryptographic hash function H (see Lines 1 and 4) and (2) the memory-consuming
n-bit hash function Fλ (see Line 3). Note that we require that the function Fλ is
1. λ-memory hard,
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Algorithm 18 Catena
Input: λ {Depth}, g0 {Initial Garlic}, pwd {Password},
u {Tweak}, s {Salt}, g {Garlic}
Output: x {hash of the password}
1: x← H(u || pwd || s)
2: for c = g0, . . . , g do
3: x← Fλ(c, x)
4: x← H(c || x)
5: end for
6: return x
2. collision resistant and,
3. its memory-access pattern is independent of the password derived input x.
Note that the for loop (Line 2–5) is required to provide client-independent updates.
For the initial deployment of Catena, we recommend to set the initial garlic value
g0 to g to achieve the best ratio between running time and memory usage. For the
sake compatibility λ and g0 should never be updated.
Note that a secure password scrambler must satisfy preimage security. It is easy
to see that Catena inherits the preimage security from the underlying hash function
H.
Next, we discuss the tweak and two further novel features of Catena.
Tweak. The tweak u is an additional multi-byte value which is given by:
u← d || λ || n || |s| || H(H),
where the first byte d denotes the mode (domain) for which Catena is used: d = 0
when used as a password scrambler, and d = 1 when used as a KDF (see Section 10.7).
All remaining possible values for d are reserved for future applications. The second
byte λ (depth) defines together with the memory cost parameter g (garlic) the security
parameters for Catena. The next 16-bit value n denotes the output length of the
underlying hash function H in bits. The 32-bit value |s| denotes the total length
of the salt in bits. The last n-bit value H(H) is the hash of the associated data
H, which can contain additional information like hostname, user-ID, name of the
company, or the IP address of the host, with the goal to customize the password
hashes. The tweak is processed together with the secret password and the salt (see
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Algorithm 18, Line 1). Thus, the tweak u can be seen as a weaker version of a salt,
increasing the additional computational effort for an adversary when using different
values. Furthermore, it allows to differentiate between password hashing and key
derivation.
Client-Independent Update. Its sequential structure does enable Catena to pro-
vide client-independent updates. Let h = Catenaλ(pwd , u, s, g) be the hash of a
specific password pwd , where u, s, and g denote the tweak, the salt, and the garlic.
After increasing the security parameter from g to g′ = g+1, we can update the hash
value h without user interaction by computing:
h′ = H(g′ || Fλ(g
′, h)).
It is easy to see that the equation h′ = Catenaλ(pwd , u, s, g
′) holds.
Server Relief. In the last iteration of the for-loop in Algorithm 18, the client has
to omit the last invocation of the hash function H (see Line 4) and then transmits
the output of Catena to the server. Afterwards, the server computes the password
hash by applying the hash function H. Thus, the vast majority of the effort (memory
usage and computational time) for computing the password hash is handed over to
the client exonerating the server. This enables someone to deploy Catena even
under restricted environments or when using constrained devices – or when a single
server has to handle a huge amount of authentication requests.
Keyed Password Hashing. To further thwart off-line attacks, we introduce a tech-
nique to use Catena for keyed password hashing, where the password hash de-
pends on both a password and a secret key K. Note that K is the same for all
users, and thus, it has to be stored on the server. To preserve the server-relief prop-
erty (see above), we encrypt the output of Catena using the XOR operation with
H(K || userID || g || K), which, under the reasonable assumption that the value
(userID || g) is a nonce, was proven to be CPA-secure in [205]. Then, the keyed
password hash y is given by
y := Catenaλ(pwd , u, s, g)⊕H(K || userID || g || K),
where the userID is a unique and user-specific identification number which is assigned
by the server. Now, we show what happens during the client-independent update,
i.e., when g = g + r for arbitrary integer r > 0. The process takes the following four
steps:
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1. Given K and userID, compute w = H(K || userID || g || K).
2. Compute x = y ⊕ w, where y denotes the current keyed hash value.
3. Update x, i.e., x = H(c || Fλ(c, x)) for c ∈ {g + 1, . . . , g + r}.
4. Compute the new hash value y = y ⊕H(K || userID || g + r || K).
Remark. Obviously, it is a bad idea to store the secret key K on the same place as
the password hashes since it can be leaked in the same way as the password-hash
database. One possibility to separate the key from the hashes is to securely store
the secret key by making use of hardware security modules (HSM), which provide
a tamper-proof memory environment with verifiable security. Then, the protection
of the secret key depends on the level provided by the HSM (see FIPS140-2 [57] for
details). Another possibility is to derive K from a password during the bootstrapping
phase. Afterwards, K will be kept in the RAM and will never be on the hard disk
drive. Thus, the key and the password-hash database should never be part of the
same backup file.
10.6. Security Analysis of Catena
We denote a password scrambler to be secure if it provides at least 1-memory-hardness
and preimage security. Furthermore, it should be resistant against cache-timing at-
tacks. It is easy to see that Catena inherits its λ-memory-hardness from Fλ. Since
the memory-access pattern of Catena is static and therefore, independent from the
password, it provides resistance against cache-timing attacks. Finally, we show that
Catena is a secure passsword scrambler that behaves like a good random function,
which is useful for using Catena as a secure KDF. Before we present our claims, we
introduce some essential knowledge, which ease the understanding of our proofs.
Password-Recovery Resistance. In this section we show that Catena is a good
password scrambler, i.e., given the hash value h it is infeasible for an adversary to do
better than trying out password candidates in likelihood order to obtain the correct
password.
Theorem 10.5 (Catena is Password-Recovery Resistant). Let m denote the
min-entropy of a passwords source Q. Then, it holds that
AdvREC
Catena,Q
(q) ≤
q
2m
+AdvpreH (q, t).
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Proof. Note that an adversary A can always guess a (weak) password by trying
out about 2m password candidates. For a maximum of q queries, it holds that the
success probability is given by q/2m. Instead of guessing 2m password candidates,
an adversary can also try to find a preimage for a given hash value h. It is easy to
see from Algorithm 18 that an adversary thus has to find a preimage for H in Line
4. More detailed, for a given value h with h ← H(g, x), A has to find a valid value
for x. The success probability for this can be upper bounded by AdvpreH (q, t). Our
claim follows by adding up the individual terms. 
Pseudorandomness. In the following we analyze the advantage of an adversary A
in distinguishing the output of Catena from a random bitstring of the same length
as the output of Catena. Therefore, we model the internally used hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n as a random oracle.
Theorem 10.6 (PRF Security of Catena). Let q denote the number of queries
made by an adversary and s a randomly chosen salt value. Furthermore, let H be
modelled as a random oracle and g ≥ g0 ≥ 1. Then, it holds that
AdvPRF
Catenaλ
(q, t) ≤ (q · g + q)2/2n +AdvcollFλ (g · q)
Proof. Suppose that ai = (pwd i || ui || si || g) represents the i-th query, where pwd i
denotes the password, ui denotes the tweak, si the salt, and g the garlic. For this
proof, we impose the reasonable condition that all queries of an adversary are distinct,
i.e., ai 6= aj for i 6= j.
Suppose that yj denotes the output of Fλ(g, a
j) of the j-th query (cf. Algorithm 18,
Line 3). Then, H(g || yj) is the output of Catenaλ(a
j). In the case that y1, . . . , yq
are pairwise distinct, an adversary A cannot distinguish H(g || ·) from a random
function $(·) since in the random-oracle model, both functions return a value chosen
uniformly at random from {0, 1}n.
Therefore, we have to upper bound the probability of the event yi = yj with i 6= j.
Due to the assumption that A′s queries are pairwise distinct, there must be at least
one collision for H or Fλ. For q queries, we have at most q(g + 1) invocations of H.
Thus, we can upper bound the collision probability by
(q · g + q)2/2n.
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Furthermore, we have q · g invocations of the memory-consuming function Fλ. We
can upper bound the probability of a collision by AdvcollFλ (g · q). Our claim follows
from the union bound. 
10.7. The Catena-KG Key-Derivation Function
In this section, we introduce Catena-KG – a mode of operation based on Catena,
which can be used to generate keys of different sizes (even larger than the natural
output size of Catena (cf. Algorithm 19). To provide uniqueness of the inputs, the
domain value d of the tweak is set to 1, i.e., the tweak u′ is given by
u′ ← 0x01 || λ || n || |s| || H(H).
Then, the call of Catena is followed by an output transformation that takes the
output x of Catena, a key identifier I, and a parameter ℓK for the key length as
input, and generates key material of the desired output size. Catena-KG is even
able to handle the generation of extra-long keys (longer than the output size of H) by
applyingH in CTR Mode [84]. Note that longer keys do not imply improved security,
in that context. The key identifier I is supposed to be used when different keys are
Algorithm 19 Catena-KG
Input: pwd {Password}, u′ {Tweak}, s {Salt}, g {Garlic}, I {Key Identifier}
Output: K {ℓK-Bit Key Derived from the Password}
1: x← Catenaλ(pwd , u
′, s, g)
2: K ← ∅
3: for i = 1, . . . , ⌈ℓK/n⌉ do
4: K ← K || H(i || I || ℓK || x)
5: end for
6: return Truncate(K, ℓK) {truncate k to the first ℓK bits}
generated from the same password. For example, when Alice and Bob set up a secure
connection, they may need four keys: An encryption and a message-authentication
key for messages from Alice to Bob, and another two keys for the opposite direction.
One could argue that I should also become part of the associated data. Actually,
this would be a bad move. Setting up the connection would require legitimate users
to run Catena several times. But, the adversary can search for the password for one
key, and just derive the other keys, once that password has been found. Instead, one
should rather employ a single call to Catena with larger security parameters and
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then run the output transformation for each key. In contrast to the password-hashing
scenario, where a user want to log in without noticeable delay, users may tolerate
a delay of several seconds to derive an encryption key from a password [231], e.g.,
when setting up a secure connection, or when mounting a cryptographic file system.
Thus, we recommend to use higher values for g for key-derivation.
Security Analysis. It is easy to see thatCatena-KG inherits its λ-memory-hardness
from Catena since it invokes Catena (Line 1 of Algorithm 19). Next, we show the
PRF security of Catena-KG in the random-oracle model.
Theorem 10.7 (Catena-KG Security). Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a random
function. Then, for g ≥ g0 ≥ 1, it holds that
AdvPRF
Catena-KGλ
(q, t) ≤ (q · g + q)2/2n +AdvcollFλ (g · q)
Proof. For the sake of simplification, we omit the truncation step and let the adver-
sary always get access to the untruncated key K. Since H is a random function, the
only chance for an adversary to distinguishCatena-KG(H,λ,g)(·) from a random n-bit
function is an input collision in Line 4 of Algorithm 19. Thus we have to upper bound
the probability that two outputs of Catena λ collide. Let a
i = (pwd i || ui || si || gi)
denote the i-the query, where pwd i denotes the password, ui denotes the tweak, si
the salt, and gi the garlic. A collision between two distinct queries ai and aj , i.e.,
Catenaλ(a
i) = Catenaλ(a
j) with ai 6= aj , implies a collision in H. The probability
for this event can be upper bounded by
(q · g + q)2/2n +AdvcollFλ (g · q),
using similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 10.10. 
10.8. Catena-DBG
In this section we introduce Catena-DBG, a concrete instantiation of Catena
where Fλ is instantiated with the Double Butterfly Hashing (DBH) operation that is
based on a stack of λ G-superconcentrators. The following definition of a G-super-
concentrator is a slightly adapted version of that introduced in [151].
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Figure 10.1.: A Cooley-Tukey FFT graph with eight input and output vertices.
Definition 10.8 (G-Superconcentrator). A Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) with
a set of vertices V and a set of edges E, a bounded indegree, G inputs, and G outputs
is called a G-superconcentrator if for every k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ G and for every pair
of subsets V1 ⊂ V of k inputs and V2 ⊂ V of k outputs, there are k vertex-disjoint
paths connecting the vertices in V1 to the vertices in V2.
Double Butterfly Graph (DBG). A DBG is a G-superconcentrator which is de-
fined by the graph representation of two back-to-back placed Fast Fourier Trans-
form (FFT) [53]. More detailed, it is a representation of twice the Cooley-Tukey
FFT algorithm [65] omitting one row in the middle (see Figure 10.1 for an example
where g = 3). Therefore, a DBG consists of 2g rows.
Based on the DBG we define the sequential and stacked (DBGgλ) where the security
parameters λ and g determine the depth ( number of stacked superconcentrators)
and the width ( number of nodes per row, i.e., 2g), respectively. In the following,
we denote vki,j as the j-th vertex in the i-th row of the k-th superconcentrator. Note
that in this thesis we use the vertices vk0,j and v
k−1
2g−1,j as synonyms since due to the
stacking of λ DBGs the last row of the k − 1-th DBG is identical to the first row of
the k-th DBG.
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front
vertical sequential + connecting layer
back
diagonal
Figure 10.2.: Types of edges of an (3, 1)-Double Butterfly Graph.
Definition 10.9 (DBGgλ). Fix two integers g, λ ≥ 1, then the (g, λ)-Double Butter-
fly Graph (DBGgλ) Π(V , E) consists of 2
g(λ(2g − 1) + 1) vertices2g−2⋃
i=0
2g−1⋃
j=0
λ⋃
k=1
{vki.j}
 ∪
2g−1⋃
j=0
{vλ2g−1,j}

and λ · (2g − 1) · (3 · 2g) + 2g − 1 edges
• vertical: 2g · (λ · (2g − 1)) edges
2g−2⋃
i=0
2g−1⋃
j=0
λ⋃
k=1
{vki,j , v
k
i+1,j}
• diagonal: 2g · λ · g + 2g · λ · (g − 1) edges
λ⋃
k=1
2g−1⋃
j=0
(g−1⋃
i=0
{vki,j , v
k
i+1,j⊕2g−1−i}
)
∪
2g−2⋃
i=g
{vki,j , v
k
i+1,j⊕2i−(g−1)
}

• sequential: (2g − 1) · (λ · (2g − 1) + 1) edges2g−1⋃
i=1
2g−2⋃
j=0
λ⋃
k=1
{vki,j , v
k
i,j+1}
 ∪
2g−2⋃
j=0
{vλ2g−1,j , v
λ
2g−1,j+1}

• connecting layer: λ · (2g − 1) edges
2g−2⋃
i=1
λ⋃
k=1
{vki,2g−1, v
k
i+1,0}
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Figure 10.3.: An (3, 1)-Double Butterfly Graph.
For the parameter set g = 3 and λ = 1 Figure 10.2 illustrates the individual types
of edges we use in our Definition above. Moreover, an example for an (3, 1)-Double
Butterfly Graph (DBG) Figure 10.3.
Double Butterfly Hashing (DBH). The DBHgλ operation is defined in Algorithm 20.
The structure is based of a DBGgλ. Note that the function σ (see Lines 7 and 9) is
given by
σ(g, i, j) =
{
j ⊕ 2g−1−i if 0 ≤ i ≤ g − 1,
j ⊕ 2i−(g−1) otherwise.
Thus, σ determines the indices of the vertices of the diagonal edges.
Since the security of Catena in terms of password hashing is based on a time-
memory tradeoff, it is desired to implement it in an efficient way, making it possible
to increase the required memory. We recommend BLAKE2b [13] as the underlying
hash function, implying a block size of 1024 bits with 512 bits of output. Thus, it can
process two input blocks within one compression function call. For Catena-DBG,
we cannot simply concatenate the inputs to the hash function H while keeping the
same performance per hash function call, i.e., three inputs to H require two com-
pression function calls. Therefore, we compute H(X,Y, Z) = H(X,⊕Y || Z) instead
of H(X,Y, Z) = H(X || Y || Z). Obviously, this doubles the probability of input
collisions. Nevertheless, for a 512-bit hash function, the advantage for an adversary
is still negligible.
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Algorithm 20 Double Butterfly Hashing (DBH)
Input: g {Garlic}, x {Value to hash}, λ {Depth}, H {Hash Function}
Output: x {Password Hash}
1: v0 ← H(x)
2: for i = 1, . . . , 2g − 1 do
3: vi ← H(vi−1)
4: end for
5: for k = 1, . . . , λ do
6: for i = 1, . . . , 2g − 1 do
7: r0 ← H(v2g−1 ⊕ v0 || vσ(g,0,j))
8: for j = 1, . . . , 2g − 1 do
9: ri ← H(ri−1 ⊕ vi || vσ(g,i,j))
10: end for
11: ~v ← ~r
12: end for
13: end for
14: return x← v2g−1
10.9. Analysis of Catena-DBG
Next, we discuss the security of Catena-DBG against side-channel attacks. Fur-
thermore, we discuss the memory-hardness and collision resistance of the DBHgλ op-
eration.
10.9.1. Side-Channel Attacks and Collision Resistance
Straightforward implementations of Catena-DBG have neither password-dependent
memory-access pattern nor have they password-dependent branches. Therefore, our
proposed instantiation of Catena is resistant against cache-timing attacks.
Considering a malicious garbage collector, Algorithm 20 exposes two arrays, namely
v and r. Both are overwritten multiple times. Therefore, Catena-DBG is resistant
against garbage-collector attacks. Note that Catena-DBG with some λ ≥ 2 is at
least as resistant to garbage-collector attacks as the same variant with λ− 1 without
a malicious garbage collector.
Next, we analyze the collsion resistance of DBHgλ. Therefore, we model the inter-
nally used hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n as a random oracle.
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Theorem 10.10 (Collision Security of DBHgλ). Let q denote the number of
queries. Furthermore, let H be modelled as a random oracle for some fixed integers
g, g0, λ ≥ 1 with g ≥ g0 and G = 2
g. Then, it holds that
AdvcollDBHgλ
(q, t) ≤
(q · λ · g)2
2n−2g−3
.
Proof. From Algorithm 20 it is easy to see that collision DBHgλ(x) = DBH
g
λ(x
′) for
x 6= x′ implies either a input or output collision for H.
For our analysis, we replace the random oracle H by H′(x) := H(truncaten(x))
that truncates any input to n bits before hashing. Thus, any collision in the first n
bits H in Line 7 and 9 of Algorithm 20 leads to a collision, regardless of the remaining
inputs.
Output Collision. In this case, we can upper bound the collision probability of H by
deducing the total amount of invocations of H′ per query. There are G invocations
of H′ in Lines 1–4. of Algorithm 20. In addition, there are λ(2g− 1)G invocations in
Lines 5-14 of Algorithm 20. In total, we have λ2gG invocations. Since H is modelled
as a random oracle, we can upper bound the collision probability for q queries by
(q · λ · 2g ·G)2
2n
≤
q2λ2g2
2n−2g−2
.
Input Collision. In this case, we have to take into account that a input collision for
distinct queries a and b in Line 7 and 9 can occur:
va2g−1 ⊕ v
a
0 = v
b
2g−1 ⊕ v
b
0 (Algorithm 20, Line 7)
or
rai−1 ⊕ v
a
i = r
b
i−1 ⊕ v
b
i (Algorithm 20, Line 9).
For each query this can happen λ · (2g − 1) · 2g times. Note that all values vi, ri are
outputs from the random oracle H′, except the initial value for v0. Hence, we can
upper bound the collision probability for this event by
(qλ · (2g − 1) · 2g)2
2n
≤
q2λ2g2
2n−2g−2
.
Our claim follows from the union bound. 
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10.9.2. Memory Hardness.
In 1970, Hewitt and Paterson introduced a method for analyzing Time-Memory
Tradeoffs (TMTOs) on directed acyclic graphs [189], called pebble game. While their
method has been known for decades, it was recently used in a cryptographic context,
see e.g., [86]. In general, a pebble game is a common model to derive and analyze
TMTOs as shown in [216, 217, 222, 227, 229].
The pebble-game model is restricted to DAGs with bounded in-degree and can be
seen as a single-player game. Let Π(V , E) be a DAG and let G = |V| be the number
of vertices within Π(V , E). In the setup phase of the game, the player gets S pebbles
(tokens) with S ≤ G. A pebble can be placed (pebble) or be removed (unpebble) from
a vertex v ∈ V under certain requirements:
1. A pebble may be removed from a vertex v at any time.
2. A pebble can be placed on a vertex v if all predecessors of the vertex v are
marked.
3. If all immediate predecessors of an unpebbled vertex v are marked, a pebble
may be moved from a predecessor of v to v.
A move is the application of either the second or the third action stated above. The
goal of the game is to pebble Π, i.e., to mark all vertices of the graph Π at least once.
The total amount of moves represent the computational costs.
In [151], Lengauer and Tarjan have already analyzed the TMTO for a stack of λ G-
superconcentrators. Since the double-butterfly is a special form of aG-superconcentrators
there bound also holds for DBGgλ.
Theorem 10.11 (TMTO for a stack of λ G-Superconcentrators [151]). For
pebbling a stack of λ G-Superconcentrators using S ≤ G/20 pebbles it holds that
T ≥ G
(
λG
64S
)λ
.
Note that the DBH operation computes a special variations of the DBGgλ where
each vertex represents the the hash values of its direct predecessors. Thus, DBHgλ
and therefore Catena-DBG inherits the λ-memory hardness from DBGgλ.
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Discussion. We have to point out that the computational effort for DBHgλ with
reasonable values for G, e.g., G ∈ [217, 221], may stress the patience of many users
since the number of vertices and edges grows logarithmic with G. Thus, it remains an
open research problem to find a G-superconcentrator – or any other λ-memory-hard
function – that can be computed more efficiently than a DBHgλ.
10.10. Results Summary
We introduced a new class of side-channel attacks, called garbage-collector attack,
which bases on a malicious garbage collector. We showed that the common password
scrambler scrypt is vulnerable to this kind of attacks. Furthermore, we presented
a (theoretical) cache-timing attack on scrypt that exploits its password-dependent
memory-access pattern. Both attacks allows an adversary to construct a memoryless
password filter that enables massively-parallel password-guessing attacks. Moreover,
we show that our attacks work even without knowledge of the password hash. All
regular implementations, i.e., implementations that are not hardened against side-
channel attacks, of password scramblers with a password-dependent memory-access
pattern appear to be vulnerable to these attacks.
As a remedy, we introduced a novel password-scrambler framework Catena, which
is based on a λ-memory-hard function. It is the first framework which naturally
supports client-independent updates and server relief. It consists of two security
parameters λ (depth) and g (garlic), where λ reflects the memory hardness and g the
memory consumption. In addition, we have shown that Catena is provably secure
in the random oracle model.
Furthermore, we presented a DBH based instantiatation ofCatena, Catena-DBG.
Note that DBH basically computes a stack of several Double Butterfly Graph where
each vertex of the graph is the hash value of its direct predecessors.
Finally, we want to stress out that the limited practicality of this implementation.
There is a good chance that the runtime of Catena-DBG might exceed the patience
of many users.
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11
Conclusion
Science never solves a problem
without creating ten more.
George Bernard Shaw
In this section we conclude this thesis by giving a brief summary of the main contri-
butions and emphasize some further work as well as open research topics.
11.1. Summary
Robustness. One of the main topics of this thesis is the analysis and design of
misuse-resistant authenticated encryption schemes. The field of robust authenticated
encryption schemes was pioneered by Rogaway and Shrimpton [210] who introduced
the notion of (nonce-) misuse resistance in 2006. During our research we came up
with a generalized definition of robustness as well as the security notion of decryption
misuse.
Moreover, we introduced two novel on-line authenticated encryption schemes: McOE
and COFFE. The latter one is the first provably secure OAE scheme that has been
designed for the usage of a hash function rather than a block cipher as the underlying
primitive. In contrast to conventional AE schemes, COFFE also provides ciphertext
integrity in the nonce-misuse scenario. The former one,McOE, was presented at FSE
2012 [98]. It was the first robust OAE scheme published by then. This academic work
inspired fellow researchers to introduce new nonce-misuse resistant OAE schemes
[5, 7, 73]. Our work seem to have influenced the submission requirements of the
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upcoming Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and
Robustness (CAESAR):
. . . that the cipher is designed to provide the maximum possible robustness
against message-number reuse1.
We expect that our contributions in terms of nonce- and decryption-misuse resistance
will foster misuse awareness in future (O)AE scheme designs. Furthermore, we do
believe that providing a second line of defence – by applying robust authenticated
encryption – helps to make the IT-world a little bit more secure.
Hash Function Design. Another main topic of this work is the presentation of
Twisterπ, a family of cryptographic hash functions. It is a revised version of the
SHA-3 submission Twister [88] that has some vulnerabilities against certain re-
bound attacks [166]. In the revision process we applied effective countermeasures to
overcome those weaknesses. Until now, no attacks are known.
Password Scrambler. Inspired by the discovery of cache-timing attacks on scrypt,
we designed Catena, the first provably secure and memory-consuming password
scrambler that does not only thwart GPU-based attacks, but also provide a pass-
word independent memory-access pattern to render cache-timing attacks infeasible.
Furthermore, Catena naturally supports client-independent updates and server re-
lief, and it is provable secure in the random oracle model. The program chair of the
Password Hashing Competition (PHC) has serendipitously added support for client-
independent update as a functional requirement and cache-timing resistance as a
security requirement2. Finally, we hope that our contribution lay the groundwork for
all subsequent password-hashing schemes.
11.2. Further Research
Due to the CAESAR contest, the design and analysis of authenticated encryption
schemes is a hot topic in the field of symmetric cryptography. Inside the cryptographic
community, there is a clear consensus about the fact that the notion of secure AE
(CCA3 security) is the de facto gold standard for the vast majority of secure channels.
Nevertheless, there are still some open research topics.
1http://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-call.html
2https://password-hashing.net/call.html
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• Is it possible to design an integrated tweakable block cipher E˜ ∈ Block(k, u, n)
which is more efficient than a constructed one? Instances of McOE or TC1
[211] would greatly benefit from such a primitive.
• What is about the software and hardware efficiency of such integrated primi-
tives?
• McOE is highly sequential. Is it possible to construct a provably secure on-line
authenticated encryption scheme which is both parallel and robust?
• Are there, apart from nonce and decryption misuse, any other misuse scenarios
that should be taken into account by the cryptographic community?
• Shall possible security issues in the case of robustness also be discussed in public-
key cryptography, e.g., digital signatures or fully homomorphic encryption?
Cryptographers have almost orphaned the field of password-hashing schemes in spite
of the medial omnipresence of leaked password databases. Therefore, designing a
good password-hashing scheme is more an art than a science. The PHC tries to raise
the awareness of this research topic. Imperatively, a solid theoretic foundation is
needed, i.e., rigorous analysis, formal definitions, and security notions.
• Is it possible to design a fast and parameterizable cryptographic hash function
which can be turned – by an appropriate parameter choice – into a memory-
hard KDF or password scrambler?
• How efficient would such a construction be in soft- or hardware?
• Are there any other relevant properties research should take a look at?
• Which reasonable security notions should become the gold standard for password-
hashing schemes?
• Is it possible to construct a λ-memory hard function that is more efficient than
our proposed DBG operation? For example, does a scalable G-superconentrator
exist, that can be computed more efficently, i.e., that has a linear number of
edges and vertices?
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A
Twisterπ: Test Vectors
A.1. Twisterπ-256
Input: 61 62 63 (3 octets)
Output: 12 f6 c9 7c 5a 07 22 ad a 16 0d 1c 92
32 f8 9d ed 3e ba e7 f8 39 14 28 3c 91
4f b1 41 17 71 83
(32 octets)
Input: 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 62 63 64 65 66
67 68 69 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 64 65
66 67 68 69 6a 6b 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b
6c 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 67 68 69 6a
6b 6c 6d 6e 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 69
6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f
70 71 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 6c 6d 6e
6f 70 71 72 73 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74 75
(112 octets)
Output: 48 41 3c 68 03 45 7b 8f d9 22 23 10 a8
43 ef 0d 1d 3a 67 9b 1f a3 5e 0d 44 99
37 f9 d3 b7 8c 3e
(32 octets)
Input: 61 61 61 61 61 61 ...61 61 61 61 61 61 (1,000,000 octets)
Output: 5e ab cc 39 e6 0e e7 94 42 9d 88 0b 74
9b f3 13 47 58 52 88 37 ac 49 d7 c1 b6
16 50 39 b4 6b 9c
(32 octets)
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A. Twisterπ: Test Vectors
A.2. Twisterπ-512
Input: 61 62 63 (3 octets)
Output: d9 2e 69 c1 86 9e 0c c1 17 06 77 fc fb
79 b4 33 ea b9 23 93 b6 59 07 bb d1 69
0e f2 1f 69 d8 3a 72 ae 44 30 84 56 f0
49 e6 ec 38 64 bc 37 7a 47 76 02 ee 9e
98 67 48 50 09 66 6f 60 80 1d 16 2a
(64 octets)
Input: 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 62 63 64 65 66
67 68 69 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 64 65
66 67 68 69 6a 6b 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b
6c 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 67 68 69 6a
6b 6c 6d 6e 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 69
6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f
70 71 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 6c 6d 6e
6f 70 71 72 73 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74 75
(112 octets)
Output: b0 e3 4b aa 3d a1 54 87 0f 1f 7a c4 ef
a1 5e 33 d6 d3 23 f0 74 c6 2f e1 40 ea
37 57 9e ee 1a 2e 4b ce 3e be 6c 0e 40
56 bb 83 57 e8 41 b0 05 0e 3d df ea e3
5a 02 49 0c ac 0f e0 1b dd 4a 7f f4
(64 octets)
Input: 61 61 61 61 61 61 ...61 61 61 61 61 61 (1,000,000 octets)
Output: 8b 99 35 5a 36 c6 29 53 62 02 4a de 91
94 b3 ab a9 d1 d0 b9 18 ce e4 c4 d2 2e
0d 92 bc ca 74 af 9e ad d3 9e 56 6e 4a
b6 b7 68 2b c6 14 9e 33 ec 37 d0 69 83
1e c1 3e fd f5 2e e3 3b 9a d9 36 c3
(64 octets)
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benchmarks, 89
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NDMA advantage, 39
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password recovery advantage, 129
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pebble game, 148
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provable security, 1
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related key attacks, 19
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